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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation documents how the U.S. national perspective toward ballistic 
nuclear missiles changed dramatically between 1957 and 1967 and how the actions and 
attitudes of this time brought about long term difficulties for the nation, the Air Force, 
and the missile community.  In 1957, national leaders believed that ballistic missiles 
would replace the manned bomber and be used to win an anticipated third world war 
between communist and capitalist nations.  Only ten years later, the United States was 
deep into a limited war in Vietnam and had all but proscribed the use of nuclear 
missiles.  This dissertation uses oral histories, memoirs, service school theses, and 
formerly classified government documents and histories to determine how and why the 
nation changed its outlook on nuclear ballistic missiles so quickly.   The dissertation 
contends that because scientists and engineers created the revolutionary weapon at 
the beginning of the Cold War, when the U.S. and U.S.S.R. were struggling for influence 
and power, many national leaders urged the military to design and build nuclear 
ballistic missiles before the Soviet Union could do so.  This pressure prompted the 
Army, the Navy, and the Air Force to compete for the new mission and wasted billions 
of dollars as the services built duplicative, unreliable and unsafe liquid fueled missiles 
that were only in use for a few years.  Then, as the Cuban Missile Crisis revealed the 
true threat of nuclear conflict, the perspective towards nuclear missiles changed 
considerably. 
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The dissertation also argues that the Air Force garnered control of the new 
capability, primarily to retain and protect their manned strategic air mission, so it chose 
not to deal with inherent problems of missile duty that were revealed almost 
immediately, such as loneliness, boredom, tedium, and an inability to find a sense of 
accomplishment.  Once U.S. political leaders turned their focus away from nuclear war 
and toward the Vietnam conflict, the Air Force relegated the missileers -- those 
selected to operate the new missiles -- to secondary status, allowing their concerns to 
fester for decades.  Missileers created a proud, but dysfunctional organization that 
rewarded what Secretary of the Air Force Deborah Lee James in 2014 called unrealistic 
test scores rather than operational experience and expertise.  At the same time, the Air 
Force intensified an unhealthy focus on manned flight that prevented the service from 
most effectively incorporating and using advances in technology to defend the nation. 
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1. INTRODUCTION AND HISTORIOGRAPHY
Introduction 
In December of 1957, many people in the United States perceived the nuclear 
intercontinental ballistic missile as the "ultimate weapon."1   By tying the newly 
developed hydrogen bomb to the ballistic missile and giving it intercontinental range, 
scientists had created a revolution in military affairs as great as that of gunpowder or 
the rifled barrel.  The ballistic nuclear missile could devastate portions of an enemy 
country in minutes and there was no defense against it.2  Although only one working 
ballistic missile with intercontinental range had been successfully launched at the time, 
an early Atlas missile, the hopes of many Americans' future peace and security lay in 
this missile and its successors, already under development.3   
The Air Force planned to recruit capable and highly educated men to operate 
and maintain these awesome weapons for the defense of the nation and, American 
leaders proclaimed, for the protection of Europe, Asia, and other areas.  These men 
were to guide the Air Force and the United States into a future of stability and 
international harmony through strength.  Their own futures seemed boundless.4   
Less than ten years later, the Atlas missile was being decommissioned, along 
with the Titan I, the Thor, and the Jupiter, other nuclear missiles that were developed 




were retained, but held only as a necessary deterrent to the use of enemy nuclear 
weapons while the nation focused on a "limited war."5  In fact, on September 18, 1967, 
the official who oversaw the largest buildup of U.S. ballistic missiles, Secretary of 
Defense Robert McNamara, stated, "I want, however, to make one point patently clear:  
our current numerical superiority over the Soviet Union in reliable, accurate and 
effective warheads is both greater than we had originally planned and in fact more than 
we require."6  He continued, "Moreover, in the larger equation of security, our 
'superiority' is of limited significance, since even with our current superiority, or indeed 
with any numerical superiority realistically attainable, the blunt inescapable fact 
remains that the Soviet Union could still -- with its present forces -- effectively destroy 
the United States, even after absorbing the full weight of an American first strike."7 
 As McNamara shifted his focus to non-nuclear combat, the Air Force relegated 
missiles to a minor position, significantly behind flying operations and support to flying 
operations, and ignored the concerns of the missileers who controlled them.  The 
service began to treat these men -- for they were all men at the time -- who controlled 
these missiles as second-class citizens, regarding them as support personnel rather 
than warfighters.8   
 But what led to such a development?  How did such a promising field of military 
weaponry and its adherents drop so quickly in status?  To be sure, this result was not 
predetermined.  As the U.S. Air Force created its missile force, the Soviet Union built its 




the primary driver in strategic force decisions, since technological limitations largely 
dictated the shape and capabilities of the forces."9  The Soviets developed the atomic 
bomb, then the hydrogen bomb.  They created intercontinental bombers, followed by 
intercontinental ballistic missiles.  However, in the Soviet Union, the destiny of these 
missiles and the men who controlled them followed a much different pattern.    
 Following Joseph Stalin's death in 1953, a power struggle at the highest levels 
resulted in the eventual ascendency of Nikita Khrushchev.    Because Khrushchev was 
more concerned with consolidating power than strategic weapons, engineers and the 
budding aerospace industry promoted and developed the ballistic missiles, garnering 
"only the most grudging support of the military."  However, when the Soviets launched 
Sputnik, the first earth satellite, Krushchev became convinced of their value and 
determined that future Soviet military power would be centered on the nuclear 
missile.10  He "declared that 'The present period is something of a turning point.  
Military specialists believe that airplanes, bombers and fighters, are in their decline . . . .  
Fighter and bomber airplanes can now be put into museums."11  
 Initially, all Russian rocket forces were placed under the Soviet Ground Forces 
commander of artillery.  They were then designated as brigades under the Supreme 
High Command Reserve (RVGK).  In 1953, the Soviets created the Directorate of the 
Deputy Artillery Commander for Special Equipment (UZKA) to create and produce 
missiles and launch vehicles for nuclear weapons.  Soon after, these organizations were 




engineering.   In August 1958, strategic missiles were separated from tactical missiles, 
and on December 17, 1959, as the military placed the new intercontinental ballistic R-7 
missiles into the weapons inventory, the Council of Ministers "established a new 
service of the armed forces, the Strategic Rocket Forces (RVSN)."12  This organization 
and the Soviet missileers who served in it achieved and continued to retain exceptional 
esteem and pride even through the demise of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, 
unlike their counterparts in the United States.13  
 Nonetheless, this study is not a comparison between Soviet and U.S. missileers.  
Rather, it will analyze how and why the United States Air Force missile community 
evolved as it did rather than how it was expected to progress.  This project will argue 
that three key factors powerfully shaped the perception and treatment of ballistic 
missiles in the United States and those who operated them, ensuring that neither the 
missiles nor the missileers attained their advertised prominence.  It will also contend 
that the decisions made about the trajectory of the missiles' potential harmed both the 
military personnel who controlled the missiles and, because of the lesson taken from 
these decisions, the Air Force. 
 The study will first show that missiles were oversold as the ultimate weapon 
during a time of national political turmoil and global discord.  Rapid scientific advances 
occurring as a Cold War escalated between two former allies, specifically during the 
decade between 1947 and 1957, caused the United States to develop and build 




who had just witnessed the most terrible and costly war the world had ever seen were 
determined to stay militarily ahead of their greatest international adversary as the two 
superpowers began to compete for global influence and prepare for conflict.  The 
credible fear of a near-term World War III also influenced the public's perception of 
nuclear warfare.  Consequently, both nations quickly developed and immediately 
incorporated the powerful new technology into their war plans. 
 In the United States, especially after the Soviet Union launched Sputnik, both 
Democrats and Republicans endeavored to prove their support for the new weapons 
and the military services threw themselves into the effort in an attempt to not be left 
behind.  Numerous careers were made and broken on the premise of whether the 
United States was behind the Soviet Union in its ability to launch nuclear ballistic 
missiles.  The purported "missile gap" notably influenced the election of the nation's 
thirty-fifth president.14  Even though President Dwight Eisenhower knew there was no 
"missile gap" and actively argued the case throughout his term of office, he too was 
forced to participate in this dangerous race, "direct[ing] that the Intercontinental 
Ballistic Missile research and development program be accorded the highest national 
priority, above any and all other programs."15  This ensured missiles' high standing in 
the short term, but tied their value to political vagaries, potentially setting them up for 
a future demise. 
 The second contributing factor was the creation of a separate Air Force and the 




many pilots of the need to protect and prize their cherished flying mission against any 
and all competitors.  Many perceived the new ballistic missile as the natural 
replacement for the manned strategic bomber.  The Air Force leaders, in response, 
believed they could best protect the manned bomber and their domination of the 
strategic air mission by controlling the new weapon so that they could determine its 
future.16  The Army, conversely,  stung from the loss of the Air Corps, especially as the 
Air Force became the nation's dominant military capability under President 
Eisenhower, believed the ballistic missile should belong with the ground forces.  The 
Navy, too, recognized that this awesome new weapon had caught the attention of the 
nation and held the promise of extravagant funding and historical prominence.   
Therefore, each of the three major services struggled mightily to obtain control of the 
new mission in order to expand their credibility and funding, if not to ensure their 
survival.17  Thus, although the first successful intercontinental ballistic missile was not 
built until 1957, this study will examine how the creation of a separate Air Force in 
1947 influenced the incorporation of the ballistic missile into the new service and 
prejudiced its treatment toward the new capability after it was assimilated and political 
leaders returned their focus to limited war. 
 The third contributing factor, the Cuban Missile Crisis -- arguably the pinnacle of 
success for U.S. Air Force missileers -- rather than validating the nation's perception 
that missiles were the trend of future military operations, convinced the nation and its 




Therefore, as the nation became enmeshed in the Vietnam conflict, neither the 
Kennedy nor the Johnson administration seriously considered the first use of nuclear 
weapons.  The political leaders became focused on fighting the war with conventional 
weapons, allowing the Air Force leaders to transfer money, personnel, and prestige 
away from the missiles and back to the flying mission. 
 Thus, as missileers moved into their second decade of existence, the meteoric 
rise that was promised to them disappeared as quickly as it had developed.  They were 
no longer the exalted combatants of the future, but a proud, mostly unnoticed and 
unappreciated cohort of warriors tied to the monotonous grind of underground, "push-
button" warfare.  Many of the concerns they had expressed, including the loneliness 
and tedium of missile duties, unfulfilled job fulfillment, and poor promotion 
opportunities, were left to fester for decades. 
 
Significance and Historiography 
 
 Historians have written numerous tomes about the U.S. Air Force and its pilots, 
but few have fully addressed the Air Force's ballistic missiles.  Walter Boyne's A History 
of the U.S. Air Force, 1947-1997 is a perfect example.18  Boyne chronicles the growth of 
the Air Force, noting briefly the service's absorption of missiles, but spending the vast 
majority of his energy detailing the lives of pilots and their aircraft.  In a similar manner, 




Command's culture and addresses Strategic Air Command's pilot culture rather than 
that of the missileers.19   Bernard Nalty's collected work, Winged Shield, Winged Sword, 
spends just 8 pages of a 520 page volume on missiles, but even then he only addresses 
the development and advances in missile technology rather than their incorporation 
and does not deal with their demise at all.20   
 By comparison, only a few authors have focused on the history of 
intercontinental ballistic missiles.  Almost all, like Nalty, concentrate their efforts on 
how missiles were created, neglecting their incorporation into the service and 
operational use.  Roy Neal interviewed the scientists and engineers who developed the 
Minuteman for the Air Force to write Ace in the Hole.21  Three years later, Ernest 
Schwiebert published A History of the U.S. Air Force Ballistic Missiles, working with 
many of the same people to detail the scientific and logistical development of the Atlas, 
Titan, and Minuteman missiles.22  Jacob Neufeld, in The Development of Ballistic 
Missiles in the United States Air Force, 1945-1960 updated Schwiebert's work in 1990.23  
Each of these authors remained centered on the scientific and engineering aspects of 
the intercontinental ballistic missile rather than their operational maturity.   
 Edmund Beard, in Developing the ICBM:  A Study in Bureaucratic Politics, 
expanded the study of missiles to reveal the bureaucratic and political machinations 
involved in building the ballistic missile and instigated the most prolific argument on 
the subject by stating that Air Force leaders did not want the missile to succeed as they 




against Beard's thesis in "The United States Air Force and the Emergence of the 
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, 1945-1954."25  Once again, both remain fixed in the 
creation of missiles rather than addressing what happened to them after their 
construction. 
 Desmond Ball, in Politics and Force Levels:  The Strategic Missile Program of the 
Kennedy Administration, broadened the focus again to include the influence of the 
political arena on missiles and vice versa.26  Later, Neil Sheehan entered the fray, 
authoring A Fiery Peace in a Cold War:  Bernard Schriever and the Ultimate Weapon, in 
2009. 27   All of these authors center on missiles as a piece of technology or on the 
political machinations involved in gaining control of and building such weapons rather 
than on how they were incorporated into the Air Force inventory as a key weapon in 
national defense or on the struggles of the personnel assigned to control them. 
 In 1958, Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth Gantz gathered the writings of 
prominent leaders involved in creating ICBMs to edit The United States Air Force Report 
on the Ballistic Missile:  Its Technology, Logistics, and Strategy.28  They wrote about the 
technology of the missile, its strategic place in the Air Force, the concerns finding 
appropriate men to control the missile, the training these men would need, and many 
other fascinating topics.  Nonetheless, when the book was written, there were no 
operational ICBMs in America, so the book is full of predictions rather than descriptions 




  James Baar and William E. Howard followed up with an  authoritative book, 
Combat Missileman, that relied on interviews and personal experiences to reveal the 
struggle of the early missileers, but the book contains no footnotes and was published 
in 1961, too early to analyze how the missile culture would develop or to comprehend 
what would happen by the end of the 1960s.29  Bernard Brodie's Strategy in the Missile 
Age deals with the changes nuclear missiles produced in military capability and their 
potential for use in warfare, but remains centered on theory rather than the activities 
of missile units and personnel.  In addition, being published in 1959, Brodie, like Baar 
and Howard, is not able to consider later events.30   
 Lastly, in 2012, David Spires wrote On Alert:  An Operational History of the 
United States Air Force Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Program, 1945-2011.31  This 
tome is one of the few that deal with the operations of missiles and the day-to-day 
activities of missileers, but Spires focuses primarily on the time after 1965, with 
minimal concentration on the critical time period between 1957 and 1967.  This study 
intends to fill this historiographical chasm while placing the era into historical and 
political context by documenting the impact that the Cold War and establishment of 
the Air Force as a separate service had on the new ballistic missiles and those who 
worked with them. 
 One of the difficulties of analyzing the first decade of the ballistic missile in the 
Air Force is that most contemporary documents focus upon the scientific 




than on how the military incorporated  the new weapons.  Former Air Force historian 
Jacob Neufeld, in an interview with the author, revealed that no one at the time 
considered the human aspect of the missiles to be important.32  The few documents 
from the time that do focus on the incorporation of missiles into the Air Force remain 
difficult to obtain as many are still classified.33  This study will use personal interviews 
with former missileers and academic studies from the time to unearth new insights. 
 There are several major historiographical arguments dealing with the study of 
Air Force intercontinental ballistic missiles.  One revolves around whether Air Force 
leaders began working to design and build the ICBM at the end of World War II or 
whether the service only started to seriously undertake developing the missiles as a 
response to the political firestorm created by the launch of Sputnik.  This dissertation 
acknowledges that work began well before Sputnik, but also contends that the pace 
and funding wavered greatly until the Soviet threat appeared real.  A closely related 
argument is whether the Air Force developed and built the ICBM to become a 
significant part of its inventory or whether its leadership fought the other services for 
control of the new mission so that the service could retain the manned bomber as the 
premier weapon.  This study proposes that Air Force leaders were divided on their 
advocacy of missiles and outside forces greatly influenced their willingness and ability 
to actively incorporate the new weapons into their plans, but that when General Curtis 
LeMay became Chief of Staff in 1961, the forces against missiles prevailed.  This project 




including the Cuban Missile Crisis and the war in Vietnam, greatly influenced the 
nascent culture of missileers, preventing the group from adequately addressing 
significant concerns that haunted missileers to the twenty-first century. 
 Centered in this decade of study is one of the most influential events in 
twentieth century history: the Cuban Missile Crisis.  Although scholarship on this 
incident has expanded from the Soviet and U.S. political perspectives to acknowledging 
the many external occurrences that could have influenced the crisis, authors still have 
not investigated or analyzed how the crisis influenced the Air Force or its missileers.34  
As a result, no one to date has evaluated how this event created the impetus for a 
tremendous shift in perception of the nuclear ballistic missile.  Although it is not the 
primary focus, this dissertation also intends to help fill this gap in the historiography. 
 This dissertation will present its historical argument in a chronological narrative.  
Chapter 1 presented the thesis, and will provide the historical context and address the 
historiographical gap that this study is intended to fill.  Chapter 2 will address the 
creation of the nuclear ballistic missile and reveal how the nation's concerns over the 
emergent Cold War created a pressure to build the new capability quickly, before the 
Soviets could deploy a missile of their own.  Chapter 3 will focus on the interservice 
competition between the Air Force, Army, and Navy to control the missile, address the 
intraservice struggles within the Air Force over how to deal with the new weapon, and 
reveal the decisions that Air Force leaders finally made to build and incorporate what 




the problems caused by the rush to build and incorporate missiles into the Air Force, 
including damage to the missiles' credibility within the service and hostility engendered 
by their political favoritism.  Chapter 5 will consider the American political perception 
of missiles, addressing the Kennedy administration's move away from nuclear warfare, 
precipitated by the Cuban Missile Crisis.  Chapter 6 will analyze the impact of the 
Kennedy and Johnson administration's new perspective toward missiles on both the 
missile community and the Air Force, whose leaders learned an important, but possibly 






                                                 
[All references to newspapers are to Section ‘A’ unless indicated otherwise.] 
 1 Chuck Walker, who helped develop the Atlas missile while working as an engineer for 
Convair, believed so strongly about the ICBM being an ultimate weapon that he, with Joel 
Powell, titled their book Atlas:  The Ultimate Weapon (Burlington, Ont.:  Apogee Books, 2005).  
The Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy exclaimed about the ballistic missile, 
"This is truly the ultimate weapon."  "Findings and Recommendations Concerning the 
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile," Special Assistant to the President for National Security 
Affairs, NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries, Box 13, Missiles and Military Space Programs, 
Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas.  Hanson Baldwin, the military editor of the New York 
Times from 1937 to 1968, in an article about the ICBM, noted that "some military men have 
called [it] 'the ultimate weapon,' 'the absolute weapon,' -- 'the weapon that will rule the 
earth.'" Hanson himself deemed the ICBM "a supreme weapon of offense" and "the world's 
first unstoppable weapon."  Hanson W. Baldwin, "ICBM," Collier's Weekly (March 16, 1956), 23, 
75.  General Curtis LeMay admitted "I consider an intercontinental ballistic missile with a 
capability of instantaneous launch and with acceptable reliability, accuracy, and yield to be the 
ultimate weapon in the strategic inventory."  Curtis LeMay to Air Force Chief of Staff Nathan 
Twining, letter, Subject: (Uncl) SAC Position on Missiles, 26 November 1955, Digital National 
Security Archives, US Nuclear History Collection, Item #NH00547. 
(http://gateway.proquest.com.lib-ezproxy.tamu.edu:2048/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-
2004&res_dat=xri:dnsa&rft_dat=xri:dnsa:article:CNH00547).  Accessed 20 October 2014.  
Ironically, one of the people who refused to hold this view was the primary Air Force officer 
responsible for the development of the intercontinental ballistic missile, General Bernard 
Schriever, who said, "this should not imply that the ICBM and IRBM are 'ultimate weapons' as 
they are frequently called."  B. A. Schriever, "The USAF Ballistic Missile Program," Air University 
Quarterly Review Vol. 9, No. 3 (Summer 1957): 21.  See also James Baar and William E. Howard, 
Combat Missileman (New York:  Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1961), 19, who contended that 
the concept was not just an American thought, quoting from Voyennays Mysl (Military 
Thought) that "a sudden attack involving a massive use of new weapons may result in the rapid 
collapse of a state" and then defining the new weapons as "missiles -- ICBM's and IRBM's." 
 2 One way that scholars can be persuaded that the intercontinental ballistic missile was 
a true revolution in military affairs is the complete change from "total war" during World War I 
and World War II to "limited war" after the ICBMs were introduced.  Although the use of 
nuclear weapons were taken into account for the Korean conflict, the use of an ICBM in combat 
has never been seriously considered with the exception of the Cuban Missile Crisis, in which 
both sides refused to begin combat. Even after over fifty years, there is no effective defense 
against a ballistic nuclear missile and, although John Mueller, Atomic Obsession:  Nuclear 
Alarmism from Hiroshima to al-Qaeda (New York:  Oxford University Press, 2010), 1, 18, argues 
that "massive exaggerations of the physical effects of nuclear weapons have been very much 




                                                                                                                                                
fabricated for killing vast numbers of people in a short period of time." See also Lawrence 
Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (New York:  St Martin's Press, 1981), 152. 
 3 Edmund Beard, Developing the ICBM:  A Study in Bureaucratic Politics (New York:  
Columbia University Press, 1976), 210, states that "the first fully successful full-range Atlas 
flight occurred in November 1958, but Chapman, in Atlas:  The Story of a Missile (New York:  
Harper and Brothers, 1960), 132-33, details the story of the first successful "limited range test" 
on December 17, 1957.  Although the missile may not have traveled the entire intercontinental 
range on December 17, I consider December 1957 as the first successful launch.  The 
Encyclopedia Britannica categorizes ballistic missiles as short-range--effective to 300 miles, 
medium range--effective from 300 to 600 miles, intermediate-range--effective from 600 to 
3,300 miles, and intercontinental ballistic missiles--effective over more than 3,300 miles.  
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/290408/intermediate-range-ballistic-missile.  
Accessed June 1, 2015.  These categorizations were not as clearly defined in the 1950s, but this 
study will use these definitions for clarity unless otherwise stated. 
 4 Duane West to David Bath, email, September 10, 2014.  West, an early missileer who 
served in the 578th Strategic Missile Squadron, revealed that in 1961, his Air Force career 
counselor advised him to enter the ICBM career field as it was "the delivery system for a 
nuclear weapon of the future" and "jet bombers were the past."   
 5 McGeorge Bundy, President Lyndon Johnson's National Security Advisor declared, "by 
1964 [Johnson] was entirely clear in his own mind that he would have no interest whatever in 
ordering the use of even one [atomic] bomb, ever, except in the context of some 
overwhelmingly dangerous and direct confrontation with open Soviet aggression."  McGeorge 
Bundy, Danger and Survival:  Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York: 
Random House, 1988), 462.  The various missiles will be discussed at length in later chapters. 
 6 Robert McNamara, "American ABM Deployment," Survival:  Global Politics and 
Strategy 9: 11 (1967): 342.  See also August 9, 1967 draft "Remarks by Robert S. McNamara 
before UPI editors and publishers," 8, National Security File, Agency File, Box 12, Defense, 
Department of - August 1967, Vol V [2 of 2], Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, 
Texas.  For McNamara's support of the ICBM, see Christopher Preble, John F. Kennedy and the 
Missile Gap (Dekalb:  Northern Illinois University Press, 2004), 170, where Preble contends that 
"the Kennedy administration had subsequently boosted the Minuteman program, effectively 
doubling Minuteman capacity beyond that programmed by the Eisenhower administration." 
 7 Ibid. 
 8 Leon Hojegian, interview with the author, October 14, 2014.  Hojegian recalled being 
turned away from entering the Officers' Club while wearing his missile "whites" after being told 
that only pilots could wear operational uniforms in the club.  Eric Schlosser, Command and 
Control:  Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Incident, and the Illusion of Safety (New York:  




                                                                                                                                                
bomber pilots each claimed to be at the top.  Despite their intense rivalry, the pilots agreed on 
at least one thing:  missileers occupied a rung far below them.  Serving in an underground 
control center lacked the glamour of flying sorties into enemy territory or gaining command of 
the skies."  The term for the personnel who controlled and maintained the missiles and 
prepared for their potential launch has changed over the years, including missilemen (as all of 
the first personnel were men) and missileers.  This paper will use the term missileers as that is 
the current terminology, except where quoting sources. 
 
 9 Steven J. Zaloga, The Kremlin's Nuclear Sword:  The Rise and Fall of Russia's Strategic 
Nuclear Forces, 1945-2000 (Washington, D.C.:  Smithsonian Institution Press, 2002), 22. 
 10 Ibid., 22-23. 
 11 Raymond L. Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age (New York:  Frederick A. 
Praeger, 1958), 222-23, quoting "Khrushchev, in an interview with Mr. Reston, cited in the New 
York Times, October 8, 1957."  The article mentioned would be James Reston, "Khrushchev Asks 
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2. LIFTOFF:  RACE FOR SURVIVAL 
 
 World War II ushered in a time of significant scientific and technological 
advancement.  Scientists discovered the structure of DNA, Jonas Salk identified a 
vaccine for polio, the television was invented, Bell Laboratories conceived the transistor 
radio, Hans von Ohain and Frank Whittle designed and constructed jet propulsion, and 
Enrico Fermi triggered an atomic chain reaction.1  It was also a time of significant 
political upheaval throughout much of the world.  As the fighting wore down, the ties 
began to wear thin between the Allies who fought the Nazis.  Soviet, British, and 
American leaders found that without the chilling threat of Nazi expansion, national 
interests prevailed over the concerns of their partners in the conflict.  Soon, the former 
Allies became enmeshed in a struggle of their own -- the Cold War.2  This new clash led 
to continued rapid scientific progress, including the construction of the nuclear ballistic 
missile.  This chapter will reveal how the end of World War II and the emerging Cold 
War motivated United States leaders to accelerate their weapons programs and to 
amplify the criticality of the nuclear ballistic missile.   
  The manufacture of the nuclear ballistic missile would not have occurred at all 
except for remarkable scientific advances in two separate fields, taking place roughly 
twenty years apart.  The first was the creation of the ballistic rocket in 1926.  The 
second was the creation of the atomic bomb in 1945.  In December 1919, Robert H. 




Miscellaneous Collections, the first public proof that rockets could work in the vacuum 
of space.3  Then, on March 16, 1926, Goddard became the first person to successfully 
launch a rocket using liquid fuel.4  Goddard offered the American military "all of his 
research data, patents, and facilities . . . at a meeting with representatives of Army 
Ordnance, Army Air Corps, and the Navy's Bureau of Aeronautics" on May 28, 1940, but 
the U.S. military services were not interested.5  
 The Germans, on the other hand, expressed great interest in Goddard's work.6   
They initiated work on rocket technology in the 1930s and as the Nazis rose to power, 
German military leaders substantially expanded the program.  They hoped to use 
missiles to replace the long-range artillery that was banned to them by the Versailles 
Treaty.  In 1937, scientists working with the German Army began to develop the A-4 
rocket, later known as the V-2.7  On September 8, 1944, they launched the rocket 
against Paris and London.  Although the first attack missed Paris, the attack on London 
created quite a stir within the American and British military.8  By 1945, the Germans 
were working on newer versions of the V-2, including a two-stage rocket that was 
expected to travel about 3,000 miles, a distance that would threaten the United 
States.9   
 General Henry Arnold, the commander of the Army Air Corps, responded to 
reports of German advances in rocketry by prophetically exclaiming, "Someday, not too 
far distant, there can come streaking out of somewhere (we won't be able to hear it, it 




projectile will be able to wipe out completely this city of Washington."10  He expounded 
further on these ideas in a letter to General George C. Kenney, noting that "at present it 
appears that there will be probably two and possibly five great powers in the next 20 
years.  Certainly, presently conceived weapons will not be successfully used against any 
of these powers because of distance and weather limitations and I for one propose to 
be the leader and not the follower in the experimental development."  Arnold 
continued, "Whether we have rockets, menless [sic] aircraft, or something that replaces 
the aircraft in its entirety, I want to be very sure that the Air Forces are not again 
slightly behind our enemies in pre-war development and potential offensive capabilities 
and countermeasures."11   
 During the war, Germany also began working on the other half of the future 
intercontinental ballistic nuclear missile, the creation of a bomb using the fission of 
atoms to create energy.  This threat, like the V-2, did not escape Allied notice.  In 
August 1938, Albert Einstein wrote President Franklin D. Roosevelt, warning that some 
scientists were close to creating "a nuclear chain reaction" that would allow "the 
construction of . . . extremely powerful bombs of a new type" using uranium, and that 
Germany had "stopped the sale of uranium," leading him to believe they were doing 
the same.  Einstein's warning concerned  Roosevelt greatly and he directed the actions 
that started the Manhattan Project and creation of the first atomic bomb.12  Henry 
Stimpson, the U.S. Secretary of War, later explained Roosevelt's policy on atomic 




ICBMs:  "It was to spare no effort in securing the earliest possible successful 
development of an atomic weapon . . . .  In 1941 and 1942 they [the Germans] were 
believed to be ahead of us, and it was vital that they should not be the first to bring 
atomic weapons into the field of battle."13     
 The U.S. response to the atomic threat was much more focused and successful 
than its response to the missile threat, with Allied scientists successfully exploding an 
atomic bomb in New Mexico on July 16, 1945.  Soon after, on August 6, the U.S. used 
the bomb to devastating effect in Hiroshima and August 9, in Nagasaki.14   
 While the military reacted quickly to the threat of missiles, the three major 
army elements, the Army Ground Forces, the Army Service Forces, and the Army Air 
Forces began duplicative efforts that would plague missile development for years, with 
each trying to gain control of the new capability.15  To reduce friction between the 
contending organizations, Lieutenant General Joseph McNarney, the Army Deputy 
Chief of Staff, signed a policy statement on October 2, 1944, dividing responsibilities 
between the contenders.  He focused on each one's proven capabilities, granting the 
Army Air Forces "responsibility, including designation of military characteristics, for all 
guided  or homing missiles dropped or launched from aircraft" and for "all guided or 
homing missiles launched from the ground which depend for sustenance primarily on 
the lift of aerodynamic forces" while giving Army Service Forces, who controlled the 
Ordnance Command, "research and development responsibilities for guided or homing 




momentum of the missile."  Army Ground Forces were to develop their own 
requirements and provide them to either of the other two organizations.  McNarney 
refused to give any of the three operational control of missiles since there were no 
missiles ready for operational use at the time and he concluded that assigning 
operational control would "jeopardiz[e] future development."16  (The interservice 
competition and its influence on missiles will be addressed further in Chapter3.) 
  Major General Curtis LeMay, who became the Army's first and only Deputy 
Chief of Air Staff for Research and Development in December of 1945, noted that after 
Japan's surrender "we were at least ten years behind the Germans at the end of the 
war in aerodynamics and jet propulsion and missiles and things of that sort."17  Both 
the United States and the Soviet Union recognized this, but both also recognized the 
value of Germany's embryonic missile technology as a vehicle for the newly developed 
nuclear weapons.  Many believed the two technologies, atomic weapons and ballistic 
missiles, could be combined to create a revolution in military affairs that would make 
other military weapons and strategies obsolete.18  Each state raced to seize the 
scientists who designed and built the German missiles and their associated equipment 
from the defeated country.  In the United States, Army Ordnance was most successful 
in this quest, "liberating" Wernher von Braun, providing him with resources, and 
watching him work.  Von Braun said that he was going to build a rocket that would take 




Soviet Union also captured several German scientists and began their own missile 
program as well.19 
 In  late 1945, six months after Harry Truman replaced Franklin Roosevelt as 
president and about a month after World War II was over, the Army Air Force 
expanded its work in missiles, distributing letters to the corporations of the retrenching 
aviation industry, inviting proposals to work with them to conduct research and 
development on missiles over the next ten years.  Contracting officers requested input 
on four types of missiles:  air-to-air, air-to-surface, surface-to-air, and surface-to-
surface.  There appears to have been no concern about abiding by General McNarney's 
guidance of the previous year as by the next spring, they were working on twenty-eight 
different projects, including one with Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corporation (also 
known as Convair) to develop a ballistic missile.20   
   The $1.4 million dollar Convair contract actually requested that the company 
research two separate missiles, both meeting a requirement for a long range missile 
capable of launching a 5,000 pound atomic warhead over 5,000 miles to within one 
mile of its planned target.  The company was not expected to produce the missiles, but 
to review possible options that could be built in five to ten years.  The first was a 
subsonic, jet-powered winged missile while the second, called Project MX-774B, would 
be supersonic and rocket powered.21  Soon after, the Army Air Force offered a second 




missile for the long range requirement.  Northrop's contract required the company to 
design a supersonic turbojet aeronautical missile.22 
 Shortly thereafter, funding began to dry up quickly.  The Cold War had not 
started in earnest and, as Atlas author John L. Chapman reminded his readers, "in the 
years immediately following World War II the nation was naturally less concerned 
about military preparedness for new wars than about the immediate problems of 
demobilization and readjustment."23  Moreover, many thought ballistic missiles were 
not yet ready to power the proposed nuclear revolution.  The V-2 missile, the most 
powerful ballistic missile operational at the time, only had a range of about 180 miles, 
not the thousands of miles required to accomplish the long-range nuclear mission, and 
the missile was notoriously inaccurate.24  Vannevar Bush, the highly influential head of 
the U.S. Office of Scientific Research and Development during World War II, ridiculed 
the idea of an intercontinental ballistic missile, saying that such an idea was not feasible 
and arguing that even if a long-range ballistic missile could be built that would reach a 
predicted target, its cost would be astronomical and would economically exhaust the 
nation before its use affected the enemy.25   
 Thus began a second American struggle over the fate of missiles.    Some 
politicians, scientists and military officers  in the United States, including General 
Arnold and Dr. Theodore von Karman, Chairman of the Air Force's Scientific Advisory 
Group, believed the nation should obtain the new "ultimate weapon" -- the 




Others like Vannevar Bush determined that the scientific knowledge and technology of 
the time could not adequately extend the range and accuracy of the missiles to make 
them practical, so argued that the time and money should be put toward improving the 
ability of bombers to deliver the nuclear weapons rather than being wasted on dubious 
missile technology.27  In addition, many expected that the nation would retain exclusive 
control of nuclear technology for several years, if not decades, and believed the nuclear 
bomb had established the United States as the dominant world power in the Cold War, 
so there was no need to expend the effort to rush the new weapon.28   
 On June 30, 1945, when General Arnold finally conceded that he had major 
heart problems and retired from active duty, the United States lost a powerful voice in 
support of missile research.29  Consequently, when Congress cut the services' research 
and development budget by 40 percent in 1946, the Army Air Force decided to reduce 
support for ballistic missiles.  Instead, the organization focused on jet-powered 
bombers and aerodynamic missiles, weapons that service leaders believed would be 
operational sooner, were cheaper, and could travel further with a larger payload, so 
the organization focused more effort on these assets.  General Donald Putt, Director of 
Research and Development for the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Materiel, had an 
alternate explanation.  He believed that the Air Force put wings on its missiles and kept 
them in the atmosphere to distance itself from the Army's interpretation of missiles.  
"We were afraid that if we developed them to look like rockets or a big artillery shell, 




also conjectured that psychologically, air-breathing missiles closely resembling aircraft 
were easier for the service to accept than ballistic missiles.30 
 Regardless of the reason, in December 1946, the Army Air Force reduced its 
budget for missile development from about $29 million to $22 million.  This forced the 
Army Air Force to cancel over one third of its twenty-eight missile projects, including 
Convair's subsonic missile, and to reduce funding for the company's long range rocket 
powered missile.31   
 Seven months later, in July 1947, the Army Air Force terminated Convair's 
contract, stating that the MX-774 missile did "not promise any tangible results in the 
next eight to ten years."32  In fact, an Air Staff evaluation of the guided missile program 
proclaimed that "for the next ten years, at least, the subsonic bomber will be the only 
means available for the delivery of long-range (1,000 miles and over) air 
bombardment."33  Fortunately for both the nation and for Convair, the officers 
controlling the contract allowed the company to retain the funding it had already 
received and continue work on the project with the remaining resources.34  This 
decision was probably one of the most critical affecting the future Air Force's 
development of ballistic missiles. 
 Like other manufacturers of the time, Convair based its missile on the German 
V-2, but improved the German missile's weak guidance system to enhance its accuracy.  
The company's chief engineer on the project, Karel "Charles" Bossart, also decided that 




the entire area between the warhead and the rocket into a large fuel tank of thin 
aluminum rather than designing separate tanks inside a strong metal exterior.35  The 
only thing separating the fuel from the oxidizer was a single bulkhead so the weight of 
the warhead had to be held up by the gases inside the missile as the metal was not 
strong enough to hold the warhead by itself.  However, the changes were expected to 
increase the range of the missile significantly.  In addition, the company redesigned the 
rocket's engines, increasing their thrust and designing a control system to move the 
engines in flight so the rocket could be steered.  The designers were not required to 
produce a missile, but they thought that building one would allow them to learn more 
quickly.  They requested permission and, since it did not cost them any more money, 
the Army Air Force allowed it.36   
 In July 1949, the National Security Council recommended that President Truman 
prioritize the production of the atomic bomb as the nation's highest priority and the 
production of the B-36 bomber to carry it as the second highest priority.  Ballistic 
missiles were not listed as a priority.   Significantly, U.S. intelligence reports that the 
Soviet Union successfully tested an atomic bomb on August 29, 1949, did not alter the 
decision to ignore ballistic missiles.  After careful study and deliberation, on January 31, 
1950, Truman announced that he had "directed the Atomic Energy Commission to 
continue its work on all forms of atomic weapons, including the so-called hydrogen or 
superbomb."37  However, the military services feared that the Soviet Union might gain 




had not thought the Soviets would obtain atomic technology for another decade, so 
they funded "current" technology, aircraft and aeronautic missiles, to combat this 
threat rather than "technology of the future" including ballistic missiles.38     
 On June 25, 1950, a critical shift in the Cold War altered the status quo for 
ballistic missiles.  North Korean communists invaded South Korea.  As war broke out on 
the Korean peninsula, President Truman replaced Louis Johnson with a new Secretary 
of Defense, former General George C. Marshall, and the Defense Department initiated 
a partial mobilization.  The communist aggression drove increases in defense funding.  
Some of the added funding became available to support further research and 
development for missiles.39    
 Convair had prepared for this moment.  Even though the government support 
for its missile development program had run out, Convair had provided "Charlie" 
Bossart, the primary engineer for the MX-774 contract, with about $3 million to 
conduct further research on the project between 1949 and 1950, believing that their 
advances would lead to future contracts.  This foresight paid substantial dividends.  
With the money provided from the earlier contract, Convair had built a working ballistic 
missile, launching the first on July 13, 1948.  Although it had never traveled further than 
about thirty miles, the Convair missile was the most promising ballistic missile America 
had to offer.40 
 Hearing that the Air Force was again considering new research on missiles, the 




1950, including a ram-jet missile that Convair thought the Air Force favored.  Two 
months later, when the service's Engineering Division wanted to determine the best  
approach to build a long range surface-to-surface missile, the Air Force turned to 
Convair, the only company with any real experience and operational concepts in this 
arena.41   
 Thus, on January 23, 1951 -- three and a half years after it cancelled its original 
agreement with Convair, the Air Force signed a new $500,000 contract with the 
company to study "an intercontinental missile with a minimum range of 5,000 miles, a 
minimum speed of Mach 6 over the target, a circular error probable (CEP) ['the radius 
of a circle within which half of a missile's projectiles are expected to fall'] of 1,500 feet, 
and a nuclear warhead."42  Donald MacKenzie, in Inventing Accuracy, speculates that 
the CEP requirement was designed to mimic the target area believed to be achievable 
by 1950s era bombers dropping bombs by radar from 25,000 feet.  These requirements 
were deemed impossible at the time, leading some historians to believe Air Force 
leaders established the requirement to ensure Convair could not succeed.  Cruise 
missiles, the closest weapon to the missile, had still not achieved a circular error 
probable of 5,000 feet, over three times larger than the target established for Convair's 
ballistic missile.43 
 Within the Air Force, most thought the optimum missile would be a "glide" 
missile, launched into orbit and remotely guided to its target by the use of attached 




ballistic rocket, believing the glide rocket would be too easily intercepted and that 
building a winged system to reenter the atmosphere was much more difficult than 
creating a solid warhead to do the same.  The Air Research and Development 
Command supported the company's premise, predicting that a working ballistic missile 
could be operational in the early 1960s.  General John Sessums, the Deputy 
Commanding General of Air Research and Development Command, later remembered 
that "members of the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board  told him that in his advocacy 
of ballistic missiles, he was promoting a comet that would burn up upon atmospheric 
reentry."44 
 Over the summer, the Air Force perspective on glide missiles changed  and, in 
September 1951, Headquarters USAF directed that all work on Project Atlas, the 
Convair study, "be directed towards the development of a rocket-powered ballistic 
missile rather than a rocket-powered glide missile."  In the meantime, the Strategic Air 
Command, the organization responsible for launching the Air Force's nuclear arsenal, 
which had been established in 1946, published their goals for missiles in "Preliminary 
Plans for Activation and Employment of USAF Guided Missile Units."45 
 On November 1, 1952, another technological development greatly improved the 
prospects of the Air Force missile program.  American scientists successfully tested a 
thermonuclear or hydrogen bomb, producing a much lighter warhead with much 
greater explosive capability, which meant the missiles could carry it much further and 




missiles feasible in the near term.  A preliminary Air Force Special Weapons Center 
(AFSWC) study dated September 15, 1953 identified how the new development made 
ballistic missiles viable, but this fact did not appear to have been widely understood or 
accepted at the time and the official Air Force perception of missiles did not change.46   
 In December 1952, after Dwight Eisenhower was elected president, Roswell 
Gilpatrick, Truman's Undersecretary of the Air Force, explained the official Air Force 
position on ICBMs to the incoming Secretary and Undersecretary of the Air Force, 
stating that "many years will elapse before major dependence can be placed on these 
new weapons and that meanwhile another generation of piloted aircraft . . . will be 
needed."47  Airmen working in missile programs were ordered to refer to their 
creations as "pilotless aircraft" rather than missiles.48 
 Not all airmen agreed with the official Air Force position on missiles.  Trevor 
Gardner, the newly appointed Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force for 
Research and Development, had a decidedly different view.49  Gardner believed "the 
era of the unmanned missile in warfare . . . is very much at hand," and contended that 
"the United States must have 'weapons of such superior ingenuity, performance and 
effect as override the enemy's ability to attack or defend himself.'"50  Thus, in his 
opinion, the current military requirements for missiles were "unnecessarily complex, 
and occasionally impossible. . ., especially those concerning CEP's [expected ability to 
hit within a defined target area], payloads, and guidance."51  Gardner wanted the 




capability "to assure that the peacetime checks and balances which are necessary in 
our system of government will not be the cause of time delays in the accelerated 
progress of the program."52  He lobbied the nation's political leaders to accelerate Air 
Force research into and production of ballistic missiles, but found himself struggling 
against the tide.53   
 After assuming the presidency, Eisenhower worked to extricate the United 
States from the conflict in Korea and, on June 27, 1953, an armistice was signed.  
Achieving the ceasefire allowed Eisenhower to implement another goal, a significant 
reduction in government spending based on the administration's "New Look" and 
"more bang for the buck" defense philosophies by focusing on nuclear weapons.  In the 
spring of 1953, as the combatants in Korea worked toward a peace agreement, Charles 
Wilson, Eisenhower's Secretary of Defense, reduced research and development funding 
for the services by 25 percent.  This cut again highlighted the duplication between the 
services' work on missiles, so, a few weeks later, Wilson ordered a review of the guided 
missile programs to eliminate duplication and identify a standard missile to accomplish 
the service's operational requirements.54 
     Gardner made the most of this opportunity.  When Secretary Wilson charged 
the Secretary of the Air Force to guide the study, Gardner became the point man for a 
tri-service study group, but he also established a Committee on Strategic Missiles, 
sometimes called the Teapot Committee or von Neumann Committee after its leader, 




technologies, especially in comparison to the expected capabilities of potential 
enemies, and to recommend solutions to any problems identified.  Gardner ensured 
the committee was made up of nationally esteemed "university and industrial 
scientists" who were strongly in favor of missiles, as he was.55 
 On February 10, 1954, the von Neumann Committee, officially renamed the 
Strategic Missiles Evaluation Committee, presented its findings.  The report postulated 
that the new thermonuclear bomb, or hydrogen bomb, would indeed allow the military 
to reduce the size of warheads within a few years and recommended accelerating the 
ICBM program, strengthening Gardner's position immeasurably.56   Those who had 
been working intimately with the future missile systems recognized this fact over a year 
earlier, but had been "dismissed without serious consideration" because their views 
seemed "so incredible."  Some of these workers were frustrated that their own views 
had not been accepted as readily as those of the committee, but they quickly seized on 
the opportunity.57 
 In its report, the von Neumann Committee contended that the ICBM program 
should be accelerated because "unusual urgency for a strategic missile capability can 
arise from one of two principal causes:  a rapid strengthening of the Soviet defenses 
against our SAC manned bombers, or rapid progress by the Soviet in his own 
development of strategic missiles which would provide a compelling political and 
psychological reason for our own effort to proceed apace."  The committee then 




positive estimate of the progress being made by the Soviet in the development of 
intercontinental missiles . . . evidence exists of an appreciation of this field."  The 
Committee further asserted that they could not rule out that "the Russians are ahead 
of us."58  It also recommended relaxing "the military requirement . . . on C.E.P. . . . from 
the present 1500 feet to at least two, and probably three, nautical miles."  By using the 
new thermonuclear warhead to reduce weight and increasing the target size, some 
member of the committee believed the nation could produce a "preliminary system. . .  
sometime between mid-1958 and mid-1960."  Thus, instead of reducing costs as the 
Secretary of Defense intended for it to do, the committee called for a tremendous 
increase in missile expenditures.59 
 The Committee's recommendation gained strength from a similar report that 
was released two days prior.  The RAND Corporation published "A Revised Program for 
Ballistic Missiles of Intercontinental Range" predicting that an Atlas ICBM could achieve 
initial operational capability by the early 1960s if performance criteria were relaxed and 
the program was prioritized and funded appropriately.   The von Neumann Committee 
had reviewed the RAND report and received several briefings from RAND employees as 
they prepared their own report "and used much of the material in the preparation of its 
own findings and recommendations."60 
 Once Gardner had the reports, and even before he presented them to the Air 
Force, the Assistant Secretary recommended the Air Force abandon the current missile 




only on ballistic missiles.  In this way, he insisted, the Air Force could attain an 
emergency capability between 1958 and 1960.  He obviously convinced Secretary 
Talbott of at least some of his plan.  The next week, Talbott informed the Air Force 
Chief of Staff, General Twining, that "Mr. Trevor Gardner has developed a plan for 
accelerating our efforts so as to achieve  . . . an intercontinental ballistic missile 
operational system within approximately five years." He then directed that "the Air 
Force immediately accelerate the intercontinental ballistic missile program . . . at 
maximum effort . . . on the assumption that total funding required will ultimately be 
provided by Congress."  Thus, while Secretary Talbott did not abandon Convair's Atlas 
program, he approved acceleration of the ICBM program.  Two months later, in May, 
he boosted the program to the top of the Air Force's research and development priority 
list and directed the Air Research and Development Command to "accelerate the 
revised ATLAS program to the maximum extent permitted by technology."61   This level 
of political pressure to design and build ballistic missiles remained and even increased 
until the Air Force had developed several types of ballistic missiles in the early 1960s. 
 On July 1, 1954, the Air Force established the Western Development Division 
and named Brigadier General Bernard Schriever as its commander.  This organization 
was to "exercise complete authority and control over all aspects of the development 
program for WS-107A (ATLAS), including ground support, operational logistic and 
personnel concepts, and all engineering decisions."62  Motivated by the opportunities 




a target date of July 1959 for having an "operational launch capability from an 
operational base." A month later, in May, Schriever managed to accomplish another of 
Gardner's agenda items, by establishing an alternate ICBM development program 
called Titan.  This was ostensibly to "provide alternate development routes and greater 
assurance of successful accomplishment of the ICBM development mission within 
target dates," but the action also set up an opposing system to Convair, which both 
Schriever and Gardner disliked. Even with this tremendous success, Gardner was not 
satisfied and kept pressing for greater effort on the ballistic missile.63 
 Just one month after the von Neumann Committee released its report, in March 
1954, Eisenhower provided another opportunity for Gardner.  The President met with 
members of his Science Advisory Committee of the Office of Defense Mobilization to 
discuss his concerns about a surprise attack on the United States.  Lee DuBridge, the 
chairman, recommended an ad hoc committee be set up to study the problem.  On July 
26, 1954, Eisenhower established the Technological Capabilities Panel of the Scientific 
Advisory Committee to "consider the vulnerability of the United States to surprise 
attack."  It is not known exactly why Eisenhower requested this study, but he faced 
many threats and was concerned about a "Pearl Harbor" type nuclear attack.    
Communists were invading Guatemala, Chinese Communists threatened Taiwan, and 
the French were struggling against Communist nationalists in Vietnam.  In addition, just 
a little over a month earlier, Senator Joseph McCarthy (R-Wisconsin) had attacked the 




was also struggling with political pressure to increase the defense budget, an action he 
was loathe to do.64 
 In February 1955, the forty-two member committee released its report, stating 
that "the intercontinental ballistic missile [could] profoundly affect the military posture 
of either [the United States or the Soviet Union in the future] and recommending that 
the "National Security Council formally recognize the present Air Force program for the 
development of an intercontinental ballistic missile as a nationally supported effort of 
highest priority."65 
 The National Security Council asked the Department of Defense to comment on 
the Killian report, named for the head of the Technological Capabilities Panel.  Gardner 
again took advantage of this opportunity.  When Gardner presented his response to the 
Secretary of the Air Force, he revealed that he had already given much of the 
information to Senator Henry Jackson's Subcommittee on Military Appropriations of 
the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy in response to the committee's 
queries and suggested that Talbott forward a copy of the report to them.  Within days, 
Senator Jackson (D - Washington) and Senator Clinton Anderson (D - New Mexico), the 
chairman of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, both of whom 
strongly agreed with Gardner's views on missiles, sent Eisenhower their "Findings and 
Recommendations Concerning the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile."  In their report, 
the congressmen warned that "the question of war or peace may depend upon who 




upon carrying out a nuclear Pearl Harbor.  If the Soviets win the race for the ICBM, and 
if they thereupon use it in a massive surprise attack against our cities and industries 
and the bases of the Strategic Air Command, effective retaliation may be impossible."  
To resolve these concerns, the Joint Committee strongly recommended that the 
president "immediately issue a directive singling out the ICBM as the most important 
project in our entire defense effort, assigning it unique and over-riding priority within 
the entire defense establishment."66 
 Other alarms were ringing as well.  At almost the same time, retired Brigadier 
General Thomas Phillips, U.S. Army, publicly expressed his concerns that the Soviets 
"started two years later than we to make a jet intercontinental bomber and now they 
have it in formations while we don't; . . . they have built more jet aircraft of a single 
type -- the MiG-15 -- than we have of all jet aircraft combined and have built more light 
two-engined jet bombers than all the free world put together."   He then criticized the 
U.S. missile program, proclaiming, "At the same time that the Soviets were involved in 
crash programs for medium and heavy bombers, they also had crash programs on long-
range missiles.  The United States, in contrast," Phillips contended, "completely 
dropped its intercontinental ballistic missile for two years and was progressing at a 
leisurely pace until Soviet progress forced a top priority on our missile programs."67 
 A week after receiving the Congressional report, on July 6, 1955, Eisenhower 
met with Wilson and Talbott and requested a briefing on ballistic missiles.  It appears 




scenes to convince like-minded presidential staffers to schedule an opportunity for 
them to brief the National Security Council and President Eisenhower on the nascent 
U.S. missile capability while the senators and representatives pushed from the front.  
Consequently, on July 28, Gardner, with Dr. von Neumann and General Schriever, the 
Air Force point man for missiles, informed the president of their endeavor to build a 
ballistic weapon that could carry nuclear weapons across the world and warned of the 
threat of a similar Soviet effort.68 
 Compelled by Senate Democrats, concerned citizens, and members of his own 
administration, on September 13, 1955, Eisenhower approved NSC Action No. 1433.  
The NSC's document acknowledged that "there would be the gravest repercussions on 
the national security and on the cohesion of the Free World, should the USSR achieve 
an operational capability with the ICBM substantially in advance of the United States" 
and directed that "the U.S. ICBM program [be] a research and development program of 
the highest priority above all others, unless modified by future decision of the 
President."69 
 That same day, Gardner established an ICBM Administrative Procedures 
Evaluation Group to streamline management procedures for ballistic missiles.  Like the 
von Neumann Committee, the new committee was often called the Gillette Committee 
after its chair, Hyde Gillette, the Deputy Secretary of the Air Force for Budget and 
Program Management.  Less than two months later, on November 8, Secretary Wilson 




Force Plan for Simplifying Administrative Procedures," setting up the Air Force Ballistic 
Missiles Committee and the Office of the Secretary of Defense Ballistic Missiles 
Committee as the only formal approval authorities.  The Gillette procedures also 
"established a separate ICBM funding category, separate from other Air Force 
programs."  This change was significantly more important than its title appears, as it 
granted Schriever authority "only exceeded by that of the head of the wartime atomic 
bomb effort."70  With the added authority came extra stress.  General White, the Air 
Force Chief of Staff, directed that Schriever use his new authority and budget to attain 
the earliest possible initial operational capability and called for "the speediest possible 
integration of missiles and aircraft."71  In addition, by stiff arming more than forty 
organizations that previously had authority to help Schriever and his organization, the 
new procedures created many more enemies within the government than had 
previously existed. 
 Nevertheless, significant changes to the missile program continued apace.  
During its review, the von Neumann Committee had only been asked to study 
intercontinental missile programs, but the committee had warned that "there is . . . no 
current Air Force program for ballistic missiles of medium range (say, 200-1500 miles) 
[which] . . . should be considered by some qualified agency."72  The Killian Committee 
had seconded this concern, reporting that  "we believe the development of a medium 
range ballistic missile would be an easier development, more certain of success in a 




achieve a medium range ballistic missile capability sooner than the U.S. could achieve 
an intercontinental ballistic missile capability."  The Killian Committee recommended 
"the U.S. initiate a medium range ballistic missile program to increase the probability 
that the U.S. is first to achieve a ballistic missile capability."73   The State Department 
influenced the decision as well, with a study that "concluded that, should the Soviets be 
the first to develop a long range ballistic missile, this achievement would greatly reduce 
Free World confidence in American technological superiority and might lead several 
nations toward a 'third world orientation.'"  The study then speculated that "if the 
United States  managed to develop an IRBM at the same time that the Soviets 
demonstrated an ICBM, that feat would mitigate the problem."74   
 Therefore, even though Eisenhower had serious concerns about the efficacy of 
ballistic missiles, the willingness of the services to work together on their development, 
and the technological expertise required to accomplish the two demanding tasks 
simultaneously, he conceded.75  On December 20, 1955, a little over a month after the 
CIA produced a National Intelligence Estimate reporting significant improvement in 
Soviet bomber capability and during what historian Richard Leighton terms an abruptly 
chillier trend in the Cold War, "the President directed that the IRBM and ICBM 
programs should both be research and development programs of the highest priority 
above all others."  Schriever and other like-minded ICBM advocates feared that work 
on an Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile could slow or even prevent completion of the 




between these programs should be avoided so far as practicable, but if a conflict should 
occur in which strict application of paragraph a above would . . . cause major damage to 
the security interests of the United States, then the matter will be promptly referred to 
the President."76   
 In response, the Air Force Western Development Division -- and the Army, given 
special permission to work with the Navy on the Jupiter IRBM -- began to design and 
construct intermediate range missiles while the Air Force retained the responsibility to 
develop the ICBM. The Air Force's initial goal for an operational IRBM capability was 
January 1960. 77  The Navy Polaris missile was added as a key defense priority as well 
because it could be launched from submarines, making it more invulnerable to a 
nuclear first strike.78 
 The growth in number and importance of the missile programs drastically 
increased their costs, frustrating Eisenhower's attempts to reduce the national budget.  
After cutting the budget in several other areas, the Eisenhower administration began to 
study if it could reduce defense expenditures by cutting the technological development 
and production of the bomber force.  When he was informed that bombers would 
continue to be a critical part of the defense establishment at least until 1967, the 
president requested another review of the missile programs in order to reduce costs.79   
 This time Gardner was not available to influence the proceedings.  Gardner and 
several other senior Air Force representatives had requested about $500 million in 




who was trying to stay in line with the President's policy of frugality.  Despite the fact 
that he admitted that the ballistic missile program was not underfunded at the time, 
Gardner resigned in protest on February 10, 1956, proclaiming that other defense 
needs were not being met.  Missile advocates keenly felt Gardner's absence soon 
after.80 
 As Eisenhower began to reduce costs again, Stuart Symington, a former 
Secretary of the Air Force under Truman and then Democratic Senator from Missouri, 
"accused the administration of allowing the United States to fall behind the Soviet 
Union in the race for the 'ultimate weapon,' the guided missile, and in general of risking 
national security to save money."81  The Republican party responded by contending 
that cuts during the Truman administration, when Symington was Secretary of the Air 
Force, stopped the initial work on the Atlas program.82  Over the protests of the 
Democratic congressmen and following his Secretary of Defense's advice, Eisenhower 
directed that the duplicative Titan program be prioritized lower than Atlas "in an effort 
to make substantial economies in this alternative development."  He also asked the 
services to prioritize the IRBM programs so that they could focus on the Jupiter or Thor 
rather than on both of the competing projects, but this directive was overtaken by 
events.83    
 The Air Force launched its first Thor IRBM on January 25, 1957, one month 
behind schedule, but the launch failed.  Five and one half months later, on June 11, the 




disappointing, they were not completely unexpected with the new technologies.  The 
real crisis came soon after.84 
 On August 26, 1957, the Soviet news agency TASS reported that the Soviet 
Union had successfully launched an intercontinental ballistic missile.  The story was 
quickly reported in the U.S. media, but Eisenhower downplayed the event, explaining 
that Soviet announcements were not particularly reliable and a single missile was not 
militarily significant.  He assured Americans that the U.S. missile program was 
progressing rapidly and, according to historian Robert Watson, "the public took their 
cue from these reassurances and showed little concern over the matter."85 
 However, the situation changed dramatically less than two months later.  On 
October 5, 1957, the top New York Times headline read, "Soviet Fires Satellite into 
Space." The satellite the story referred to was the 184-pound Sputnik.  It circled the 
globe transmitting audio signals, ensuring it could be both seen and heard.  The Times 
quoted unnamed military experts as saying, "the satellites would have no practicable 
military application in the foreseeable future," but also mentioned that "the study of 
such satellites could provide valuable information that might be applied to flight studies 
for intercontinental ballistic missiles."86   
 The Soviets quickly followed the announcement about Sputnik with a second 
story, a proclamation that the Soviet's had tested a "mighty hydrogen bomb of new 




 A former advisor to the president, Charles Jackson, privately declared the 
launch "an overwhelmingly important event -- against our side."  He contended that 
the Soviets orchestrated the announcement of their successful ICBM test, the Sputnik 
launch, the almost simultaneous announcement of the hydrogen bomb test, and the 
predicted launch of a second, larger satellite in a thirty day period in a "skillful 
alternation of war and peace" was a masterful piece of psychological warfare.88 
 Eisenhower tried to maintain course.  On October 10, he told his National 
Security Council, "There's no reason for hand-wringing, just because the Russians got 
there first -- they're to be congratulated . . . .  But we've lost nothing of our national 
security, and we shouldn't change our scientific plan."  He was forced to do so.89  On 
October 28, Newsweek reported that "most Americans are in favor of a crash program 
to put the U.S. ahead in the missile race . . . .  There was concern but no panic . . . .  
Above all, they understood that catching up might well be a matter of survival."90 
 By the time the Soviets launched Sputnik II, a much larger satellite on November 
3, some leading Congressmen were ready to call hearings to "'speed up our [missile] 
program' and to convert former target dates into much earlier deadlines for 
achievement in the development of missiles, satellites and rockets."  Senator Lyndon B. 
Johnson (D-Texas) declared that "target dates have been set for 1961 or 1965, while 
'we ought to be talking about 1958 or '59, '60'."91  By the end of the month, when the 
inquiry began, at least one newspaper declared that the committee would "smash 




 Again, Eisenhower's opposition was supported by his  own advisors.  On April 4, 
1957, concerned about protecting American civilians from nuclear attack, Eisenhower 
had established the Security Resources Panel of the Office of Defense Mobilization 
Science Advisory Committee, better known as the Gaither Committee, to determine if 
he should build blast shelters across the country.  Although Eisenhower explicitly 
directed the committee to stay on task, when it presented its report on November 4, its 
contents proved the members had not done so.93 
 The report asserted that "by 1959, the USSR may be able to launch an attack 
with ICBMs carrying megaton warheads, against which SAC [Strategic Air Command] 
will be almost completely vulnerable under present programs."  The report further 
proclaimed that, under a "medium weight [attack]--divided between military and 
civilian targets . . . , about half of the population would be casualties."  Among other 
things, it recommended that "an integrated program of Atlas and Titan, and an IRBM 
program including the achievement of a significant operational capability at the earliest 
possible date, should be given the highest national priority."  "To lessen SAC 
vulnerability to an attack by Russian ICBMs (a late 1959 threat)," the report 
recommended Eisenhower "increase the initial operational capability of our IRBMs 
(Thor and/or Jupiter) from 60 to 240 . . .  increase the IOC of our ICBMs (Atlas and 
Titan) from 80 to 600."  Finally, all the missiles "except for the initial Atlas group, . . .  




Report acknowledged that to accommodate its recommendations would cost the 
nation billions, the authors still pressed for their acceptance.94  
 The pressure only got worse when, on December 16, the Vanguard, a missile the 
administration touted as the U.S. response to Sputnik, with its own satellite, failed 
spectacularly after rising only two feet. The first successful launch of the Atlas, on 
December 17, did not significantly change this perspective because the Atlas was a 
military missile and thus not as well known.  In addition, the Atlas only flew 530 miles 
and carried no satellite.95  Even though Eisenhower declared space a separate and less 
important mission than military missiles, many Americans felt so strongly about the 
issue that the military continued efforts to launch a satellite, finally succeeding a year 
later, on December 18, 1958, when an Atlas entered earth orbit, relaying a Christmas 
message from Eisenhower for 34 days.96 
 Lyndon Johnson, as Senate Majority Leader, demanded access to both the 
Gaither Report and the Killian Report.   The Gaither Report was classified, but on 
December 20, 1957, the Washington Post reported key contents in Chalmers Roberts' 
story "Enormous Arms Outlay is Held Vital to Survival" under the front-page headline 
"Secret Report Sees U.S. in Grave Peril," including a declaration of a "missile gap" that 
could not be closed before 1960 or 1961.97  Since he had access to intelligence from the 
U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, Eisenhower realized there was no missile gap, but decided 
to debate the issue without disclosing that information rather than risk revealing the 




   Eisenhower refused to take several of the recommended actions, but he 
increased the defense budget by $4 billion over the next year and nine months and 
compromised in some areas.  On the advice of his Secretary of Defense, the president 
accelerated the Jupiter, Thor, and Polaris IRBM programs, increasing the number of 
planned ICBMs to one hundred and thirty (ninety Atlas and forty Titans) and IRBMs to 
one hundred and eighty, even though "he feared that they would become obsolete 
quickly and have to be scrapped."99  He also authorized research to begin on the solid-
fueled Minuteman, a missile that could be manufactured much more cheaply than the 
Atlas or Titan and was safer and more reliable than either.100 
 The workers building the missiles labored at breakneck speed.  Colonel Richard 
Jacobson later remembered being told that they "were going to deploy [the Thor 
intermediate range ballistic missile] as soon as you had something that would be a 
threat to the Soviet Union."  When asked for clarification, he responded that the 
decision point to deploy the missiles was when 50 percent of the missiles would hit the 
Soviet Union -- not a specified target within the Soviet Union, but the country itself.  
This haste did not stop the political sniping.101 
 Both parties continued to blame the other for falling behind in the quest toward 
missiles.  The contention increased dramatically over the next few years, egged on by 
newspaper columnist Joe Alsop.  Alsop and other harsh critics of the Eisenhower 
administration frequently condemned the old general, asserting that he had allowed 




fact that the gap was nonexistent or favored the United States.  The supposed "missile 
gap" developed into a major issue of the 1960 presidential election and contributed to 
John Kennedy become the thirty-fifth president.102  It also forced the Air Force to place 
tremendous emphasis on building and incorporating ballistic missiles into their mission, 
even though some members of the service believed the rush, and possibly the 
incorporation of missiles, was detrimental to their flying mission.    Only on October 21, 
1961, when Kennedy's Deputy Secretary of Defense, Roswell "Gilpatrick, stated 
explicitly that the United States now knew that the Soviets had neither a quantitative 
nor a qualitative superiority in nuclear missile technology" was the issue completely 
diffused.103  During this frenetic time, four of the nation's five ballistic missile systems 
became operational and the Jupiter IRBM's future was determined.104  The 
accomplishment of this feat in such a short time and under such pressure was to have a 
tremendous effect on the Air Force's relationship with the new weapons and the men 
who controlled them and, thus, major consequences for the future of ballistic missiles 
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3. TURBULENCE: INTERSERVICE AND INTRASERVICE CONFLICTS 
 
 While the crises of the early Cold War intensified, exacerbating the U.S. political 
dissension, disagreements over missiles brewed between the military services and 
within the Air Force.  This discord greatly influenced the reception and incorporation of 
ballistic missiles into the service and prejudiced the Air Force's perception of those 
selected to manage these powerful weapons. 
 Although the armed forces initially ignored missile technology, the services 
quickly clashed over the control of missiles when it became apparent that the new 
weapons would be a key part of the nation's defense.  This quarrel was part of a 
struggle that reached back as far as the end of World War I.  After the Great War, the 
United States drastically cut spending on the military.  These reductions led to a crisis 
between what historian James Tate deems the "visionary" flyers who demanded 
"several hundred millions of dollars to acquire the newest airplanes and to train men to 
fly them" and the "realists" in the Army who wanted to spend the money on current 
needs.  Brigadier General William "Billy" Mitchell became the primary voice for the 
flyers.  Tate contends that, as the disagreement intensified, Mitchell began to perceive 
his non-flying antagonists as stupid or immoral, arguing that "the Army feared 
innovation . . . because it might curtail 'their ancient prerogatives, privileges, and 
authority,'" and earned himself a court-martial.  Because of Mitchell's haughty 




confident, self-righteous attitude . . . . conditioning his followers and those they would 
later indoctrinate never to be satisfied with anything short of independence from the 
Army."1  However, based on future interservice and intraservice conflicts, his primary 
lesson appears to have been what historian John Darrell Sherwood terms a "flight suit 
attitude." This attitude, explained Korean-era pilot George Berke, one of Sherwood's 
biographical subjects, meant, "If you could fly, we accepted you, and if you couldn't, 
out!!!  We didn't want you around."2 
 On July 26, 1947, the "visionaries" obtained their goal of a separate Air Force 
with the signing of the National Security Act of 1947.  This law did not completely 
resolve the conflict between the flyers and ground troops, however, as many roles and 
missions had to be divided when the two services separated.  Some of these troubles 
traced back to the origin of the Army Air Corps, but this chapter will address the one 
that began in November of 1943:  control of the ballistic missile.3  
 Within the Air Force, a related conflict emerged.  Historian John Chapman noted 
in 1960 that for many officers in what would become the U.S. Air Force, Germany's V-2 
missile "changed the complexion of modern war.  It wiped out much of our antiquated 
thinking about rockets.  It took the guided missile out of the artillery class and 
established it as a strategic weapon of devastating potential."4  This was true for 
General Henry H. "Hap" Arnold, the Commander, Army Air Forces, and those like him, 




differing attitudes created a friction that greatly influenced the prospects of ballistic 
missiles in the Air Force.5 
 The leaders of the Army Service Forces would have agreed with Chapman on 
the missile's potential but not its classification.  Thus, they were the first to respond 
effectively to the new weapon.  In September 1943, Army Ordnance, under the Service 
Forces, created a Rocket Development Branch.  Two months later, Dr. Theodore von 
Karman, the Director of the Guggenheim Aeronautical Laboratory of the California 
Institute of Technology (often known as Cal Tech), submitted a proposal to develop 
long-range, surface-to-surface missiles.  In that same month, November 1943, General 
Arnold directed that Army Air Forces emphasize research, development, and 
procurement of guided missiles.  Arnold's instructions began an intraservice 
competition to control ballistic missiles, though the contest later expanded greatly and 
became more intense as the Air Force became a separate service.6 
 With their head start, in January 1944, Cal Tech scientists working for Army 
Ordnance began developing the Private A and Corporal missiles, tactical ballistic 
missiles with the capability to carry nuclear warheads less than one hundred miles.  The 
Army launched the first twenty-four Private A rockets in December of that year and 
launched the Corporal the next September.7   
 The Army Air Force began its work on missiles six months after the Ordnance 
Department, focusing on aeronautical missiles -- missiles that remained within the 




offered Northrop Aircraft a contract to develop the JB-1, a jet-propelled pilotless 
aircraft more similar to the German V-1 than its ballistic counterpart, the V-2.8  The first 
prototype of the JB-1 was delivered to the Army Air Force on September 8, 1944, but 
these missiles were plagued with problems. Therefore, General Arnold requested the 
production of JB-2s, a copy of the German V-1 designed by piecing together parts from 
exploded V-1 missiles.  He wanted to produce enough JB-2s to launch one thousand per 
month, but the War Department countermanded this requirement, saying it would 
disrupt the production of essential war material.9      
 Arnold continued to press for missiles.  "David Griggs, a scientific specialist 
attached to [Carl] Spaatz headquarters, made a tour of the front and interrogated all 
the top allied commanders on the subject of the JB-2 program."  After the tour, "Griggs 
told Spaatz that the uncontrolled JB-2 would not be available in quantity until 
Sept[ember] 1945 [and] Spaatz took the position that if the Germans were still fighting 
in Sept[ember], it would only be because some new developments by the Germans had 
made it impossible for the allies to continue to operate the 8th Air Force on the present 
scale."  Nevertheless, Arnold thought that the JB-2 " would not only be effective, but 
might well be essential to continue the air offensive."   His thoughts would not prevail.  
"Apparently [General] Eisenhower had opposed the program, [concerned] it might 
interfere with the shipment of materiel needed more immediately in his theater."  The 
contracts for the JB-2 missiles were terminated by early 1946 and none of the missiles 




 Soon, the three organizations, Army Ground Forces, Army Service Forces, and 
Army Air Forces, were competing heavily to control the development and operation of 
missiles for the Army.  Not to be outdone, the Navy struggled to assert its own control 
over the new weapon. Between the years of 1945 and 1950, even though Congress 
drastically cut service budgets after the war, naval planners prioritized the 
development and acquisition of an air-atomic capability and spent more money on 
missiles than either the Army or the Air Force.  As in the Army, the Navy programs were 
divided between the Bureau of Aeronautics and the Bureau of Ordnance.11 
 To reduce the friction between the contentious Army organizations vying for 
control of missiles, Lieutenant General Joseph McNarney, the Army Deputy Chief of 
Staff, divided responsibilities between the contenders on October 2, 1944, based upon 
each organization's proven capabilities.  He  assigned the Army Air Forces 
"responsibility, including designation of military characteristics, for all guided  or 
homing missiles dropped or launched from aircraft" and for "all guided or homing 
missiles launched from the ground which depend for sustenance primarily on the lift of 
aerodynamic forces" while giving the Army Service Forces' Ordnance Command 
"research and development responsibilities for guided or homing missiles launched 
from the ground which depend for sustenance primarily on momentum of the missile."  
Army Ground Forces were to develop their own requirements and provide them to 
either of the other two organizations.  McNarney refused to give any of the three 




operational use at the time and he determined that assigning operational control 
would "jeopardiz[e] future development."12 
 McNarney's decision did not resolve the infighting.  In fact, the dispute 
worsened to the point that, in March 1946, Brigadier General R. C. Coupland, the Army 
Air Forces air ordnance officer, who had experience in two of the opposing camps, 
recommended creating "a single government agency similar in scope to the Manhattan 
Project with exclusive control over research, development, production, and operational 
application" to resolve the problem.  In a foreshadowing of the future, the 
recommendation was not accepted even within the Army Air Force and it never went 
further.13   
 Therefore, on September 18, 1947, when Stuart Symington became the first 
Secretary of the Air Force, key military leaders worked quickly to establish the 
appropriate roles and missions for the new service, including acquisition of the new 
missile.  Planners and commanders from both the Army and Air Force met to determine 
how to best separate responsibilities and resources.  One month later, Secretary of 
Defense James V. Forrestal approved the document they hammered out, the "Army-Air 
Force Agreements:  As to the Initial Implementation of the National Security Act of 
1947."  Among other things, this document redefined the relationship between the 
services and the missile, declaring that "strategic missiles will be assigned to the U.S. Air 
Force.  Missiles within this category are those designed for employment against targets, 




Tactical missiles, those "which will have a direct effect on current Army tactical 
operations," were assigned to the Army.  However, the agreement asserted that this 
was "no change" to present agreements and it did little to prevent continued 
contention over roles and missions and duplication of efforts.14  Vannevar Bush,  
Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, then tried to resolve the 
issue by creating a Guided Missiles Committee, composed of three civilians and two 
officers from each of the three competing services, but all three of the military services 
ignored the group.15 
 Consequently, when Louis Johnson became President Truman's Secretary of 
Defense on March 28, 1949 and reduced service budgets again, interservice struggles 
over who would control missiles erupted once more.  The Army tried to regain control 
of surface-to-surface ballistic missiles by recommending that the Air Force focus on air 
launched missiles and the Navy control sea launched missiles, leaving the ground 
launched missiles to the Army.  Because the services could not come to agreement, 
Johnson ordered a complete review of all Defense Department missile programs.  The 
review accomplished little as the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the services 
hold joint control rather than defining clear roles and responsibilities as Johnson had 
desired.  Therefore, Johnson ordered Secretary of the Air Force  Symington to come up 
with a better plan.  Symington established the Special Interdepartmental Guided 
Missiles Board, known better as the Stuart Board after its head, Harold Stuart.  Another 




 Secretary Johnson was frustrated at the lack of cooperation.  He considered 
bringing in someone from outside of the Defense Department to help resolve the issue, 
but the services did not want to lose control of this potentially valuable weapon as they 
had the nuclear bomb.  Symington convinced Johnson to allow the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
one last opportunity to prioritize defense missile projects and establish order.  This 
time, according to Air Force historians Michael Del Papa and Sheldon Goldberg, the 
Joint Chiefs recommended "that the Air Force be given operational responsibility for 
surface-to-surface missiles that replaced aircraft other than close air support aircraft" 
while the Navy was assigned "responsibility for surface-to-surface missiles that 
replaced naval aircraft" and the Army was assigned joint responsibility with the Air 
Force over control of "surface-to-surface missiles that replaced close support aircraft."  
The agreement should have reduced the antagonism, but the services continued to 
"study" missiles that were not within their purview, wanting to be ready if and when 
the guidance changed again.16   
 In the midst of all of the maneuvering, the Joint Chiefs prioritized the existing 
missile programs and relegated "long range strategic missiles" to eighth on their 
priority list.  Air Force missile advocates were angry over this low ranking, but the Air 
Force itself had "assigned top priority to those missiles which would enhance the 
capabilities of its strategic bombers and second priority to air defense missiles."17  All 
these disputes mattered less than it appeared as, in July 1949, the National Security 




nation's highest priority and the production of the B-36 bomber to carry it as the 
second highest priority.  Nothing was said about the long range missile.18   
 Work on missiles waned until June 1950, when North Korea invaded South 
Korea and the United States entered the conflict.  Increases in defense funding allowed 
additional research and development, so the Air Force renewed work on the 
intercontinental missile, including Convair's Atlas ballistic missile.  Unfortunately, as 
some of the limited resources started to move toward missiles, a conflict arose within 
the Air Force that was almost as antagonistic as its interservice rivalry with the Army.   
 Richard Curtain, a lower ranking officer on the Air Staff at the time, explained 
the conflict.  "Many of the people who were real airplane types .. [were] not sure that 
we [in the Air Force] should have these new things [missiles].  The new things might 
take over some of the jobs of the airplanes and so forth . . . ."  Conversely, other airmen 
remembered the contest over roles and missions when the Army attempted to take 
over missiles, potentially threatening the Air Force's strategic bombing mission.  
Therefore, missile advocates like Curtain advised Nathan Twining, Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, and Thomas White, Air Force Chief of Staff, that the Air Force had to 
develop missiles or the strategic mission would be taken away from them.   
If the Army controlled missiles, Curtain explained, "Why should we [the Air Force] have 
the mission of bombing targets 500 miles away, as opposed to the Army who said they 




 Eisenhower, along with many others, believed that missiles would carry the 
burden of warfare within the decade, replacing the manned airplane for most 
missions.20  Airpower advocate Gill Robb Wilson acknowledged the concern most 
explicitly, stating, "The Air Force could make no sadder mistake than to believe that 
public concern about air power is ipso facto zeal for the Department of the Air Force.  
The fact is that Army and Navy could quietly absorb every major role of the Air Force 
without enough public outcry to disturb a nursery."21  Senior Air Force leaders 
remembered General Arnold's concern that "whether we have rockets, menless [sic] 
aircraft, or something that replaces the aircraft in its entirety, I want to be very sure 
that the Air Forces are not again slightly behind our enemies," and Billy Mitchell's belief 
that the Army was the enemy and could not be trusted with the strategic air mission.  
Therefore, Air Force pilots struggled fiercely to retain missiles even though many were 
terrified that they might replace the aircraft they loved.22  If the Air Force controlled 
missiles, presumably it could ensure the new weapons would not completely replace 
the manned airplane.  To ensure the latter did not happen, Air Force leaders began to 
argue that "missiles and aircraft can be combined, capitalizing on the performance and 
characteristics of each, to create a formidable instrument of air power considerably 
greater than the use of missiles or aircraft alone.  The creation of such an instrument is 
a primary objective of the Air Force."23  Another factor looked into the future.  Several 




even if manned flight was not immediately threatened, they believed the Air Force 
must control missiles to ensure the service's future in space flight.24 
 Historian John Lonnquest contends that, paradoxically, even though the Air 
Force struggled desperately to control ballistic missiles, between 1946 and 1952, Air 
Force leaders never prepared adequate operational concepts for the ballistic missile, 
refused to allocate appropriate resources, and failed to monitor the development of 
the ballistic missile.  Ray Soper, an Air Force veteran of the time, agreed.  "The 
Op[eration]s attitude, at the Pentagon, was to let the 'longhairs' develop the system -- 
they didn't take a very serious view of the ballistic missile, for it was thought to be 
more a psychological weapon than anything else," he remembered.  "The main Air Staff 
support was from the Vice Chief -- later Chief of Staff, General [Thomas] White -- and 
from General Don Putt, the [Deputy Chief of Staff for Development].  I remember many 
times General White lectured the Air Staff on ballistic missiles--they were here to stay, 
he told them, and the Air Staff had better realize this fact and get on with it."25 
 Roy Ferguson, who was assigned to the Air Staff in 1951 as a major, reinforced 
Lonnquest's argument.  Years later, he recalled being "the only missile enthusiast in the 
Directorate of Operations . . . .  The Air Force then [after World War II] decided to get 
into missiles like Matador and Snark and Rascal.26  And nobody had really given any 
thought to how they were going to use them."  When he mentioned his interest in 
missiles, his leadership "was tickled pink because in those days . . ., the Air Force didn't 




 Some movement did take place, based on the actions of missile enthusiasts 
including White, Ferguson, and Curtain.  In April 1951, Strategic Air Command 
published "Preliminary Plans for Activation and Employment of USAF Guided Missile 
Units."  A year later, General White, a supporter of missiles, created a new office, the 
Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations (Guided Missiles), to help incorporate 
missiles into the service and to develop operational concepts for them.  This action still 
did not heal the widening rift between those who supported missiles and those who 
did not.28   
 In January 1953, the commander of Air Research and Development Command, 
Lt. General Earl Partridge, complained that a lack of centralized Air Force guidance on 
missiles made it difficult for his command to coordinate their development.  Bomber 
advocates, he argued, were able to push the ICBM program to the side over the 
objections of a "small but vigorous missile group."  He then warned that if the Air Force 
failed to work aggressively to integrate missiles, the Air Force would split into two 
hostile camps:  missile advocates and "old fogies," those who fought for the dominance 
of piloted aircraft.29   
 Partridge was not far off the mark.  Ferguson later elaborated, "The Air Force 
didn't want missiles because any money you spent on missiles took away from the 
manned fleet.  That's the reason General [Curtis] LeMay hated us so . . . ."  He 
continued, "[LeMay] wanted new airplanes and lots of them.  And with these missile 




theirs.  Not only that, they kept saying we were throwing pilots out of work . . . ."  In 
fact, when the Air Force began awarding missile badges, Ferguson remembered taunts 
that "the missile badge, it was shooting down the wings, which are right above it."  
Soper, too, remembered LeMay saying, "You guys are going to regret everything you're 
doing.  You're going to regret every penny spent on this damned [Atlas] missile."30 
 Eisenhower's appointment of Trevor Gardner as Special Assistant to the 
Secretary of the Air Force for Research and Development in 1953 greatly strengthened 
the lot of those who sought to incorporate missiles into the service, but it did nothing 
to resolve the enmity between the two groups.  Instead, Gardner's appointment further 
exacerbated the antagonism.  Ray Soper remembered a "feeling [on the Air Staff] that 
Gardner was out to create a personal empire, employing Air Force operational needs 
for ballistic missiles to further this aim."31 
 As discussed in Chapter 2, Gardner wanted a "crash" program, one unhindered 
by anything or anyone, to produce missiles as quickly as possible.  Less than a year after 
the Americans demonstrated the efficacy of the hydrogen bomb, in August 1953, his 
missile program gained urgency and political backing as the Soviets detonated their 
own hydrogen bomb.  By the end of the year, the Eisenhower administration made 
"nuclear weapons with the most advanced aerial delivery systems" the primary focus of 
national defense in order to reduce military costs.  Gardner, with the backing of key 
scientists and politicians, "urged Air Force policy-makers to give over-riding priority to 




 While Gardner widened the rift within the Air Force, he opened another in the 
contracting world as well.  Even though Convair engineers had designed Atlas while the 
Air Force neglected ballistic missiles, Gardner did not trust that they had the scientific 
and engineering aptitude to create an ICBM."33  Therefore, he selected two 
technological entrepreneurs who had served on the Air Force's Scientific Advisory 
Board, Simon Ramo and Dean Wooldridge, and wrangled a contract for them to 
"conduct an analytical engineering study [on] the progress of development in the 
strategic missile field."  Not unsurprisingly, in February 1954, Ramo-Wooldridge, the 
company formed for the task, "expressed dissatisfaction with Convair's development 
efforts on the Atlas missile and recommended the establishment of a new 
Development Management Group which would have directorial responsibility for the 
entire project."  Gardner immediately hired Ramo-Wooldridge to guide his missile 
program, "recommending that [the] group . . . have the highest priority obtainable in all 
matters of development, production, and support in that it would be relieved of all 
hindrances created by military regulations."  Ramo and Wooldridge then gathered 
talented civilians to work on the missile project.  Cherry-picking the best employees 
helped ensure that the new workers cared about missiles and had the capability to 
accomplish the job at hand, but the new organization quickly engendered the hostility 
of other aerospace companies and Air Force commands that lost outstanding personnel 





 Since the von Neumann Committee and RAND reports on the capabilities of the 
thermonuclear bomb were released about the same time, in early February 1954, 
Gardner pushed Secretary of the Air Force Talbott to radically reorganize and 
accelerate the ICBM program, pressing for an emergency capability as early as 1958 in 
order to achieve a capability before the Soviets. Talbott agreed.  Air Force Chief of Staff 
Nathan Twining asked the Air Force Council to determine how to best accomplish this, 
so on March 11 and 15, the members convened.  The Council recommended that the 
Air Force retain the Snark, Navaho, and Atlas missile projects, but revised the payload 
and circular error probable standards to make them more realistic in light of the new 
thermonuclear capability.  In addition, the Council advised that the "development and 
operation of [the Atlas] is a mission of the Air Force and must be under control of the 
Air Force."35  A month later, on May 14, General White, as Vice Chief of Staff, directed 
the Air Force to assign Atlas the highest Air Force priority and to accelerate the 
program to the maximum extent that technology would allow.36  
 On June 21, 1954, still concerned that Gardner was creating another Manhattan 
Project, the Air Staff "delegated [the Air Research and Development Command] the 
responsibility of developing the [missile] weapon system and of recommending the 
logistics, operational, and personnel concepts to be applied in supporting this weapon."  
Air Force leaders also directed that the Command establish a new division, the Western 




but ensured that General Bernard Schriever, a recognized expert on missiles and a 
zealot in his own right, became the division's commander.37 
 Jamie Wallace, one of the officers that worked for Schriever, remembered that 
"The bomber men like LeMay were in full control of the Air Force and so interest in 
guided missiles was low indeed."  Nevertheless, a number of airmen like Wallace had 
become involved in the various early missile programs and acquired experience in that 
way, so when Schriever began to look for workers, a cadre of officers with experience 
in missiles existed.  Wallace recalled, "When Schriever got the job a lot of us came out 
of the woodwork.  They knew where everybody was . . . . We were delighted to finally 
find someone who had the misison because we knew exactly what to do."38  
 The new division was situated near the offices of Ramo-Wooldridge in California 
and included the company's workers, but fell under the authority of the Air Research 
and Development Command.  A separate procurement office, responsible to the Air 
Materiel Command, was established to support the WDD.    Schriever had developed a 
close relationship with Gardner and quickly began to handpick his own personnel.  At 
the same time, he established a symbiotic relationship between Ramo-Wooldridge and 
the Western Development Division.  In the coming years, Schriever's division competed 
in a tug of war with the established Air Force commands and Air Staff over the control 
of missiles within the Air Force.39 
 A similar struggle was occurring in the contracting world.  At the beginning of 




contracted work on the Atlas, and expected to remain the primary weapon system 
contractor throughout the design and production phase.  Instead, the WDD transferred 
the systems engineering management job to Ramo-Wooldridge during the fall of 1954.  
Then, in a second precedent-setting act, the division decided to only request and 
review subsystem designs from select companies rather than requesting designs from 
all qualified companies and evaluating each proposal.  To introduce continuous 
competition into the process, Schriever convinced the Air Force to allow him to select a 
second contractor for each subsystem, calling the dual track program parallel 
development.  Thus, not only did Convair not get to design and build the missile that 
the company had exclusively worked on to that point, but the contracts it did earn 
forced it to compete with other companies to earn the final sale.  This new requirement 
was unprecedented and Convair, along with other companies infuriated by the process, 
complained to Congress and senior Air Force leaders.  It appears that the criticality of 
getting a missile developed and built overrode concerns with legality or propriety.  
When the Air Force established a committee to review and approve the ICBM 
development plan, the Robertson Committee, as the committee became known, 
"reviewed [the process], doubted that the source-selection procedures were entirely 
fair . . ., but suspended judgment pending further observation."40   
  Because the Air Force did not have enough personnel to oversee all contracts in 
a timely manner, Ramo-Wooldridge was given authorization to guide the contractors 




process was being carried out, but "a joint Ramo-Wooldridge/Western Development 
Division/Ballistic Missiles Office committee explored the problem and concluded in 
August [1956] that almost everyone concerned had been more interested in getting his 
work done fast than in observing regulations . . . .  To WDD and Ramo-Wooldridge 
leaders, these were examples of the 'law's delay'" and such delays were not justified in 
slowing down the missile program.41  
 Finally, contractors complained that they were forced to reveal proprietary 
information to a competitor, Ramo-Wooldridge, since Ramo-Wooldridge participated in 
the selection of other contractors and wrote the contracts for these other companies.  
Because of parallel development, each company's ideas were provided to their 
opponents so that the programs could remain interchangable.  The WDD argued that 
there was no issue since Ramo-Wooldridge was prohibited from building missiles itself, 
but this did not resolve the ill will from many companies who felt cheated by the 
process.  42 
 All of these internal and contractual Air Force struggles did nothing to resolve 
the conflict with the Army, which had continued to work on ground-to-ground strategic 
missiles.  In the early 1950s, the Army's Redstone Arsenal in Alabama developed the 
Redstone missile, a liquid-fueled nuclear missile with a range of up to 200 miles, clearly 
within the Army's designated mission area.43  Then, advancing outside of its allocated 
field,  the Redstone Arsenal began to promote plans for a family of missiles, including 




 On December 2, 1954, possibly reacting to these Army advances, the Air Force 
established an operational requirement for a tactical ballistic missile even though Air 
Force historian Neufeld contends that "Headquarters USAF was not yet certain what to 
do with [a] shorter-range ballistic missile." 45  Ironically, in response to the new Air 
Force requirement "for the development of a 1,000-mile missile using existing 
hardware," the Army permitted the Redstone Arsenal to upgrade its Redstone missile 
early the next year.46  The Air Force agreed to consider the Army proposal, but 
recommended breaking up the Army team and assigning portions of the team to 
accomplish specific tasks.  The Secretary of the Army objected strenuously to this 
recommendation and won.47 
 Schriever hated the very idea of a medium or intermediate range ballistic 
missile, believing it would harm the development of the Air Force intercontinental 
ballistic missile.  He especially feared that the government would take the opportunity 
to "transfer . . . responsibility to another service or, because of the high priority of 
ballistic weapons, [establish] a separate management group for ballistic weapons 
directly under the DOD."48  In February of 1955, when the Killian Committee agreed 
with the von Neumann Committee that the United States must immediately create an 
IRBM with a 1,500 mile range in parallel with the ICBM, Schriever's fears were realized.  
The Army took its plans for a 1,500 mile intermediate range ballistic missile to the 
Department of Defense, arguing that the service also required "the ability to attack 




for Schriever, the Navy also offered two separate missile programs and a U.S./U.K. 
cooperative program was presented.  The Air Force, which had previously been given 
control of all missiles other than those replacing close air support or on water, 
responded to these perceived threats immediately.  It first claimed that the IRBM 
would be a derivative of the ICBM and then offered a separate IRBM program.50  To 
determine which of the competing programs the Department of Defense would 
sponsor, the Secretary of Defense established a Technical Advisory Committee, led by 
his deputy, Reuben Robertson. 
 During this precarious time for the Air Force, on May 2, 1955, the Air Staff 
approved Gardner and Schriever's development of a second ICBM, later named the 
Titan, under the stipulations that they study the creation of an IRBM from this two-
stage rocket and that it be produced in the central United States rather concentrating 
all missile development on the California seacoast.51   Neufeld reports that in July, the 
Robertson Committee determined that "the IRBM was not a natural derivative of the 
ICBM," knocking the Titan out of consideration for DoD's IRBM.  Intriguingly, the 
Robertson Committee used studies Ramo-Wooldridge had conducted earlier, which 
revealed that "the longest range expected of this type of IRBM was approximately 700 
nautical miles," a much shorter range than that of the Titan, to do so.52 
 Each service argued that it was most qualified to build the IRBM.  In fact, the 
Army offered to combine the Air Force and Navy programs and build them at Redstone 




shorter-range missile.  Predictably, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were unable to agree.  
Finally, they recommended that the United States develop two intermediate range 
missiles:  an Air Force missile and a joint Army-Navy missile, with the latter "having the 
dual objective of achieving an early shipboard capability and also providing a land-
based alternative to the Air Force program."53  The Secretary of Defense accepted this 
compromise on November 8, specifying, according to General White, that "an early 
operational capability will demand the utmost in cooperation between these 
programs."  White noted that the Secretary further "stated that not only is maximum 
technical and managerial coordination between the two IRBM programs essential, but 
maximum coordination among all of the ballistic missile programs is required."54  Soon 
after, "the President directed that the IRBM and ICBM programs should both be 
research and development programs of the highest priority above all others."55  
General Twining complained that the IRBM would be more complicated than the ICBM, 
would take more time to deploy, would be more vulnerable to the enemy, and more 
difficult to support," but Secretary Quarles rebuffed these concerns.56  
 Predictably, the services never achieved the required close cooperation.  Each 
service viewed the task as a competition.  They exchanged liaision officers, established 
delivery schedules for common components, and discussed mutual use of facilities, but 
each realized the importance of their service's success.  According to Richard Jacobson, 
an officer who worked on the Thor program, Schriever was surprised at the way that 




Thor had been cancelled, there is no doubt in my mind that the Army would have 
gotten the ICBM."57   
 The missile zealots quickly disregarded the internal and contractual discord as 
the interservice and political pressure to produce missiles increased.  Once President 
Eisenhower declared ballistic missiles to be the highest national research and 
development priority in September 1955, Gardner and Schriever used the momentum 
to further speed the process of building missiles.58   
 To clarify responsibilities and to ensure his programs were not slowed by the 
usual Air Force bureaucracy, Gardner established the Gillette Committee, under the Air 
Force Deputy for Budget, Hyde Gillette, to come up with an administrative plan to 
ensure missiles were prioritized within the Air Force.  In its "Air Force Plan for 
Simplifying Administrative Procedures for the ICBM", the Gillette Committee 
recommended the establishment of the Air Force Ballistic Missiles Committee and the 
reduction of the number of agencies and offices that guided ballistic missile decisions 
from forty-two to ten. When approved by the Secretary of Defense in November, the 
Gillette procedures consolidated the ten remaining approval organizations into two 
committees, one at Headquarters Air Force level and one at Department of Defense 
level.  Political machinations worked both ways as the Air Staff used the Gillette 
procedures to block Gardner's ambitions, "real or imagined," to create another 
Manhattan Project by establishing special Air Force measures to integrate missiles into 




conventional Air Force and Secretary of Defense methods for coordinating the 
incorporation of new missions, infuriating many who were thereby avoided.59  Soon 
after, Gardner and Schriever also managed to garner a specific annex to the Air Force 
budget for the missile program that no one else could touch, creating more resentment 
among Air Force leaders who were competing with them for money.60 
 In addition to the administrative changes, the Gillette Committee also 
recommended establishing an initial operational capability for missiles that would be 
directed by the Western Development Division.61  The division was to work with the 
appropriate commands to "develop a plan for employing the weapon in combat, 
prepare the associated logistics support plan, establish the first launching bases, and 
organize and train the first combat squadrons."62  When the Secretary of Defense 
received these recommendations, he responded forcefully, directing the Air Force Chief 
of Staff on November 14, 1955 "to issue the appropriate directives which will 
implement the procedures and organizational arrangements contained in the plan."63  
On November 18, General White, then Vice Chief of Staff, charged the Western 
Development Division with achieving an initial operating capability as soon as possible.  
White's order expanded the Division's requirement from developing a working missile 
to creating, producing, manning, and basing the missiles.  His directive did not dictate 
the required number of ICBMs or a timeline for its achievement, but he provided these 




 To accomplish these challenging goals, Schriever and the Western Development 
Division became further convinced that they had to "discard the usual procedure . . . [of 
building] a new weapon, part by part, in a series of consecutive steps--to fashion hand-
wrought prototypes before venturing into production tooling."  Schriever explained 
that "from the earliest days we saw that our assignment would demand a new kind of 
specialized planning to coordinate the myriad elements involved in our program . . . .  
But to reduce the time cycle we decided to attack all areas of our assignment 
concurrently."  He further clarified, "In short, we took the calculated risk of planning, 
programming, and spending our funds concurrently on research, development, testing, 
production, manpower training, base construction, and other phases of our 
production."65 
   "'Concurrency' -- the practice of scheduling the simultaneous conduct of various 
elements of the development program so as to insure the earliest possible availability 
of the operational weapon ...," Warren Greene explained in his formerly classified 
history of the Titan missile, "ran counter to the accepted -- and time honored -- 
sequential development process, in which the completion and proof of one step in a 
total system development process was an essential preliminary to commencement of 
the next step."66  The concept of concurrency, hazardous under the most opportune 
circumstances, was made even more volatile because the missile technology itself was 
not fully developed, much less the conceptual theories that would be used to guide the 




 Thus, not everyone -- even missile proponents -- agreed with Schriever's 
decision.  Lieutenant General Roscoe Wilson, Air Force Deputy Chief of Development 
from 1958 to 1961, revealed the opposing side's concerns.  In 1961, he complained, 
"The weapon system concept . . . was formerly called a 'crash' program.  The objective 
was to trade time for money.  By contrast, the concurrency concept that we are 
employing today is useful but very wasteful.  It should be employed only in extreme 
cases.  My view is 180 degrees opposite of that of General Schriever on this.  It took 
seven years to develop the B-52 using the prototype management approach before it 
was operational.  We have now spent seven years on the Atlas which is still not 
operational.  The missile program has thus been very costly." Schriever and Gardner's 
decision to fund and build a second, alternate missile, the Titan, using their concept of 
parallel development only exacerbated this frustration over cost and waste.67 
 Concurrency did allow the Air Force to accomplish its most important agenda -- 
to build and operate nuclear ICBMs before the Soviet Union did and before the other 
services could acquire the mission.  However, concurrency created extremely volatile 
conditions for the personnel selection and training and for the development of 
infrastructure and operational concepts associated with missiles.68  It also heightened 
the enmity of some Air Force and defense leaders who suspected that the new 
weapons were taking funding and support from existing military resources while only 




saw that their oversight of the new capability was reduced through political 
machinations.69 
 Those opposing Air Force control of missiles may have believed they obtained a 
reprieve when Gardner resigned on February 10, 1956, but General White and 
Congressional Democrats continued the press to achieve operational status for the 
missiles as soon as possible.  On December 28, 1955, a little over a month after his first 
directive on missile initial operating capability, White added numbers and a timeline to 
his requirements:  one wing of 120 missiles and sixty launching positions to be 
completed by January 1, 1960.70  This standard required more than building missiles.  
White specified that the wing should be divided equally between three support bases 
to be located on government property in the eastern, central, and western United 
States and the first ten missiles were to be operational by April 1, 1959.  This 
assignment required the Western Development Division to not only construct bases 
and missile sites in this compressed timeframe, but also to select and train the 
personnel who would operate the missiles. 71  
 Roy Ferguson had been tasked to design an organization for the missiles.  He 
remembered being given three or four days to complete the duty.  After trying to 
compare the number of people required or the destructive capability to a standard Air 
Force unit, he discovered there was nothing to guide his decisions.  Therefore, he 
decided to build the organization in a way that would allow the Air Force to launch the 




missiles, he organized the first missile squadron to have six missiles and two guidance 
stations.  This decision provided each squadron missile with a primary and backup 
guidance station.  While he admitted that the organization was completely arbitrary, no 
one had any better ideas.72 
 When the wing was completed in 1960, White expected the new missileers at 
each base to be capable of launching ten missiles within fifteen minutes of an alert, ten 
more within the next two hours, and all forty missiles within two hours and fifteen 
minutes.  In March 1956, he also set the initial operating capability for IRBMs:  one 
wing of three bases in England with ten missiles ready by October 1958 and 120 
missiles combat ready by July 1, 1959.73 
 The pressure was too much for even Schriever, who worried that missiles built 
in this short time frame would not fly.  After negotiations with General White failed to 
sway the Vice Chief, Schriever requested help from his boss, the commander of Air 
Research and Development Command, General Tommy Power, and from one of 
Schriever's arch-nemeses, General LeMay, to help delay him.  Power argued that 
White's timeline was so short that it would not allow Schriever to adequately test and 
produce the missiles, much less create training and personnel pipelines to generate the 
required operators.   LeMay, one of the most powerful men in the Air Force at the time, 
backed Schriever and Power, contending that the compressed schedule would force 
contractors to produce the missiles before they had been adequately flight tested and 




 In May, the two sides agreed to a still aggressive goal of twenty-five operational 
ICBMs by January 1, 1960, with 120 missiles (eighty Atlas and forty Titan) ready for 
launch by March 1961.  The requirement for IRBMs had been pushed back as well, with 
only thirty IRBMs needing to be deployed by July 1, 1959, and the entire 120 missile 
wing postponed to July 1960.   The new agreement reduced some of the pressure on 
the Western Development Division.75 
 Schriever should not have worried.  The Air Force Ballistic Missile Committee, 
run by Secretary Quarles, refused to accept even the less compressed timetable due to 
financial concerns.  On November 10, 1956, after all the negotiations were done, the 
Air Force reduced the ICBM force requirement to forty Atlas missiles and forty Titan 
missiles, to be in place by March 1961, with three launchers and six missiles prepared 
by March 1959.  The  IRBM schedule remained the same, with the first squadron to be 
ready by July 1959 and the fourth completed by July 1960, but the squadrons would 
now only possess fifteen missiles each, cutting the total number of missiles by 50 
percent.76  
 During this same time, Air Force missile proponents won another conflict.  On 
November 26, 1956, the Secretary of Defense assigned "operational employment of the 
land-based Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile system [as] the sole responsibility of 
the U.S. Air Force."  On the other hand, the Secretary felt the need to document that 
"this does not, however, prohibit the Army from making limited feasibility studies in 




missile, the Jupiter or Thor, would "be used for various missions in the armed 
services."77  Less than two weeks later, the solid-fuel Navy missile was added as a key 
defense priority because it could be safely launched from submarines, making it less 
vulnerable to a nuclear first strike.  Therefore, on December 8, the Navy withdrew from 
the Jupiter program to develop its own missile, which it designated the Polaris.  The 
competition between the services for control of ballistic missiles continued unabated.78 
 On January 11, 1957, President Eisenhower and the NSC approved the Air 
Force's initial operating capability plans, although Eisenhower warned that he might 
change the force's size or schedule.  On March 28, 1957, after coordinating with the 
British at the Bermuda conference, which was scheduled to improve relations between 
the two countries after conflict over the Suez Crisis, the President agreed to retain both 
the number and schedule of the missiles, although he changed the wording requesting 
the missiles from "the earliest possible date" to "the earliest practicable date."79  The 
reduced requirements and extended schedule created an opportunity for Eisenhower's 
critics to attack his defense policies, with former Air Force Secretary Symington leading 
the pack, keeping politics firmly in the equation.80 
  For much of the rest of the year, the Air Force struggled between the opposing 
pressures to build the missiles as quickly as possible and to reduce costs.  The service 
obtained Camp Cooke, on the coast of California, from the Army and began developing 
it as Cooke Air Force Base to serve as an operational and training missile base.  The 




it could while hurriedly determining the requirements of the servicemen -- deemed 
missilemen -- who would operate these missiles.  Then, during the summer of 1957, to 
prevent the national debt from rising over its authorized ceiling, the Secretary of 
Defense reduced the scheduled production of missiles -- pushing the initial operational 
capability [IOC] date back by months -- and ordered the Air Force to cut overtime costs.  
In July, in response to further economic pressure, Secretary Wilson reduced the priority 
of Titan and suspended production of both Thor and Jupiter until a single IRBM 
program could be selected for continuation.  On August 6, the missile advocate, 
General White, who had become the Air Force Chief of Staff in July, appealed to the 
new Secretary of the Air Force, James Douglas, to intercede against further cuts, but if 
the cuts could not be prevented, at least to allow the Air Force to determine where to 
take the cuts.81 
 The timing could not have been better for the missile advocates.  Two days 
earlier, the Soviet Union had launched Sputnik and the United States was beginning to 
react.  Congressional inquiries and immense public pressure began to motivate 
Eisenhower's administration to revise its priorities.  Neil McElroy, who replaced Wilson 
as Secretary of Defense on October 9, had his new Director of Guided Missiles, William 
Holaday, order the Army and Air Force to produce and deploy four squadrons each of 
the Thor and Jupiter missiles, with the first squadrons to be operational by December 
31, 1958, and the last by March 1960.  Soon after, Holaday approved an Air Force 




rate of production in order to complete this task by March 1963.  He also returned the 
Titan to operational status, but did not agree to the Air Force request to double the 
production of that missile.  These new demands intensified the pressure to select and 
train the new missileers.82 
 Another significant change happened within the Air Force itself.  On November 
27, 1957, the key leaders involved in the production and use of missiles (Power, now at 
SAC; Schriever; Edwin Rawlings of Air Materiel Command; Samuel Anderson, now 
commanding Air Research and Development Command; and Ben Funk of the Ballistic 
Missile Office) agreed that the Air Force should "transfer to SAC . . . all IOC training and 
operational responsibilities, units, and bases."83 
 Of course, everything was far from perfect.  Following the Gaither Committee 
report, Secretary McElroy turned to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for help determining clear 
ICBM requirements.  Once again, the JCS failed to find consensus.  General White 
pressed for more ICBMs while Admiral Arleigh Burke wanted to increase the number of 
the Navy's Polaris missiles.  On the other hand, General Maxwell Taylor, the Army Chief 
of Staff, declared that the military had too many nuclear weapons and needed to focus 
on non-nuclear forces.84   
 McElroy declared that the Air Force would control all land-based missiles, 
including ICBMs and IRBMs.  The Western Development Division, now called the Air 
Force Ballistic Missile Office, transferred the new missiles and associated bases and 




these new weapons, especially if they were going to replace the manned airplane.  The 
rush to quickly develop and deploy the new missiles, exacerbated by the political and 
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4. RUSH TO ALERT: INTENSIFYING MISTRUST AND ENMITY1 
 
 U.S. Air Force Colonel Thomas McGehee contended in his 1955 Air War College 
thesis, that "in any race for qualitative weapons superiority the advantage gained is apt 
to be temporary and even lost if the weapon system is not operational almost 
simultaneously with its scientific development."2  Many Americans, including some 
political leaders, agreed with him.  Thus, after the Soviets launched Sputnik 1 and 
Sputnik 2 in November 1957, "a form of 'mass hysteria' coupled with frustration . . . 
spread rapidly over the political, military and scientific circles throughout this country.  
The public began to clamor for drastic emergency action in a desperate struggle to 
overcome our seemingly secondary position in technological development."3    
 The Air Force fiercely contended with the other services to maintain control of 
the ballistic missile throughout this turbulent time.  Malcolm MacIntyre, Under 
Secretary of the Air Force from 1957 to 1959, remembered, "Sputnik went off in 
October 1957 and there was great criticism about our missiles not being in place.  As a 
matter of fact, around that time we had about six failures with the Atlas.  There was a 
great cry to cancel the Atlas program [and give the ballistic missile program to another 
organization], which we [the Air Force] resisted."4 
 Due to this intense political and social pressure, the Air Force began the process 
of making the ballistic missile operational even though it had not yet successfully 




remembered that the Atlas was "not ready to go."  The Air Force, he contended, 
pushed Atlas into operational service because it desperately needed a squadron of 
missiles that the service could call operational.5  Therefore, on October 31, 1959, 
following a successful long-range launch, General Thomas Power declared the Atlas 
missiles at California's Vandenberg Air Force Base to be the first operational ICBMs.6  
His decision would have long term, negative repercussions on the credibility of missiles 
in the Air Force.  The Atlas and other early liquid fueled missiles were very unreliable 
and quite dangerous because of the requirement for liquid oxygen.  Between June 1, 
1963 and May 14, 1964, four separate Atlas F sites, three at Walker AFB, NM, and one 
at Altus AFB, OK, had explosions traced to liquid oxygen, leading to the liquid fueled 
missiles being removed from service after only a few years and providing a rationale, no 
matter how thin, for Air Force pilots to denigrate and disregard later missiles.7 
 Power's declaration began a year of frustration for Air Force missileers.  After 
the general deemed the Atlas operational, Bernard Schriever's team could not 
consistently replicate the successful launch.  Major Benjamin Bellis, who worked for 
Schriever during this time and later retired as a lieutenant general, observed that when 
a missile was launched without problems, "we didn't have a record of how we made it 
successful . . . .  So we were having random success, the worst thing that can happen to 
you because you know you got it right but you can't repeat it."8   
 Random success also created credibility problems for other Air Force missiles.  




and so these missiles, like Atlas, struggled with credibility issues.  Colonel Bill Large, a 
highly decorated pilot who was then serving as the Assistant Commander-in-Chief, 
Strategic Air Command, for Missiles, recalled taking the members of a SAC 
commander's conference to a Thor missile launch.  After a leak in the missile system 
caused the launch team to cancel the launch, Large remembered that "all of the SAC 
guys said, 'We told you so.  Missiles are no good, are not here to stay.'"9 Some missile 
crewmembers expressed similar concerns with the Atlas' capabilities, although they did 
not attempt to be so prophetic.  Staff Sergeant Donald Glantz, who served as a missile 
guidance technician at Vandenberg from 1958 to 1964, remembered that the Air Force 
"eventually worked out most of the bugs and we had many successful launches, but it 
was not a reliable military weapon."  He also believed "these missiles were more of a 
symbolic deterrent than a credible threat."10   
 The decision to place the Thor and Jupiter IRBMs in the hands of American allies 
created other difficulties as well.  On March 25, the last day of the 1957 Bermuda 
Conference, President Dwight Eisenhower and British Prime Minister Harold MacMillan 
announced an agreement to deploy Thor missiles to England.  Six months later, in 
September, the Air Force successfully launched the first Thor in the United States.  The 
Air Force transported the first Thor to England by air on September 19, 1958, but the 
Thor missile was not declared operational until December 16, three months later, when 
a Strategic Air Command crew successfully launched one from a site at Vandenberg.11  




December, 1958; the second in June 1959, the third in October, and the fourth in 
March 1960.  Nevertheless, the Air Force did not turn over a complete Thor squadron 
to the United Kingdom until June 6, 1959, six months behind schedule.12   
 The delays in Thor's operational status created friction between the United 
States and Great Britain, but this discord was nothing compared to the problems the 
Jupiter missile created with other American allies.  The United States had originally 
planned to place Jupiter squadrons in several allied nations belonging to the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization, including three in France, but Charles DeGaulle's 
government refused to accept the missiles on French soil despite the fact that France 
had previously requested U.S. nuclear missiles.  Since the missiles were already 
designed and being constructed, the United States worked to coordinate new locations 
for the IRBMs in the Far East and on the European continent or North Africa.  
Concerned that the State Department might not find allies willing to accept the missiles 
on U.S. terms, the Department of Defense selected Elmendorf AFB, Alaska, as the 
fallback option.13  Diplomats finally worked out deals with Italy, in August 1959, and 
Turkey, in late October of the same year, to place Jupiter missiles in these countries, 
but political and technical struggles pushed back operational dates and further 
damaged the missiles' credibility.14 
 When historians asked several former SAC generals about integrating early 
missiles into the force, General David Burchinal recalled, "We covered all their targets 




manned airplanes."  After General Leon Johnson agreed, Burchinal continued, "One 
never counted on them as an independent strike force sufficiently reliable in 
themselves."  Atlas did not fare much better in their minds.  Curtis LeMay remarked, 
"The accuracy of the first missiles was nothing to jump up and down about."  General 
Jack Catton recapitulated the theme, "These idiots pulled me down into the basement 
there and started explaining to me that we were going to shoot this rocket, that was 
going to go 5,000 miles and it was going to be within . . . I guess about a mile of the 
target."  Catton continued, "There you are, shooting a rocket like a cannon, and it is 
going to go 5,000 miles and be within a mile of the aiming point.  That was just hard for 
me to comprehend.  That makes you apprehensive.  Then there was General LeMay's 
point about being tested fully, and being sure you know what you are doing."  He did 
not say, but it was likely that all of the ICBMs were 'backed up" by manned aircraft as 
well since most of LeMay's "bomber men" refused to trust missiles.  Tellingly, in 1958, 
LeMay remarked, "Initially, strategic missiles will augment our offensive striking forces.  
As we learn more about them and know that they will be able to accomplish the job 
they are designed to do, they will replace a portion of our  manned bomber force."  He 
continued, "However, as far into the future as I can see, I feel we must have integrated 
forces of both piloted and unpiloted systems to give us greater flexibility in our 
operations."15 
 To make matters worse, Schriever had employed a concept he labeled 




aerodynamic missiles used what Major Bellis "called the three-step stage.  We would 
do some handmade prototypes, and then we would come out with an experimental 
model.  After we had demonstrated that, then we would go into a production 
prototype.  What happened between the X version and the Y version is that we would 
take the new technology that was now available and incorporate it and literally create 
something new."16  Only after validating the concept would the engineers move on to 
production.   
 Richard Jacobson, a veteran of Schriever's process, later explained how 
concurrency was different.  "You develop and produce all at the same time, and you 
deploy as quick as you can though you may not have finished development."17  Colonel 
McGehee explained the reasoning behind the change, contending that in aircraft 
development, "the maximum efficiency of the system is gained after a period of trial 
and error in which experience of personnel is increased, equipment is modified or 
augmented and operational concepts are tried and adopted or discarded."  On the 
other hand, McGehee argued, "in an ICBM system there is no opportunity for this trial 
and error period.  The components of the system must be managed so as to guarantee 
simultaneous availability of missiles, warheads, operational and maintenance 
personnel, supplies and equipment, logistics concepts, launching sites and operational 
concepts and plans."18 
 Concurrency was not a new concept.  According to Department of Defense 




to ready the Army for a possible war with the Soviet Union . . ., but the acceleration 
complicated production and resulted in some inadequately tested systems that 
performed poorly in the field."19  The Air Force had used the concept as well, in World 
War II, with the B-24, the B-26, and the B-29 bombers, but Converse contends that 
"accelerated acquisition allowed little or no time for testing the system prior to the 
initiation of production.  Changes to improve performance or correct deficiencies were 
made after production had begun or was completed, and special modification centers 
were established for this purpose."20 
 The initial iterations of concurrency involved known technologies produced en 
mass during a war, but had still struggled with problems.  Major Bellis described how 
using concurrency for missiles created even more concerns:  "In the development part 
of the program, the problem of quality control was the harshest we had ever really 
gotten into because in the manned aircraft, the pilot can work it out.  If the anomalies 
of the thing do not work out, we have a pilot to fix it; not so on ballistic missiles."  He 
further admitted that, "the quality just has to be to a 'T', plus we had not set up a 
system test area to test the whole system.  We had tested the propulsion system; we 
had tested the reentry; we had tested the subsystems, but we didn't have a system test 
area."  After putting the system together, Bellis recounted, the designers found "that 
the subsystems looked fine, but wouldn't play as the test system."21   When the Air 
Force began building the missile launch centers, the problem worsened.  Contractors 




measured in thousands of an inch.  Since it was very unlikely that any of the 
construction workers had even seen a missile, they found it difficult to understand 
these tight tolerances.  The workers' frustration with these exacting standards, added 
to complaints over the rushed timeline and sometimes perplexing leadership, led to 
conflicts between labor unions and government overseers and several unions began 
strikes over the issues.22 
 Another problem with concurrency was the ever-changing requirements.  "The 
engineers kept finding new things in ballistic missiles that they wanted to make sure 
they got in that first operational site . . . .," Bellis recalled.  "What we found was that we 
had been approving changes to go into the Thor from the test experience, from the 
development experience, from the technology advancement experience, and so we 
were directing the contractors to put changes into the program, into the missiles and 
then the corresponding changes into the ground support equipment," he 
commiserated, "--all the testers and evaluators and controls and all those kinds of 
things that go with it, and the depot tooling, and the spare parts, and the tech manuals.  
You try to keep them all coming together.  We found nobody was keeping it 
together."23   
 To resolve the difficulties, Bellis enacted what he later termed configuration 
control.  "We went back and got into a specification program to define more specific 
detail so we could have a configuration baseline and then keep changing that baseline 




missile."  The baseline allowed the Air Force to define "where the modification would 
be done and who was going to do it; the spare parts that had already been produced 
versus the new spare parts; and the tech manuals and the change sheets to the tech 
manuals, because we were going to have both configurations in the field at the same 
time . . . .  Then you get changes on top of changes on top of changes on top of 
changes." 
 Because this process still did not work as Bellis had hoped, he later amended 
the system to what he called configuration management, but  "found out we had no 
knowledge of what the status was with respect to all of these change decisions.  We 
would find some change kits going in ahead of schedule because they had shorter 
leadtime [sic] than earlier approved changes.  So we had stuff that wouldn't fit because 
the earlier change hadn't been put in that gave you the required fit."  After many 
adjustments, Bellis' team was finally able to develop a more effective system.24 
 Nevertheless, Bellis found the Atlas missile program struggled with the same 
problems that he had seen in the Thor, except the situation was even more flawed.   
Because the Air Force decided to upgrade the Atlas at the same time as it placed the 
missiles at operational sites, the service began building three different configurations of 
Atlas missiles at the same place at the same time, compounding the problems.25 
 Bellis complained, "We had lost control of the Atlas.  We were installing systems 
in Cheyenne at Warren Air Force Base for the Atlas D, which was [a] soft, horizontal 




the hard silo vertical configuration."  All were being placed into operation at the same 
time.  What Bellis found astounded him.  "We found the part numbers were wrong; we 
found the discipline of dash number--you have a part number and then the dash 1 or 
dash 3 or dash 5 tells you the change configuration.  The log books were not up to date.  
They didn't even tell you what [change configuration or part] was there."  This 
uncontrolled mish-mash led to the random success that infuriated Bellis, further 
hurting the credibility of the missiles in the minds of many key Air Force leaders as well 
as those assigned to operate the missiles.26 
  The rush to put missiles on alert led to other problems as well, including the 
selection and training of personnel.  In early 1958, Colonel Allen Stephens, the Chief of 
Staff for the 1st Missile Division, expressed the common worry from his organization 
that "all missilemen must be in the genius category."  Many who were planning the 
missile enterprise for the Air Force had the same concerns.  Lieutenant Colonel Leroy 
Ferguson once asked a group of General Schriever's missile planners, "Do we need a 
bunch of Ph.D.'s to fire this thing?"  The response was not encouraging.  Otto Glasser, 
program director for the Atlas quipped, "If you do, we've failed."27   
 James Baar and William Howard, in Combat Missileman, quoted an unnamed Air 
Force officer as saying "Our research people and the factory people still wanted each 
crew made up of nine stars, every man [equal to] a Ted Williams [one of the greatest 




Williamses, and even if you could, you couldn't pay 'em.  So we had a lot of give and 
take and ended up with some more reasonable requirements."28 
 After discussing the concern with Jim Dempsey, Convair's chief engineer for the 
Atlas program, Colonel Stephens was reassured that the Air Force was tailoring the 
missiles to meet the "personnel qualifications and limitations" of the thousands of 
airmen already serving to maintain and operate the current bomber fleet.  Glasser 
agreed with Dempsey.  "There is no real reason why the missile should be any more 
complicated than an airplane," Glasser said. "It isn't learning to fly that makes a good 
pilot.  Learning to fly is easy.  It's judgment that is important.  It's who can make the 
right decision quickly.  This is what you can't put into a machine, but what the combat 
missileman is going to have to be able to do."29  
    Glasser was right about judgment being a necessity.  The people selected to 
operate the new missiles would hold a position very different from any other.  While 
they would hold the power to devastate large areas of land, killing or maiming almost 
everyone in the target area and destroying most of the buildings and natural habitat, 
they would hold no authority to determine when their weapon was used and often 
were not aware of the target that their missile or missiles were aimed toward.  In 
addition, because of their isolation, missileers had little contact with the outside world 
and thus could not verify or prepare themselves for, other than through official 
channels, any situation leading to a launch command.  Alerts were tedious, preparing 




that they must be prepared to respond to if it came.  The bomber pilots held a similar 
responsibility, but would at least have a few hours of flight time to reflect on their 
awesome duty and to ensure their mission was ethical before launching their bombs. 
  General Power, in a message to the first missileers, expounded on the problem 
of finding the right people: "Not only because of the complexity of the weapon systems 
involved but primarily because of the unprecedented nature of combat missile 
operations, our main problem . . . is the manning of our rapidly expanding missile force 
with personnel who meet the stringent qualifications demanded of SAC missile combat 
crews."30  Power detailed additional specifications required of the new missileers.  
"They must be thoroughly trained in the highly technical aspects of a revolutionary new 
science.  They must possess the superior physical, mental and moral attributes required 
of the military man, especially in this day and age, and above all," he declared, "they 
must be imbued with an exceptional degree of maturity and dedication in order to be 
worthy of the unparraled [sic] responsibilities which are assigned to them."31   
 Since the pilots who had flown and fought in World War II and Korea had 
proven themselves capable in many of these aspects, as had the enlisted aircraft 
maintainers, Strategic Air Command turned to them to fill the billets.  Colonel William 
S. Rader, the first commander of the Air Force's first missile wing, strongly 
recommended this action, stating, "The operation of this mixed force [of manned and 
unmanned strategic weapons in the Air Force] will pose many problems. . . .  Obviously, 




flying game should be the best qualified to solve these problems."   Rader further 
advised, "These factors dictate a need for manning policies whose criteria provide for 
rated personnel in all key missile management functions and a minimum of 50% rated 
personnel for all officer positions exclusive of the combat support group and medical 
group functions."32  General Power levied the necessary airmen from the Strategic Air 
Command units around the world.  He requested volunteers, but volunteer status was 
not a requirement.  The key requirement was "excellence," meaning that, for officers, 
the selectee had to be evaluated as "outstanding" or "very fine officer," the top half of 
a four level rating system that the Air Force used at the time.  Non-commissioned 
officers who were selected must have been assessed as above average and 
"demonstrated leadership and superiority."  All volunteers were to be career 
servicemen, not in their first enlistment.33 
   This decision resolved one problem and a considerable one at that, but it 
created others.  Taking large numbers of rated officers and qualified non-commissioned 
officers from the bomber fleet entailed losing valuable resources from what the Air 
Force considered their most critical mission--flying.  Initially the Air Force planned to 
find "compatible [people], capable of accepting the most uniform behavior pattern" 
who would serve in missiles their entire career.  Lieutenant Colonel Anderson advised, 
"The launch officer will find his exercise of ingenuity largely restricted.  The target is 
preselected.  Weather is no longer a major factor.  Where once military leaders 




is no requirement for this in ballistic systems.  All this will mean a loss of the customary 
incentives."  He further predicted, "The missile man will be a student of standard 
methodology.  The highly individualistic personality, capable but unorthodox, loses his 
special value in this rigid situation.  There is a new market for the compatible person, 
capable of accepting the most uniform behavior pattern.  Monotony should flourish in 
this  atmosphere . . . ."  There was a concern that not many pilots would "flourish" in 
such a monotonous environment, which proved true.34 
 Instead of resolving the potential concerns, the Air Force moved flyers into the 
missile field, but only on a rotational basis to give the pilots career broadening 
experience, not as a new career.  Moreover, because unit commanders selected the 
new missileers, it is doubtful that they sent their absolute best.  Strategic Air Command 
wanted good men in missiles, but the command's leaders would not consider losing 
volunteers to missiles as an excuse for a flying wing performing poorly on an exercise or 
inspection and the wing commanders who were selecting the new missileers knew this.  
Colonel Rader acknowledged this problem, complaining to his boss that "there have 
been cases where the officers were assigned primarily so that they, or a member of 
their families, might be in close proximity to a general hospital, . . . due to grounding 
action for physical reasons, . . . [and because an officer] was close to mandatory 
retirement."35   
 To prevent or at least reduce losing skilled rated and maintenance personnel 




that the flyers selected to rotate through missiles would come from overseas or school 
assignments, on their way back to the flying career field.  Others were pulled from units 
with outdated aircraft that were intended to be deactivated.  This way, the command 
retained their best flyers and maintainers in important operational units, but were able 
to man the new missile units.36  Robert Kelchner, who retired as a Chief Master 
Sergeant, reflected on his personal experience as a knowledgeable radar technician 
with more than two years remaining on his enlistment.  "When I was identified for 
missile training in June 1961, I had been on active duty for over five years.  The SAC 
personnel at Offutt AFB [in Nebraska were] in the process of fielding a huge weapons 
system.  The Minuteman ICBM was to have at least six wings at six different bases.  To 
man these bases, the Air Force had decided to shut down all the medium bomber B-47 
wings."  He then explained the reasoning behind the process, "The transfer of all these 
personnel to Minuteman was to get their experienced operations and maintenance 
people.  It was a delicate balance of maintaining operational bombers until the 
Minuteman became operational."37   
 Concerned over losing such a large percentage of the flying force, even 
temporarily, the Air Force again revised the standards for selecting missileers.  The 
service began to recruit young engineers to serve as deputy missile combat crew 
commanders, who would work under the guidance of a more senior crew 
commander.38  The Air Force also developed and began giving aptitude tests to recent 




service used these new tests to select enlisted personnel with backgrounds and 
aptitudes in electronics for important missile positions.39  Frank Dlugas, who worked as 
an Electro-Mechanical Technician for the Atlas F in 1961, remembered that he was 
selected for missile training after he scored very highly on the general aptitude test and 
almost 100 percent on the mechanical and electrical portions.40 
 The new engineers reduced the need for personnel with operational flying 
experience to serve in missiles, but the change did not imply that Air Force leaders no 
longer wanted rated missileers.  Howard Tarleton, who began working in missiles in 
1963 after seven years as a navigator, recalled, "They [Strategic Air Command leaders] 
were trying to get people with operational backgrounds.  Although many of the 
assignees were non-rated, they hoped to get experienced people (rated) to bring 
knowledge and leadership to the Minuteman program."41  Leon Hojegian remembered 
that, at Plattsburg Air Force Base in New York, all key leadership positions were filled by 
rated officers, leaving no leadership opportunities for the non-rated missileers.42  
 The debate over whether missile units should be filled with rated officers or not 
raged for years.  However, the Air Force never considered making missiles a rated 
position, which would have presumably given missiles the same status in the Air Force 
as aeronautical positions, even though it would never have achieved the glamour of 
flying.43  Either way, the result was the same.  Most rated officers who served in 
missiles did not consider themselves missileers.  Rather, like Colonel Floyd Wikstrom, 




rated officer with missile experience," the flyers remained focused on flying.44  The 
situation was made worse as all rated officers had to maintain their flight qualifications 
during missile duty, but missile leaders above the crew level were not required to be 
trained on missile operations.45  Thus, most Air Force personnel equated the leadership 
of missile units with that of "support" units rather than operational units as the Air 
Force required all leaders in flying units to be flight qualified.46  The overall impact of 
this unsettling standard was that many of those who did consider themselves missileers 
saw themselves as less viable for promotion than their flying peers, not an 
unreasonable view.  In fact, Colonels William Brooksher and Jimmy Scott, in a survey of 
missileers conducted for a National War College study, discovered that "there is 
practically no demand for general officers who are not rated.  Within the operations 
field in SAC, rated officers are a prerequisite for command . . . .  As long as the 
operations command structure combines both missiles and rated organizations the 
demand for missile general officers will continue to be negligible."  Therefore, when the 
Congressional and public pressure to build and operate missiles diminished after the 
Cuban Missile Crisis, these new missileers found very few powerful allies in the Air 
Force.47   
 Once selected into missiles, the first missileers faced many difficulties.  Duty 
with the Thor and Jupiter IRBMs presented the most frustrating duty.  Because the 
IRBMs would be deployed on foreign soil, the U.S. government agreed to allow NATO 




control of the nuclear warhead, but without the opportunity to operate the missiles on 
a daily basis.48 
 The initial state of affairs for missileers in the United States was not much 
better.  The first missileers traveled to their new assignment to discover that the 
missiles they were to oversee had not yet been built.  Moreover, the Air Force had not 
finalized plans for operations, so the service had no training program in place.  For 
these reasons, many missileers sat in the offices of their new squadrons for several 
months with no real mission.  In some instances, they were allowed to visit the 
construction sites where their missile silos were being built, but this was not always the 
case.49   
 The first missileers learned their profession by watching and listening to the 
engineers who were designing and building the missiles.  When the Air Force did begin 
instruction, it paid Convair, Douglas, Burroughs, General Electric, and other missile 
contractors to conduct training programs at the manufacturers' factories.  The 
instructors prepared training manuals as the courses progressed, updating them as the 
missiles evolved and changed.  After the missileers studied the basics of how the 
missiles worked, spending up to three months at one or more of the plants, and the 
particulars of their duty position, they would be assigned to a crew.  The crew traveled 
to Vandenberg AFB together where they learned to operate the missile as a team.50 
 Major John Merriman's experience illustrates the training early missileers 




Korea, Merriman volunteered for missiles and was assigned to the Atlas program at 
Wyoming's F. E. Warren AFB.  After traveling to the base, he was ordered to attend 
missile training at the Convair plant in San Diego.  He found that the school was actually 
located in the former Bernard Street Grammar School.51  Once in the school, Merriman 
worked to master the material, even attending the night classes held for the non-
commissioned officers that would be working with him in addition to his own 
coursework.  Still, Merriman struggled with the advice that one of his instructors gave 
him.  "Everything that I'm telling you . . . will be true about the [training] missiles you 
will work [with] at Vandenberg [AFB].  But watch out.  It won't be true necessarily 
about the [operational] missiles at Warren [AFB]."  The Atlas that the students were 
working with every day was an A model, but the models they would be working with in 
the field would be the D model, for all practical purposes a completely different missile.  
Furthermore, because the missiles were being upgraded daily, the instructors could not 
keep up with the changes.52 
 Once the contracted instructors deemed the new missileers competent on the 
system itself, the graduates were assigned to a crew and transitioned to Integrated 
Weapon System Training at Vandenberg AFB.  There the recently assembled crew 
learned how to operate and maintain the missile.  Major James Brewer developed the 
training program for both the Thor and Atlas programs.  He struggled with the same 




the Air Force was still developing and still determining how they would fit into 
operational plans.53 
 Before he was given this difficult assignment, Brewer was a pilot flying in 
England.  He "understood that 'Missiles' had something to do with putting mice or dogs 
into capsules and launching them toward space."  Arriving at Vandenberg, he was made 
Chief of Thor Integrated Weapon System Training.  He complained that he knew 
nothing about missiles or missile training, but Brewer recalled that his new boss 
replied, "Don't worry.  No one else knows anything about missile training either.  We 
are all learning here for the first time."54  
 Brewer quickly ascertained that "some eight different missile systems, each 
completely different but each with many missiles and extensive manning, was already 
in or planned for the [training] pipeline; and each missile had an inflexible deadline to 
become operational."  His first duty was to instruct the launch crews and maintenance 
teams at Vandenberg.  These newly qualified missileers then trained the crews assigned 
to manage the Air Force's operational missiles.  Brewer recalled that, under the concept 
of concurrency, "development step number fifty could not wait for number forty-nine 
to be completed -- indeed not even for step nine."  Consequently, "the inevitable 
problems and changes [did not] cause ripples--they cause[d] shock waves!"  One of 
these shock waves included the missile blowing up during a training simulation, 
destroying the launch pad that Brewer had planned to use for future training.  To 




documentation prepared in spite of such problems, he and his two person staff worked 
fourteen hour days, seven days a week.55 
 Brewer's reward for creating a successful training program for the Thor missile 
was a second assignment to develop a missile training program -- this time for the three 
Atlas missiles, models D, E, and F.  The Air Force now called the program Operational 
Readiness Training.  Brewer discovered that, although the missiles all carried the name 
Atlas, "they were as different as any three different types of bombers."  Since he was to 
create the three training programs concurrently, he was now allowed a staff of four--
two captains, a sergeant, and a secretary.  Brewer believed this number was not 
adequate to accomplish the job, so he coordinated with the Ramo-Wooldridge 
contractors to provide four additional personnel.  As he had learned with the Thor 
program, "slow and painful progress was [often] wiped out in an instant by a change of 
design, change in priority for use of a facility, or a facility disaster."56 
 Since concurrency forced the Air Force to also test and refine the missile 
systems during training launches, "on every launch the Launch Control Center (LCC) was 
crowded with [senior leaders] from SAC or some other headquarters, to the detriment 
of students and training."  As a result, Brewer's own assessment of his training efforts 
were "nothing to brag about.  There were simply too many people to be trained, too 
short a time, too few launch facilities available for training, and too many other 




missiles into operation before they were ready continued to frustrate the Air Force's 
incorporation of the new weapons.57 
 Even after the new missileers moved to their operational squadrons, they faced 
unique problems with training.  As previously noted, technical documentation was 
atrocious.58  Moreover, there were no qualified personnel to provide the continuous 
training and evaluation that the Air Force determined was required at the squadron 
level.  Lawrence Hasbrouck remembered his first experience as a missileer in the 66th 
Strategic Missile Squadron at Ellsworth AFB in 1962.  "I was selected as an instructor 
because I was told to 'pick a desk.'  The one I chose was manned by a Lt. Colonel, who 
immediately said, 'Captain, welcome to the 66 SMW.  You are an instructor!'  I replied, 
'Of what, sir?'  He answered, 'Of this new weapon system.'  My next question was, 
'What if I had chosen one of the other desks?'  If I chose the middle desk, I would have 
become an evaluator; [if] the last desk, just a crew member."  Because no one had any 
experience, instructors and evaluators were often chosen at random and had no better 
qualifications than the average crew member.  This situation improved as the manning 
situation got better, but it presented another concern over the quality of training and 
the credibility, as well as the capability, of the overall missile program.59   
 In History of the Jupiter Missile System, Army historians Grimwood and Stroud 
contend that the effort to create the training plan for Jupiter was even more grueling 
than either the Thor or Atlas.  "Not only did the Agency have to struggle to get a 




program."  Then, in 1959, when the United States decided to have allied forces control 
the missiles, the Army had to remove all Restricted Data, highly classified material that 
had been an integral part of the training, from the program and try to make the training 
comprehensible to non-native English speakers.60   
 The rushed deployment and confusion caused by concurrency also wreaked 
havoc with the initial operations of the missiles.  Staff Sergeant Glantz recalled that 
"the original Tech[nical] Orders and operational and maintenance procedures were so 
bad that new ones had to be written from scratch.  It was a very lengthy, expensive 
operation with teams of engineers, tech[nical] writers and airmen working [twenty four 
hours a day, seven days a week]."61  Ronald Bishop, a captain at the time, agreed that 
"in the early missile days . . ., 'growing' pains . . . included incomplete tech data, 
checklist errors, some evaluation issues resulting from the noted problems, a steep 
learning curve for not only the crew members but [also for] the squadron and wing 
senior staff officers who were aircraft oriented, and for all new SAC members, an initial 
shock at the standards that required mistake free performance."62 
   An early history of the 706th Strategic Missile Wing, the first Atlas wing, reveals 
that the rush to deploy the first ICBM squadrons caused even more complications.    In 
May 1956, the Air Force decided to place one and one half of the four Atlas squadrons 
at Cooke AFB (renamed Vandenberg AFB on October 4, 1958), with the remainder to be 
assigned to the next base chosen.   The next May, in 1957, the Army's Fort F. E. Warren 




and one half squadrons.  Shortly after this decision, the Air Force Ballistic Missile 
Division (AFBMD), formerly the Western Development Division, determined that 
dividing an operational squadron across over 1,500 miles was not as efficient or 
feasible as it first seemed.  Since the Air Force chose to increase the number of Atlas 
squadrons at about the same time, the AFBMD authorized Warren AFB to receive four 
complete squadrons rather than leaving a squadron divided.63   
 The wing began preparing to build its first Atlas D missile site as Major Ferguson 
planned, in what became known as a two by three design.  In this configuration, the 
goal was to place everything the squadron needed in the same operating location, 
reducing logistics and maintenance problems.  Two launch control complexes -- where 
the missileers would control their missiles -- were situated about seven miles from one 
another.  Each launch control complex controlled three missiles that surrounded the 
control complex.  The plan included storing four additional missiles nearby so that, 
after launching an attack, missileers would be able to emplace and prepare at least 
three additional missiles for a second launch sequence.  While Army Corps of Engineers 
began building the missile site, however, the Air Force decided to cut costs by reducing 
the distance between the control centers to 1,000 feet and consolidating some of the 
structures.64    
 Soon after, Air Force leaders grew concerned that placing the missiles so close 
to each other left them vulnerable to destruction from a single Soviet missile.  




the first squadron's missile complex had even started, the Air Force changed the Atlas 
squadron configuration again.  From May on, all squadrons were to be built in a three 
by three concept:  three launch control centers, built on separate sites, each controlling 
three missiles apiece.  Therefore, each missile control center would be placed in 
separate plots of land, separated from the other launch control centers by fifteen to 
eighteen nautical miles.  The new concept reduced the chances of the site's missiles 
being destroyed in a single attack, but sacrificed the capability to provide a backup 
guidance facility for the missiles.65   
 Although the reasoning is not documented, the Air Force chose to retain the 
original two by three orientation for the 564th Strategic Missile Squadron, so Strategic 
Air Command built the 564th missile site as originally designed rather than reducing its 
size.  Not long after, Air Force leaders determined that trying to deploy and launch a 
second round of missiles was unrealistic, so the extra missiles and support equipment 
for this purpose were consolidated with other wing assets instead of being placed with 
the 564th's missile site.  Therefore, despite the fact that they controlled the same 
missiles, Warren AFB's first two missile squadrons were built to completely different 
specifications, controlled different numbers of missiles, and had differing operating 
procedures.66 
 In another stunning change, the Air Force decided to begin co-locating single 
Atlas squadrons with Strategic Air Command bomber wings -- the first near Omaha and 




continuing to build separate Atlas missile wings.  Bewilderingly, at the same time, 
service leaders elected to place four Titan squadrons, with missiles in hardened silos, 
near Lowry AFB in Colorado to ease logistical support from the contractor's plants.  
Consequently, as the Air Force separated the Atlas squadrons to assimilate them into 
the larger Air Force organization, it segregated Titan under a single leadership 
structure.67 
 The 706th Strategic Missile Wing historians reflected their wing leadership's 
frustration, noting that "the concept of concurrency . . . was apparently causing a great 
deal of confusion . . . .  Day to day changes in various projects were frequent.  Pending 
actions were equally commonplace.  In short, then, everything was in a rapid state of 
flux."68  Lieutenant Gary Alkire, assigned to the base as a civil engineer during this time, 
remembered that the change orders to the missile sites were as thick as the original 
contract.69 
 To continue the inadvertent trend of differentiating each squadron of missiles 
from the others, the Air Force decided to build a third Atlas squadron at Warren AFB, 
but scattered the nine missiles of this squadron, the 549th SMS, hundreds of miles 
apart.  The dispersal was not the only difference.  The wing's first two squadrons used 
the initial Atlas D missile, but the third squadron was assigned the newly developed 
Atlas E missile.  The new missile eliminated the need for the earlier missiles radio 
towers and guidance buildings by means of a better guidance system, but once again 




 The constant changes meant that each squadron had slightly differing operating 
methods and capabilities.  The wing's first squadron stored its missiles horizontally in a 
"coffin-shaped" concrete structure that was raised for launch after sliding the roof of 
the coffin away from the building on steel railings.  The second squadron's "coffins" 
opened more quickly as the roof separated in the middle and the two halves slid to the 
side before raising the missile.  In the third, Atlas E squadron, the missiles remained 
horizontal, but placed just underground so that the roof of their "coffin" was surface-
level.  For the third squadron, the Air Force also upgraded the launch control center, 
placing it in a heavily reinforced underground room near the launcher rather than in an 
above ground block house like those in the original two squadrons."71  
 In late 1959 and early 1960, the lack of standardization became even more 
problematic as the Air Force rushed the Titan and the smaller, solid-fueled Minuteman 
into production, even though neither had yet been successfully tested.72  Then, in 
December 1961, the service upgraded the Atlas to the F model, the third iteration since 
the missile was declared operational twenty-five months earlier.  The Atlas F allowed 
missileers to store the RP-1 (Rocket Propellant) fuel in the missile rather than in nearby 
tanks.  A concrete lined cylindrical hole--an underground silo--now protected the 
missile and allowed it to remain upright even when it was below the surface while a 
subterranean tunnel connected the missile to the nearby launch control center.   
 Each of these advancements helped to better protect the missiles and to 




unique requirements that prevented crew members from moving from site to site 
without retraining. The rush to place the missiles in operation as early as possible had 
prevented the Air Force from implementing these critical changes until after the first 
missiles were installed, thus costing missileers the benefit of standardized training and 
operations.73 
 The constant changes, along with labor union strikes and other difficulties, 
delayed the building of the missile squadrons by up to six months.  In part because of 
Congressional concerns, General LeMay, now Vice Chief of Staff, inspected the new 
missile sites in June 1960.  He discovered a management nightmare.  "Lines of authority 
crossed and recrossed in an administrative maze.  There was no single recognized 
authority at any level.  Construction contractors were receiving conflicting instructions 
from as many as seven separate agencies.  Decisions that should have been made on 
the spot were in process for weeks."  Stepping in decisively, LeMay established a Site 
Activation Task Force, under the control of a single Air Force colonel, at each site to 
correct the problems, but missiles dropped further in the influential general's esteem.74 
 Both LeMay and General Thomas Power, his successor as commander of SAC, 
had helped in the development of missile technology, LeMay early on as the Air Force's 
Deputy Chief of Staff for Research and Development and Power as commander of the 
Air Research and Development Command.75  Thus, both knew the earliest missiles used 
untested technologies and were notoriously faulty, rarely reaching their target 




on it.  In other words we have never gone through the whole cycle.  So there [was] 
always some question: will they work?  We [had] done everything humanly possible to 
ensure they [would], and they probably will, but we have never done it.”76  
Remembering his experiences from World War II, he continued, “Here again, in the 
back of one’s mind, is that first outfit going into combat the first time and screwing up 
the mission.  We practiced in SAC.  We ran our war plan time and time again.  The 
crews spent hours and hours and made hundreds of bomb runs on their target in the 
trainer.  So we had confidence, but we didn’t have quite that same confidence in the 
missiles.”77 
 Missiles were not alone in their struggle for credibility.  The B-52 bomber, 
entering the inventory in 1955, suffered from structural failures during high speed, low 
level flights, the exact mission that the aircraft had to perform since the Soviets had 
built a strong anti-aircraft system to defend against high altitude attacks.  Significant 
problems, both strategic and engineering, plagued the Air Force's other bombers.  With 
the manned strategic bomber already struggling to hold its position as the crucial 
element of the nation's strategic nuclear component, the Air Force tried to develop a 
supersonic bomber capable of carrying nuclear weapons, the B-70, but George 
Kistiakowsky, Eisenhower's Special Assistant to the President for the Science and 
Technology, argued that "it is not clear what the B-70 can do that ballistic missiles can't 
-- and cheaper and sooner at that."78  Eisenhower was even more blunt.  His staff 




that the age of aircraft for actual use over enemy territory [was] fast coming to a close . 
. . . [and the nation's leaders] were talking about bows and arrows at the time of 
gunpowder when [they] spoke of bombers in the missile age."  The difference was that 
the political leaders sided with missiles, whereas LeMay and many other senior Air 
Force generals were "bomber men" and resisted the push to missiles.  Experienced 
pilots themselves, they were not convinced of the bomber's obsolescence and did not 
want to replace bombers with the new missiles.79   
 The rush to bring missiles to operational status, while politically imperative, thus 
threatened the status of the bomber and created more doubts about the efficacy of 
missiles in the minds of Air Force leaders like General LeMay.  The decision to rapidly 
develop, build, and man the new weapon systems concurrently created unnecessary 
confusion and discord while the perceived political bias favoring missiles over the Air 
Force's beloved bomber caused long-standing enmity.  Rated officers, temporarily 
thrust into missiles during the new weapon's stormy launch, struggled with erroneous 
and ever-changing guidance, variable standards, and a perceived loss of status.  Thus, 
when LeMay became Chief of Staff of the Air Force in July 1961, many Air Force leaders 
who followed him into significant leadership positions were not supportive of the new 
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5. APOGEE:  AN INTERNATIONAL CRISIS FOMENTS CHANGE1 
 
 While the Air Force raced to build and staff the new ballistic missile units 
through the late 1950s, the political struggle that fueled the race intensified.  Politicians 
and journalists continued to amplify the threat of Soviet nuclear missiles through the 
1960 presidential election and to insist that the United States immediately build its own 
missiles to remain ahead of this existential threat.  These pressures continued well into 
the Kennedy administration, although the level of intensity began to drop as it became 
clear that the United States held a commanding lead in developing and producing 
nuclear armament.  Then, immediately following the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Kennedy 
administration's political will to use nuclear missiles radically diminished, leaving the 
missiles and missileers vulnerable to unsympathetic Air Force leaders who strongly 
preferred manned aircraft.  Lyndon B. Johnson's administration, including many 
members of the Kennedy administration, retained the new outlook on nuclear conflict.  
Without the strong political pressure to support the development and operation of 
missiles that had been applied during the late 1950s and very early 1960s, the 
promising potential of the Air Force nuclear missile community dissipated significantly. 
 On October 10, 1958, in a speech to the Wood County, West Virginia, 
Democratic Committee, Senator John F. Kennedy (D-MA) asserted, "We are rapidly 
approaching that dangerous period which General [James M.] Gavin and others have 




which our own offensive and defensive missile capabilities will lag so far behind those 
of the Soviets as to place us in a position of great peril.'"  After defining "the most 
critical years of the gap" as 1960 to 1964, he continued the withering criticism of 
President Dwight Eisenhower's defense policies, 
  "Our peril is not simply because Russian striking power during the years of the 
 gap `will have a slight edge over us in missile power -- they will have several 
 times as many:  Intermediate range missiles to destroy our European missile 
 and SAC bases; intercontinental missiles to devastate our own country 
 installations, and Government; and history's largest fleet of submarines, and 
 possibly long-range supersonic jet bombers, to follow up this advantage.  If by 
 that time their submarines are capable of launching missiles, they could destroy 
 85 per cent of  our industry, 43 per cent of our 50 largest cities, and most of the 
 nation's population."2  
 
 After Kennedy launched his candidacy for the 1960 presidential election on 
January 2, 1960, he continued the verbal assault on Eisenhower's record.  The 
Democratic Platform Committee followed his lead, proclaiming that "our military 
position today is measured in terms of gaps--missile gap, space gap, limited war gap."3  
To resolve the "gaps," Kennedy promised to increase production of the Atlas missile, to 
accelerate the Titan program, to increase the numbers of the Minuteman missile, 
which was undergoing final testing at the time, to build more of the planned supersonic 
B-70 bombers, and to provide more of the Navy's Polaris missiles.4  He tied these 
military increases, along with stronger conventional forces and enhanced airlift 
capabilities, into his Flexible Response security strategy.5  Eisenhower, maintaining his 
quest for a balanced budget, argued that such increases were wasteful.  In fact, in his 




feverish building of vast armaments to meet glibly predicted moments of so-called 
'maximum peril.'"  He reminded listeners that "in these days of unceasing technological 
advance, we must plan our defense expenditures systematically and with care . . . .  The 
defense budget for the coming year has been planned on the basis of these principles 
and considerations." 6 Even so, as the second generation Polaris and Minuteman 
missiles proved themselves more reliable and militarily useful, and less vulnerable to a 
first strike from the Soviets, he did increase the planned nuclear arsenal by authorizing 
more of these second generation missiles. 
 Although the election was close, Kennedy won the presidency.  During the 
campaign, he convinced many voters that there was an existential nuclear threat to 
America.  Therefore, after Kennedy's inauguration in 1961, these Americans expected 
him to quickly escalate defense spending, including the construction of new missiles.7   
Eisenhower left the new president with 12 operational Atlas intercontinental ballistic 
missiles and 60 Thor intermediate range ballistic missiles stationed in the United 
Kingdom, but had also directed the production of newer model Atlas, Titan, 
Minuteman, and Jupiter missiles, all quickly moving toward operational status.  In his 
proposed budget for 1962, Eisenhower authorized over 1,100 ballistic missiles (255 
Atlas and Titan missiles, 450 silo-based Minuteman missiles, 90 mobile Minuteman 
missiles, and 304 Polaris missiles to be placed on nineteen submarines, in addition to 




Soviets had 248 launchers in the summer of 1960, but these were all intermediate 
range missiles and none had a long enough range to hit the United States.8 
 Kennedy selected Robert McNamara, the former president of Ford Motor 
Company and a Republican, as his Secretary of Defense.  McNamara "immediately 
made it [his] top priority to determine the size of the [missile] gap and the remedial 
action required to close it."9  He explained that the new administration needed to 
review the Eisenhower administration's 1962 budget, but "this reconsideration . . . 
involved a reappraisal of strategy . . . .  This reappraisal had to take into consideration 
what the Russians were doing."10  Within days of assuming his new position, McNamara 
requested and received a briefing from the Weapon System Evaluation Group on 
Report #50, entitled "Evaluation of Strategic Offensive Weapons Systems."  The 
evaluation, started in September 1959 and completed in December 1960, was a 
"comprehensive report on the optimal U.S. strategic force structure . . . . [and] 
implicitly rejected the possibility of a missile gap."11  McNamara and key aides also 
"spent days with the air force's assistant chief of staff for intelligence, personally 
reviewing hundreds of photographs of Soviet missile sites that had been the basis for 
the air force report." McNamara became convinced by the available evidence that the 
missile gap actually favored the United States rather than the Soviet Union.  When he 
informed reporters of this fact on February 6, 1961, they published the statement and 




 By this time, Kennedy knew for certain that the missile gap did not exist.  
Nevertheless, after contending during the campaign that the Eisenhower 
administration was lax on national security precisely because it had allowed a "missile 
gap," Kennedy realized that immediately negating the gap would create a credibility 
problem and exacerbate concerns over his planned defense spending.  Therefore, on 
February 8, Kennedy asserted in a news conference that "Mr. McNamara stated that no 
study had been concluded in the Defense Department which would lead to any 
conclusion at this time as to whether there is a missile gap or not."13  McNamara 
backtracked as well, testifying in Congress on Friday, April 7, 1961, that "based on the 
intelligence estimates available to me," there was a missile gap and "based on the 
intelligence estimates, there is evidence that a missile gap may exist up to and through 
1963."14 
 After dispelling the public's questions over the reality of the missile gap, the 
Kennedy administration increased  the 1962 defense budget by 10 percent.  The 
President built up the conventional forces and enhanced the readiness of the Air Force 
bomber fleet, but he also strengthened the missile forces.  Strategic Air Command had 
successfully launched a Minuteman in early February 1961 and Kennedy found that the 
new missiles were much more reliable, less dangerous, and less vulnerable to surprise 
attack than the early iterations. Therefore, rather than increasing the number of 
Atlases or Titans, as he had promised to do during the presidential campaign, Kennedy 




In fact, rather than speeding up the Titan program, he cut the last two squadrons of 
Titan missiles, instead using the funds planned for the Titans to double the production 
capabilities of Minuteman missiles.  He also increased the construction of Polaris 
submarines by 10, increasing the total submarines from 19 to 29, even though the first 
of this new group was not scheduled for delivery until June 1963.15 
 The increases in the defense budget did nothing to reduce the continuing 
struggle with the Soviet Union.  Kennedy met Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev in early 
June 1961 at a summit in Vienna to reduce tensions between the two countries, but the 
conference failed to resolve the discord.  Soon after the meeting, Khrushchev 
demanded that England, France, and the United States, which retained control of West 
Berlin after World War II, withdraw all western troops from the city within six months 
or face war.16  Khrushchev had made the same threat to Eisenhower, but backed down 
when Eisenhower refused to respond. Knowing this, Kennedy, rather than backing out 
of Berlin, increased the size of the Army, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps and also 
called up 150,000 reservists to prepare for war.  This time, Khrushchev increased his 
military budget as well, but, believing the Allies were militarily stronger and willing to 
fight, he again dropped the threat of war.  Instead, Khrushchev approved an East 
German plan to build a wall that would isolate the Western occupied portion of Berlin.  
Construction began on August 13, 1961.17   
 Concerned that Khrushchev might continue to threaten and cajole the United 




preponderance of nuclear weapons, the Kennedy administration decided to reveal 
publicly that the missile gap did not exist.  Kennedy selected Roswell Gilpatric, the 
Deputy Secretary of Defense, to disclose the information since he was important 
enough to convince the Soviet leaders that he represented the Kennedy administration, 
but not so important as to appear to be threatening to them.18   
 In Gilpatric's speech, given to the Business Council in Hot Springs, Virginia, on 
October 21, he exclaimed that "Berlin is the emergency of the moment, because the 
Soviets have chosen to make it so . . . .  But our real strength in Berlin . . . . is based 
upon a sober appreciation of the relative military power of the two sides."  Gilpatric 
then explained that  "Our forces are so deployed and protected that a sneak attack 
could not effectively disarm us.  The destructive power which the United States could 
bring to bear even after a Soviet surprise attack upon our forces would be as great as -- 
perhaps greater than -- the total undamaged force which the enemy can threaten to 
launch against the United States in a first strike."19  
 In July 1962, Krushchev responded in a way very few expected, coordinating an 
agreement with Fidel Castro of Cuba to place Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba.   These 
weapons not only provided a tangible nuclear threat to the United States, but 
responded to the United States' failed attempt to overthrow Castro during Kennedy's 
April 1961 Bay of Pigs debacle.20  On May 24, 1962, the Soviet Defense Council 
approved Khrushchev's plan to place ballistic nuclear missiles in Cuba, along with Soviet 




missiles, and ground forces.  Castro agreed to host the Soviets soon after.  Unlike the 
American deployment to Europe of the Thor and Jupiter missiles, the Soviets planned 
to retain operational control of their missiles in Cuba, at least at the start of the 
deployment.21 
 Khrushchev intended to deploy the arsenal quietly and announce their presence 
after the November elections in America.22  However, the United States had been 
spying on Cuba through photographic and electronic surveillance since spring of 1962, 
monitoring the buildup of Soviet military capabilities on the island.  Thus, on October 
14, a U-2 aircraft flown by Air Force Major Richard Heyser photographed what 
intelligence analysts identified the next day as "three Medium Range Ballistic Missile 
(MRBM) sites near San Cristobal[, Cuba]."23  These missiles threatened every U.S. city 
south and east of a semi-circle bounded by Washington, D.C., Cincinnati, Ohio,  and St. 
Louis, Missouri.  (See Figure 1.)  However, the CIA also revealed that the Soviet's longer 
range Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBM), presumed to be in Cuba as well, 










 Aghast at the implications, the President gathered several key advisors, a group 
he titled the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, or ExComm, to 
guide the nation's response.  After considering and deciding against a surgical strike to 
destroy the missiles, the ExComm recommended a naval blockade -- renamed 
"quarantine" to sound less bellicose -- to prevent the Soviets from shipping more 
missiles to Cuba.  Then, on October 22, at 7:00 p.m. eastern time, six days after he 
learned of the threat, the President spoke to the nation, warning of the danger and 
reassuring both the American people and the world that he had a prudent plan to have 
the missiles removed.  His actions initiated what became known as the Cuban Missile 
Crisis.25 
 Kennedy's speech was the first that many of the Air Force missileers had heard 
about this new Soviet threat in Cuba.  After reviewing a draft of the President's speech, 
General Curtis LeMay, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, recommended that General 
Maxwell Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "direct DEFCON 3 worldwide at 
noon [on October 22] to place U. S. forces worldwide in an increased readiness 
posture" and "direct SAC to generate its forces toward a maximum readiness posture, 
also at noon today."  By doing so, LeMay explained, "the strategic air forces will be in 
maximum readiness by noon tomorrow, and the force generation should not be 
apparent until after the President's speech tonight."  Furthermore, he declared, the 
action "comprises a clear warning to the Sino-Soviet Bloc and should serve as a 




provide maximum flexibility to the President in choosing further actions, should Sino-
Soviet belligerence or active counter-measures so warrant."  General Taylor decided to 
direct the forces to DEFCON 3 when the President established the blockade.26 
 General Thomas Power, who had replaced LeMay as Commander in Chief of 
Strategic Air Command, responded prior to the directive's time frame.  Two days before 
President Kennedy addressed the nation, Power ordered that all aircraft and missiles 
not ready for alert be covertly made ready.  He also placed two bombers per squadron 
and the aircraft designated to refuel the bombers on standby status, ready for 
immediate launch.  He ensured that his commanders and staff realized these actions 
did not mean a change in DEFCON status, although their actions would have been the 
same if it had.27   
 Lieutenant Charlie Simpson was one of the first Air Force officers to respond.  
On October 20, while overseeing the testing of new Titan 1 missiles at Mountain Home 
AFB in Idaho, he received a call directing that the squadron "return the missile to alert 
immediately, no questions asked and no explanation."  (See locations of U.S. Air Force 
bases with missiles in figures 2 and 3.)  Then, over the weekend, his supervisors 
cancelled all passes and leaves and started planning for the maintenance shops to work 
24 hours a day.  He saw bomber and tanker aircraft deploying to predetermined 
dispersal locations, but did not know why.  On Monday, as the president delivered his 
















Simpson's unit followed suit, upgrading to the higher level of readiness.  The weekend's 
activities became clear.28 
 Sergeant Bob Kelchner, on a targeting and alignment team for the new 
Minuteman missiles at Vandenberg AFB, also received early notification of the new 
requirements.  On Sunday, October 21, his supervisor called to say that he was coming 
to pick up Kelchner for an emergency meeting on base.  At the meeting, Kelchner 
remembered that they were briefed that Strategic Air Command was preparing for 
"higher alert conditions," then sent home to wait "on 15-minute standby telephone 
alert."  The next morning, each member who worked with Kelchner ensured his 
equipment was in top shape and, on October 23, the team traveled to the missile sites 
"with classified targeting tapes, side arms and orders not to return until our site was on 
'alert.'"  Kelchner reminisced that, before this crisis, the team "had never seen a 
loaded/live missile in the new launch facilities, nor an operational Guidance and 
Control System (G&C), nor a live reentry vehicle (RV)."29 
 Captain Willard "Stan" Stanley got the message as well.  Working in the Air 
Force Ballistic Systems Division's Reentry Vehicle (RV) Directorate, he was ordered "to 
get as many MK 5 RV shells and fuzes to [the new Minuteman missile wing in 
Malmstrom AFB,] Montana in the shortest amount of time."  He worked around the 
clock for the next several days to ensure the nuclear warheads were expedited to their 




assignment, he recalled stopping at the officer's club for a stiff drink and watching "the 
'super hyped' news anchors on the TV reporting."30 
 Not everyone heard about the crisis so quickly.  Lieutenant Philip Moore, an 
Atlas F crew member stationed near Roswell, New Mexico,  remembered learning that 
Strategic Air Command had been ordered to DEFCON 3 two days after the event 
occurred, when he arrived on base for his next alert.  He had been placed on telephone 
standby, meaning he had to remain near his phone 24 hours a day, ready to respond to 
a call, but had not known why.  He recalled the tenseness in the air as crew members 
escorted maintenance teams around the missile site to fix critical equipment problems, 
now knowing they were at DEFCON 3.31 
 Airman First Class Michael Kenderes, at the Titan wing near Denver, Colorado, 
learned of the change while deer hunting.  Returning to their camp just before dusk, 
the hunters discovered a piece of paper on the truck radio aerial.  The paper read, "This 
is from the game warden!  Report back to base immediately!  This is NOT an exercise!"  
They returned home and Kenderes called his supervisor, who informed him that the 
base had been ordered to DEFCON 3 and he needed to report for duty as soon as 
possible.  He was also told to expect to be in the missile field32  for an indefinite time as 
the Soviets were "causing some trouble down in Cuba."  Kenderes returned to Lowry 
AFB and learned his mission was to keep the squadron's nine missiles on alert.  He 
reviewed the unit's maintenance files to identify high failure items, then traveled to the 




ready, he gathered the security codes that allowed him access to the missile sites and 
drove to the missile site as the sun rose.  After determining the missiles were all 
working fine, he took a quick nap to make up for the long night.33 
 Strategic Air Command quickly attained all DEFCON 3 requirements, primarily 
because General Power had directed the command to work toward the standards 
before the heightened state of readiness was ordered.  Even though the first 
operational missile in the U.S. Air Force had only been declared ready for launch on 
October 31, 1959, less than three years earlier, and only twenty-two missiles were on 
alert in January 1962, by October 19, 1962, Strategic Air Command had placed 112 
missiles on alert.  These missiles included seventy-seven Atlas D, E, and F missiles and 
thirty-five Titan I missiles.  Nevertheless, this phenomenal feat was nothing compared 
to the achievement accomplished over the next three days, as the command tried to 
achieve DEFCON 3 requirements.  Pushed the critical nature of the threat, Strategic Air 
Command missileers, both those operating the missiles and those maintaining them, 
added another twenty missiles to the nuclear arsenal, bringing the number of 
operational missiles to 132, ninety-one Atlases and forty-one Titans.34 
 The missileers accomplished this astonishing exploit in various ways.  Missileers, 
including Harry Birmingham, who conducted maintenance on the Atlas missiles near 
Walker AFB, New Mexico, labored through numerous twelve hour shifts, or longer, 
fixing critical problems that prevented missiles from operating correctly.  Simpson's 




their missiles were prepared for immediate launch.35  Some of the change, though, was 
brought about by teams struggling intensely to bring new missiles on alert.  Airman 
Nelson "Pete" Turner recalled arming new Atlas missiles that "had only very recently 
been delivered to their respective silos and were only then being installed and 
debugged."36   
 Thus, only 39 hours later, when President Kennedy imposed the naval 
quarantine and the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the command to DEFCON 2, the 
highest level America's military has ever attained, the missileers stood ready.  Once 
again, General Power had prepared Strategic Air Command forces before the order was 
given and the command accomplished the task swiftly but covertly, as ordered.37   
 Airman Second Class John McLaughlin, serving on an Atlas F crew at Schilling 
AFB, Kansas, at the time, remembered "being directed to maintain a green 'ready to 
launch' status on the launch control console at all times in case a launch was ordered . . 
. .  The briefings escalated in intensity and the messages over the Primary Alerting 
System from SAC headquarters seemed endless.  When we went to DEFCON 2, it 
seemed like the next message could be coded in red."38 
 Patrick Spellman, a missile facilities technician for the 578th Strategic Missile 
Squadron, an Atlas F squadron near Abilene, Texas, remembered having a similar 
feeling.  Away from the command console area when he heard the Primary Alerting 
System,  he returned to see "the commander erasing the 3 [representing the current 




commander directed him to stand at his position and then began giving orders to the 
rest of the crew.  Spellman remembered everyone "standing by their positions and 
wondering what [was coming] next."39 
 Airman Second Class Lucius Morgan, also working with the Atlas squadron at 
Dyess AFB, near Abilene, revealed the acts that made the time so harrowing.  "When 
we reached DEFCON 2, Major [Truman] Grady told me to start the number 2 generator 
. . . .," he remembered.  Then,  "he and Lt [Charles] Hancock took their guns out, cocked 
them and laid them on the launch console.  Next, they took their keys and unlocked 
both [launch] buttons.  The commander told us our job was to get the missile in the air.  
He said it was what we were trained to do and we would do everything in our power to 
do just that."40 
 Lieutenant Herb Gordon, the Deputy Missile Combat Crew Commander at Atlas 
E Site 7 near Nunn, Colorado, recalled that "during our first duty shift following the 
DEFCON change, General Power . . . broadcast a message to all SAC bomber and missile 
crews . . . .  He made it clear he wanted every effort to be made to launch all missiles [if 
the president directed]."41  In the speech, the general proclaimed,  
  "This is General Power speaking.  I am addressing you for the purpose of 
 reemphasizing the seriousness of the situation the nation faces.  We are in an 
 advanced state of readiness to meet any emergencies, and I feel that we are 
 well prepared.  I expect each of you to maintain strict security and use calm 
 judgment during this tense period.  Our plans are well prepared and are being 
 executed smoothly.  If there are any questions concerning instructions which by 
 the nature of the situation deviates from normal, use the telephone for 
 clarification.  Review your plans for further action to insure that there will be no 




 in a maximum readiness condition.  If you are not sure what you should do in 
 any situation and if time permits, get in touch with us here."42 
 
 Power did not exclude himself from the task of putting the command in 
"maximum readiness condition."  On October 24, two days after Kennedy's speech 
signaled the beginning of the blockade and General Taylor ordered Strategic Air 
Command to DEFCON 2, Power gained control over another thirty-six missiles.  
According to command historians, he accomplished this feat by invoking an agreement 
between the Air Force Systems Command  and Strategic Air Command that gave the 
latter operational control of all missile launch complexes "in which a missile could be 
launched on an E[mergency] W[ar] Order mission with strategic warning" if the Joint 
Chiefs declared DEFCON 2 or higher.  Not one of the 36 missiles (9 test and training 
missiles at Vandenberg AFB and 27 others being emplaced at four new missile sites) 
was prepared for immediate launch.43   
 To ready the training missiles for wartime use rather than just testing or 
training, airmen like David Burcham rushed "to get a live nuclear weapon mated to 
each flyable missile."  Then, teams like the one Sergeant Kelchner served on realigned 
the missile's guidance system so that the missiles would launch north rather than west, 
allowing the missiles to be aimed toward authentic targets.  Finally, the teams placed 
the new targeting data into the now operational Minuteman missiles.44 
 Staff Sergeant Rodolpho Armenta conducted similar work on the Air Force's 




technician and a second lieutenant, who had just flown in with targeting information in 
a briefcase handcuffed to his wrist and a Colt .45 pistol strapped to his side.  The 
technician tried to insert the card into the missile, but the process failed to work.  
Armenta remembered, "The technician yanked the card out, rubbed it on his pants, 
reinstalled the card and gave the [missile] a few hard taps to make sure it was seated.  
At this point, I looked over at the lieutenant and noticed the flap on his .45 holster was 
now opened."45 
 "Because we had deviated from our stated installation procedures," Armenta 
clarified,  "I immediately informed the guidance technician to stop his trouble shooting 
techniques, explaining my concern that the lieutenant was about ready to go Wyatt 
Earp on us.  We then requested permission from the control center to install the card in 
slot 'B' to verify if the card was bad or if it was the slot."  They received permission and 
accomplished the task, Armenta recalled joyfully, without the lieutenant adding "any 
notches on his gun."46   
 The 27 new missiles Power garnered from Air Force Systems Command required 
a similar level of effort to become operational.  Captain Melvin Driskill, a Deputy 
Combat Crew Commander at Plattsburgh AFB at the time, remembered that "because 
our squadron was just being activated in Fall of ‘62, there were only three sites alert 
qualified and only a handful of crews operationally qualified for alert."47  His crew was 
on their first alert when President Kennedy declared the blockade.  Thus, while some 




controlling the new missiles "worked 24 hours on and 24 hours off for the first several 
weeks of the crisis" to keep their missiles ready.48   
 Strategic Air Command leaders recognized the strain they had placed upon the 
Plattsburgh AFB missileers by adding the new missiles, with the official history 
acknowledging that "this unit's capability would have been marginal even without a 
crisis situation."  For this reason, staff officers at Headquarters, Strategic Air Command, 
directed that Second Air Force temporarily send four combat ready missile crews who 
were qualified to work on the Atlas F to the 556th Strategic Missile Squadron between 
October 29 and November 20 to alleviate the personnel problems.  On November 1, 
the command temporarily moved five  more crews to support the new squadron, 
including an instructor crew from Vandenberg AFB.49     
 The new Minuteman missiles transferred from Air Force Systems Command at 
Malmstrom AFB created their own difficulties.  The Air Force had sent the missiles to 
the base in September but had not yet certified them for alert.  Therefore, when 
General Power implemented the Emergency Combat Capability Plan, the agreement for 
Air Force Systems Command to surrender the missiles to Strategic Air Command, the 
transfer ran into complications.  The field commander who controlled the missiles for 
Air Force Systems Command refused to transfer the missiles because Air Force Systems 
Command remained in DEFCON 3, not DEFCON 2 as he understood that the agreement 
required.  Thus, the only way that the Strategic Air Command wing commander was 




waivers, saying that Strategic Air Command accepted responsibility for the missiles as 
they were, acknowledging that the Air Force Systems Command was no longer 
responsible for testing or validating the missiles.50 
 Because the missiles had not been readied for launch, the systems still had 
several anomalies.  Engineers had designed the Minuteman missile to require two 
separate launch commands from two separate control centers before launch to ensure 
a missile was not launched without proper authorization.  However, at the time of the 
Cuban Missile Crisis, only one launch control center was completed and ready for use.  
Thus, the wing leadership placed a second missile crew "on standby" with a second 
launch control panel.  If directed to launch the missile, the on-duty crew would send a 
launch command with the original panel, then the second crew would replace the 
installed panel with their "standby" panel and send the required second launch signal 
to fire the missile.51    
 In addition, because the site activation task force had never completed a 
required safety test on the new missiles, Strategic Air Command kept each missile's 
safety control switch manually locked in the safety position, preventing the missiles 
from being launched without reconfiguring the switch.  Chris Adams, an officer who 
served in the command for many years, retiring as a major general, acknowledged that 
crews and maintainers used workarounds to bring the sorties to alert, resulting "in 




them for launch," thus necessitating the safe configuration, although this was not 
known at the time.52    
 The command used informal steps to get the crews to combat ready status as 
well.  Strategic Air Command historians recorded that the 3901st Strategic Missile 
Evaluation Squadron "surveyed"  the crews to determine if they were ready to man the 
missiles.  If a crew had completed the two phases of initial training and passed a 
standardized test, the evaluators deemed them "capable."  Sam Goodwin, a new 
captain at the time, illustrated his experience.  "We went to Vandenberg AFB, CA, for 
crew training in October and had almost completed it when the Cuban Missile Crisis 
occurred.  We quickly returned to Malmstrom AFB, MT.  After a few sessions with the 
instructor crews, wing scheduling scheduled us for alert on Thanksgiving."  He also 
recalled, "I soon heard from my squadron commander, Col[onel] Jim Farley, about 
going on alert prior to being evaluated and deemed qualified and without his 
knowledge."53  
 Other problems plagued the Air Force's effort to ready their missiles for 
employment.  Strategic Air Command had never prepared its entire missile force for 
war at one time.  Therefore, on October 20, as the command placed several new 
missiles on alert and prepared them for launch, SAC leaders discovered the Air Force 
did not have enough liquid oxygen, one of the two vital ingredients used to fuel the 
Atlas and Titan missiles.54  On October 21, the command quietly attempted to procure 




twelve days, which the command did not have.  The next day, the command requested 
the federal government establish a national priority to provide the required liquid 
oxygen supplies to Strategic Air Command missiles.  The government responded 
immediately.  Every government and commercial plant worked to provide the critical 
fuel.  Finally, on October 25, Strategic Air Command acquired the needed liquid oxygen 
to bring all of its missiles to mission-ready status.55 
 Through this phenomenal level of effort and sacrifice, Strategic Air Command 
missileers increased the number of ballistic missiles ready for wartime service from 132 
on October 22, to 147 on October 24.  Astonishingly, by October 28, when Khrushchev 
notified the world that "the Soviet government . . . has given a new order to dismantle 
the arms which you [Kennedy] describe as offensive, and to crate and return them to 
the Soviet Union," the missileers had prepared 171 missiles for combat use.56  When 
the Air Force missileers reached their peak readiness on November 4, sixteen days after 
General Power had begun preparing for war, the missile crews and maintainers had 
added 74 combat ready missiles to their arsenal, increasing the number of nuclear 
missiles ready for launch from 112 to 186.  During this same time, on October 10, the 
Navy added an additional ballistic missile submarine, carrying 16 Polaris missiles, to the 
6 submarines that were operational at the beginning of the crisis, and added a second 
less than a month later, on November 7.  Strategic Air Command historians 
emphatically noted that "while SAC was in Defcon 2 posture, 92.5 per cent of its 




 While October 28 ended the most threatening part of the Cuban Missile Crisis, 
the Kennedy administration retained both the quarantine and the heightened military 
alert status until November 20, when the Soviet missiles had been removed and 
Khrushchev agreed to also withdraw the nuclear-capable bombers that had been 
transported to Cuba.58 
 By November 15, though, the increased level of Strategic Air Command 
operations had begun to degrade the capabilities of both the bomber and the land-
based missile forces, so the command entered a "modified DEFCON 2 allowing for 
critical maintenance" and training.  Then, as tensions began to ease further, on 
November 21, the Joint Chiefs directed the command to drop back to DEFCON 3.59  A 
week later, the command returned to normal operations and dropped its requirement 
for every missile to be continuously readied for launch.60  Command historians declared 
the organization's effort to bring "ICBMs to alert status was eminently successful."  
They observed that the Cuban Missile Crisis had "provided the command a singular 
opportunity to determine exactly how far it had progressed toward an adequate missile 
capability.  The results were encouraging."61 
 However, the event that was arguably the crowning success for the missileers 
facilitated their becoming a political pariah to national leaders and their descent into 
perceived insignificance within the Air Force.  Most people not associated with missiles 
were completely unaware of the remarkable level of effort the missileers exerted or 




"although the crisis was receiving lots of attention in the news media, I think the local 
population saw our activities as business-as-usual since launch crews and maintenance 
teams continued to commute to and from the missile sites.  We were directed not to 
do or say anything that might alarm the civilian community."62  Captain Jim Peck, a B-47 
pilot at the time, acknowledged that even the command's pilots were not cognizant of 
the specific activities of the missileers.  They knew that the missileers had attained a 
higher state of readiness, as the bomber pilots had, and were prepared to launch 
against their targets, but most did not know exactly what that entailed.63 
 Even more important to the future of missiles and missileers in the Air Force, 
General LeMay still refused to fully support the new missiles.  In 1965 Congressional 
hearings, he declined to accept Secretary of the Air Force Eugene Zuckert's statement 
that "we have achieved the point where our missiles, most particularly POLARIS and 
MINUTEMAN, can be depended upon to perform that part of the war plan our planners 
have assigned them." LeMay later contended that "like any machine, they don't always 
work" and that he did not think "that you are ever going to get to the point where you 
have the same confidence in the missile as you have in manned systems."64     
 Finally, the Kennedy administration, which had previously supported a robust 
buildup of missiles instead of bombers, began to question the value of missiles as 
actual weapons, rather than just a deterrent, and reduced their strong sponsorship of 
the new systems.  Roger Hilsman, Kennedy's Assistant Secretary of State for 




crisis] was to change attitudes toward nuclear weapons."  This change allowed Air 
Force leaders like General LeMay to relegate the new weapons to a less significant role 
in the service's operations and to de-emphasize their operations.65 
 It is doubtful that Kennedy ever agreed with Eisenhower's assessment that "in 
ten years he saw missiles carrying the burden of warfare," especially since defense 
analyst Lawrence Freedman contends that "the basic guidelines for the strategic 
doctrines of the Kennedy administration were derived from the critique of the strategy 
of 'massive retaliation' as it had evolved during the 1950s."66  In fact, it is possible that 
some members of the Kennedy administration never supported the use of nuclear 
missiles as strongly as they appeared to have.  As early as 1945, key scientists from the 
Manhattan Project had joined together to warn against "any effort to formulate our 
[U.S.] foreign policy on the basis of a temporary superiority in atomic weapons"  which 
they claimed would "force other nations as well as ourselves into an atomic armaments 
race, thereby creating a world of fear and hatred in which both great and small nations 
will face sudden destruction."67  Political scientist Nina Tannenwald argues that by the 
late 1950s, the Eisenhower administration's attempts to persuade Americans and their 
allies that tactical nuclear weapons should be treated as conventional weapons had 
failed.  She writes, "Starting in 1954, American public opinion began shifting against 
initiating the use of nuclear weapons, where it has remained ever since . . . .  In 1955, 




Soviet Union that if war broke out the United States would not use atomic or hydrogen 
bombs if other countries did not."68   
 Daniel Ellsberg supported this mindset in his memoirs,  contending that 
McNamara had decided not to use nuclear weapons before the Cuban Missile Crisis, 
"inferr[ing McNamara's] position from the way he talked with me in a private lunch at 
his desk in 1961."69     
 However, historian Lawrence Wittner warns that while some Kennedy advisors 
were more supportive of the anti-nuclear position than Eisenhower's staff, "the 
importance of this political transition [from the Eisenhower administration to the 
Kennedy administration] should not be exaggerated."  It is very likely that members of 
the administration were influenced against nuclear warfare at the same time as many 
of the nation's citizens, following the Cuban Missile Crisis, rather than before.  Arthur 
Schlesinger, Kennedy's special assistant, later explained that "the Kennedy 
administration welcomed pressure from domestic arms control groups as an offset 
against the pro-arms-race pressure from Congress and the military, . . . [but] the 
administration valued these groups for political reasons rather than as a source of 
ideas."70   
   Kennedy had campaigned on Eisenhower's missile gap and entered office 
focused on reducing that gap and preparing a strong nuclear missile force.  This 
engaged concentration only began to wane after the Cuban Missile Crisis as the 




nuclear missiles as weapons.  In a message to Congress just seven months before the 
Cuban crisis, Kennedy argued that "in the event of a major aggression that could not be 
repulsed by conventional forces, we must be prepared to take whatever action with 
whatever weapons are appropriate."  On August 9, 1962, General Maxwell Taylor 
reiterated the administration's position on the first use of nuclear weapons, warning, 
"In my judgment, if an attack on Western Europe comes, we must use whatever 
weapons and forces are necessary to defeat it.  To meet a massive attack today, 
because of the lack of adequate conventional forces in the West, it would be necessary 
to resort to atomic weapons early in the conflict."71 
 McNamara, in a June 1962 commencement address at Ann Arbor, Michigan, 
had said:  "The U.S. has come to the conclusion that to the extent feasible basic military 
strategy in a possible general nuclear war should be approached in much the same way 
that more conventional military options have been approached in the past.  That is to 
say, principal military objectives, in the event of a nuclear war stemming from a major 
attack on the Alliance, should be the destruction of the enemy's military forces, not his 
civilian population."  This counterforce doctrine required the United States to build 
enough missiles to destroy enemy offensive weapons, since missiles could be better 
protected than bombers and launched more quickly.  Paul Nitze, the Assistant Secretary 
of Defense for International Security Affairs, explained further, "The President's first 
step was to strengthen our second-strike capability by accelerating our Minuteman and 




survival of our strategic force on early warning and a quick response.  While our B-52 
bombers continued to rely on warning and alertness for their survival, our Minutemen 
in their hardened silos and Polaris missiles in their submarines, at that time, did not."72   
 Thus, while McNamara said during the same speech that he "look[ed] forward 
to the prospect that through arms control the actual use of these terrible weapons may 
be completely avoided", he continued to increase the number and quality of ballistic 
missiles.  He also revised the Single Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP), the plan to use 
nuclear weapons, to make it less rigid and continued to prepare for nuclear war, 
including a first strike capability.  The revised SIOP, implemented in July 1962, focused 
U.S. nuclear attacks on Soviet military forces rather than its cities in order to limit the 
weapons able to be used against the United States, to convince the French that they 
did not need an independent nuclear force and to convince the Soviets to do the same, 
but the plan's aim was still to win a nuclear conflict.73 
 However, by the end of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the key leaders of the 
administration had begun to change their perspectives on preparations for nuclear war.  
Historian Gregg Herken quotes McNamara as warning Kennedy during the crisis, "If one 
of these . . . things was launched against New York, Washington, or Miami . . . it would 
destroy so many people that you, Mr. President, would never want to accept the risk" 
and later musing, "If that was the case with one, think what a limited nuclear war 
would look like."74  David Ormsby-Gore, Lord Harlech, recalled the president bursting 




intolerable state of affairs when nations can threaten each other with nuclear weapons.  
This is just so totally irrational.  A world in which there are large quantities of nuclear 
weapons is an impossible world to handle.  We really must try to get on with 
disarmament if we get through this crisis . . . because this is just too much."75   
 Clark Clifford, Kennedy's Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence 
Advisory Board, remembered that "after October 1962, . . . , the leaders of both sides 
[Soviet and American] having experienced the bitter taste that comes from thinking the 
unthinkable, shied away from any repetition of that experience."  In Clifford's mind, 
"The Missile Crisis had served the same function as an inoculation against a dread 
disease:  there was never another confrontation as dangerous as that nuclear face-off 
between the two superpowers, which taught both sides how dangerous it was to go to 
the brink face to face, eyeball to eyeball."76   
 "The Cuban Missile Crisis marked the beginning of a long, slow trend away from 
the threat of nuclear war.  War games, crisis planning, and a massive (and wasteful) 
military buildup on both sides would continue for another quarter century," Clifford 
asserted, "but after the Missile Crisis, even though the two sides continued their 
worldwide competition, neither side again flirted with a direct nuclear showdown."77  
McGeorge Bundy declared similarly that ". . .  the preeminent meaning of the Cuban 
missile crisis, for participants and observers alike, and for the quarter century of history 
that followed, is that having come so close to the edge, the leaders of the two 




 Historian Gregg Herken agreed, contending that McNamara's "reflections upon 
the crisis in Cuba convinced him that the hope of fighting a limited nuclear war was 
both futile and dangerous."79  Henry Rowan, McNamara's Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for International Security Affairs from 1961 to 1964, further substantiated the 
perception.  Rowan recalled that McNamara's memorandums to the President on 
nuclear strategy abruptly shifted from the idea of fighting or controlling a nuclear war 
to the idea of deterring conflict.80 
 If there were any further doubt, McNamara himself cleared it up in his book, 
Blundering Into Disaster, writing "I do not believe we can avoid the serious and 
unacceptable risk of nuclear war until we recognize -- and until we base all our military 
plans, defense budgets, weapons deployments, and arms negotiations on recognition -- 
that nuclear weapons serve no purpose whatsoever."  He continued, "They are totally 
useless -- except to deter one's opponent from using them.  This is my view today [in 
1986].  It was my view in the early 1960s."  He then clarified his outlook as Secretary of 
Defense.  "At that time, in long private conversations with successive Presidents -- 
Kennedy and Johnson -- I recommended, without qualification, that they never initiate, 
under any circumstances, the use of nuclear weapons.  I believe they accepted my 
recommendations."81 
 Paul Nitze noticed the change after the Cuban Missile Crisis, although he offered 
a different reason for it.  In his revealing memoir, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, he 




strategic force oriented toward an effective counterforce capability soon cooled 
McNamara's ardor after the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.  By then the danger of a 
nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union appeared to have diminished and the costs 
of meeting it . . . were thought to be greater than he had originally assumed."  Nitze 
continued, "Therefore, because of the requirements of building up our conventional 
forces and his concerns in 1963 that the country would not meet the cost of a 
ballooning defense budget, he [McNamara] changed his goals concerning our nuclear 
strategy and force structure."  Although Nitze did not agree with the change, 
McNamara's viewpoint prevailed.82 
 Therefore, in December 1963, according to historian Andreas Wenger, 
McNamara advised Kennedy that "the central objective for the strategic nuclear forces 
was to assure U.S. ability to destroy, after a well-planned and well-executed Soviet 
surprise attack on U.S. strategic forces, 'the Soviet government and military controls, 
plus a large percentage of their population and economy."  The Kennedy administration 
then significantly revised both its war plans and military arsenal, including the cache of 
nuclear ballistic missiles, switching from the counterforce strategy to mutual assured 
destruction.83   
 McNamara called his nuclear strategy Mutually Assured Destruction to show the 
futility of nuclear conflict.  Although his source is not documented, he may have 
borrowed the concept from the book, The Ultimate Weapon, edited by Bernard Brodie 




retaliation in kind is probably the strongest single means of determent.  Therefore, the 
preparation of such retaliation must occupy a decisive plan in any over-all policy of 
protection against the atomic danger."  He then applied it to the situation that 
McNamara faced:  "Neither we nor the Russians can expect to feel even reasonably 
safe unless an atomic attack by one were certain to unleash a devastating atomic 
counterattack by the other."  Brodie agreed, proposing "If the aggressor state must fear 
retaliation, it will know that even if it is the victor it will suffer a degree of physical 
destruction incomparably greater than that suffered by any defeated nation of history, 
incomparably greater, that is, than that suffered by Germany in the recent war.  Under 
those circumstances," he continued, "no victory, even if guaranteed in advance--which 
it never is--would be worth the price.  The threat of retaliation does not have to be 100 
per cent certain; it is sufficient if there is a good chance of it, or if there is a belief that 
there is a good chance of it."    Historians Gerard Clarfield and William Wiecek  contend 
that Mutually Assured Destruction was McNamara's admission that fighting a limited 
nuclear war within defined boundaries, a key goal of the Flexible Response and 
counterforce strategies, was impossible.84 
 The change in perspective on nuclear war was not limited to the Kennedy 
administration.  Khrushchev, too, changed his rhetoric, telling Norman Cousins, the 
leader of the Committee for a SANE Nuclear Policy, in mid-December 1962, "Peace ... is 
the most important goal in the world.  If we don't have peace and the nuclear bombs 




capitalists or Chinese or Russians or Americans?  Who could tell us apart?  Who will be 
left to tell us apart?"85  American citizens recognized the change in relations between 
the two superpowers.  In October, 1961, Snell Putney and Russell Middleton conducted 
a study of college student attitudes toward war.  At that time, 72 percent of 
respondents agreed that "the U.S. must be willing to run any risk of war which may be 
necessary to prevent the spread of Communism" while only 34 percent agreed that 
"the U.S. has no moral right to carry its struggle against Communism to the point of 
risking the destruction of the human race."86  After the Cuban Missile Crisis, though, 
American citizens "emerged from the crisis like convicted felons who received a 
reprieve after being strapped into the electric chair:  they sighed with relief but could 
not shake the near-memory of sudden death."87  For a few months after the crisis, 
people remained concerned.  However, by April 1963, the percentage of people who 
believed a world war would occur in the next five years dropped to the lowest point 
recorded in the 1950s and 1960s and, by July 1964, only 1% of respondents responded 
to a Gallup poll question on "the most important problem facing the country today" 
with communism or communist infiltration while 34% mentioned racial 
discrimination/civil rights and integration and 17% mentioned unemployment.  Just two 
months later, when asked if the Russian leaders would refuse to risk launching a 
nuclear war no matter what the U.S. did, a surprising 29% agreed.88  
 McNamara's Mutually Assured Destruction policy appears to have continued 




and Secretary of Defense.  Johnson, himself, in a September 16, 1964 speech at the 
Peace Arch in Seattle, Washington, proclaimed, "We have worked consistently to bring 
nuclear weapons under careful control, and to lessen the danger of nuclear conflict . . . .  
I do not want us to fight a war that no one ever meant to begin."  The Johnson 
administration had "expanded and modernized our conventional forces . . . . [so] we do 
not need to use nuclear power to solve every problem."89 
 McGeorge Bundy, Johnson's National Security Advisor, proclaimed that "by 
1964 he [Johnson] was entirely clear in his own mind that he would have no interest 
whatever in ordering the use of even one [atomic] bomb, ever, except in the context of 
some overwhelmingly dangerous and direct confrontation with open Soviet 
aggression."  Johnson, Bundy believed, saw atomic weapons as "a danger so much 
greater that one must think of any use of it not in the terms of a battle or a campaign, 
or even a war won or lost, but rather in terms of the long-term effect of any such use 
on the survival of man.  It is not wrong, I believe, to conclude that for Johnson the use 
of the bomb in Vietnam was quite literally unthinkable."90   
 The war in Vietnam is a perfect example of the Johnson administration's 
decision not to use nuclear forces as weapons.  Political scientist Nina Tannenwald 
contends that because "the United States sustained large losses in men, money and 
materiel at tremendous political cost [and] U.S. officials repeatedly declared that the 
United States could not tolerate the loss of Southeast Asia to Communism, and that the 




remarkable features of the Vietnam War is how little serious consideration US leaders 
gave to nuclear options.  Although they made some veiled nuclear threats, top political 
leaders did not come close to using nuclear weapons."  Tannenwald argues 
persuasively that "while nuclear weapons might have been militarily useful in the war, 
it was clear that, by the time the war was fought, they were politically unusable, and 
for some officials, even morally unacceptable."91  This remarkable change in attitude 
toward nuclear conflict among influential American leaders and politicians had 
significant and long-term influence on U.S. defense posture and allocations for military 
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6. FREEFALL:  THE AIR FORCE RESPONSE 
 
 Roger Hilsman, Kennedy's Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and 
Research in 1962, contended that, "before the Cuban missile crisis, most of the 
American officials who later participated in the crisis deliberations accepted Churchill's 
notion of a balance of terror."  He explained, "They assumed that to keep the peace all 
that the United States needed to do was to make certain that its nuclear forces were 
adequate, to maintain the will and determination to use those weapons if the worst 
came to the worst, and to take appropriate steps to ensure that the other side 
understood all this."  Hilsman then revealed how the crisis changed that perspective.  
"For many people involved in the crisis the lesson . . . was that the risk of an 
inadvertent escalation during a crisis was unavoidable and that in a nuclear age such 
risk was unacceptable.  The leaders of both the Soviet Union and the United States had 
gazed down the gun barrel of nuclear war and had shrunk back from the holocaust they 
saw there."1   
 The first casualties of the Kennedy administration's new attitude toward nuclear 
conflict were the Thor and Jupiter intermediate range ballistic missiles.2  It is doubtful 
that Allied leaders on either side of the Atlantic ever considered these missiles as a 
long-term defense measure as they were created to be a stop-gap measure until the 
Atlas missile could become operational.  Following the Cuban Missile Crisis, the United 




future with improved land-based medium range ballistic missiles when such were ready 
to fulfill their mission.  Until then, the Navy would fill the gap with submarine-launched 
Polaris missiles.3   
 In February 1963, General Curtis LeMay testified before Congress that the 
British "never were very enthusiastic about Thor as a weapon system . . . . [and] felt 
they would rather put their money into something else."  In fact, during the height of 
the Cuban crisis, on October 26, British Prime Minister Harold MacMillan told Kennedy 
that he would dismantle the Thor missiles in England in a quid pro quo for the Cuban 
missiles.  The first Thor squadron was closed early in 1963 and the last shut down in 
August of the same year.4   
 The Kennedy administration's new perspective on potential nuclear conflict 
quickly sealed the fate of the Jupiter missiles as well.  In the spring of 1961, even before 
the squadrons in Italy and Turkey had become operational, Department of Defense 
representatives consulted with NATO authorities about the need to replace the 
missiles, which they deemed obsolete.  Therefore, in January 1963, soon after the crisis 
over Cuba was settled, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Turkey announced that they 
would be phasing out their IRBMs.5  In late February 1963, in response to a 
Congressional question on why he was removing the missiles so quickly, McNamara 
contended that the Jupiters were too vulnerable and expensive.  He testified, "Our 
invulnerable or near invulnerable missile force, of course, is expanding very rapidly, and 




subject to sabotage, subject to attack, which are costing us substantial sums to 
maintain."  He further exclaimed, "It costs us roughly $1 million per year per missile 
simply to maintain the missile in Turkey, and we pay that, and we see no need to 
continue that expenditure for such an ineffective weapon."  Less than two months 
later, in April 1963, the Air Force had dismantled the last Jupiter squadron.6   
 A month later, in May 1963, McNamara decided to remove the liquid-fueled 
Atlas and Titan I missiles from the Air Force inventory as well.  These weapons suffered 
from some of the same problems as the Thor and Jupiter.  They were also extremely 
hazardous as the large missiles required thousands of gallons of liquid oxygen to lift the 
warhead, providing more reason for the Defense Department to retire them.  The liquid 
oxygen reacted explosively to contact with organic materials, so it had to be stored in 
insulated tanks at -297 degrees Fahrenheit and could not be loaded into the missiles 
until shortly before launch.  Missiles loaded with liquid oxygen could not remain on 
alert for an extended time as, at room temperature, the liquid oxygen would return to 
its gaseous state and "burn off."  Furthermore, if the missile crews and maintainers did 
not keep the missile area completely clean, any released oxygen had a tendency to 
cause fires or explosions.  These dangerous and volatile conditions caused several 
accidents during training and operations, including four accidents at operational sites 
during 1963 and early 1964, costing millions in damages.7 
 Tests of the integrated Atlas system showed that the frenzied development 




month retrofit program to correct the known problems,8 but still only hoped to achieve 
50 to 75 percent reliability.  For this reason, in the spring of 1963, an Air Staff study 
group recommended that the Air Force retire the Atlas D and E models, along with the 
Titan I.9  The Department of Defense also grew concerned over the poor showing of the 
Atlas F, a missile even less reliable than its predecessors since it had been rushed into 
production for the Cuban Missile Crisis.10   
 Thus, when the new Minuteman missile proved safer, cheaper, and more 
dependable than the old, notoriously unreliable, liquid fueled missiles, defense officials 
decided to replace the old missiles with the new Minuteman.  The new missiles could 
also be launched more quickly, protecting them from a sneak attack.  An additional 
benefit for the Kennedy administration was that the new missiles carried much smaller 
warheads than the earlier missiles, allowing the administration to contend that they 
were building larger numbers of missiles without increasing the real explosive power.11  
Consequently, in May 1964, McNamara decided to retire all liquid-fueled missiles. By 
July 1964, the Air Force had begun replacing Atlas and Titan I missiles with Minuteman 
missiles and thirteen months later they were gone.12 
 McNamara's decision to retire the Atlas and Titan I missiles so quickly had a 
sudden and harsh impact on the missileers, especially the enlisted personnel.  A single 
crew of two officers could oversee ten of the new Minuteman missiles while the older 
missiles each required a larger crew, including several enlisted members.  Therefore, 




missile operations were assigned to 2 posts per crew on the 54 Titan II missiles, along 
with a small number of instructors and evaluators.  Over 5,000 Atlas and Titan I crew 
members, primarily enlisted personnel, were told to retrain to another career field, 
return to their previous occupation years behind their peers, or separate from the Air 
Force.13   
 The situation was only slightly better for the officers serving on Atlas and Titan I 
crews.  Many World War II pilots were retiring and younger pilots were separating to 
join the growing and high-paying civilian airline industry, so the Air Force grew 
concerned about pilot retention. Therefore, in March 1964, the Air Force directed 1,700 
qualified pilots working in non-rated assignments back to aviation duties. The pilots 
were reassigned to flying billets over the next year through the normal assignment 
process rather than all at one time, similar to what had happened to the bomber 
personnel transferred into missiles during the previous three years.  Those who 
remained had to retrain into the very different Minuteman and Titan II weapon 
systems, leave the career field, or separate from the Air Force.  In consequence, the 
nascent missile career field lost almost all of its experienced cadre.14 
 In 1964 and 1965, the conflict in Vietnam began to command more attention, 
making the personnel problems even more challenging for missile operations.  In 
August 1964, after a Navy destroyer reported being fired upon in the Gulf of Tonkin, 
President Lyndon Johnson, with Congressional support, escalated combat operations in 




of nuclear weapons during the conflict in Vietnam, so the Department of Defense 
focused  its attention on developing and augmenting its conventional forces.15  General 
Earl Wheeler, Army Chief of Staff, in testimony to Congress, quoted McNamara's 
important change in perspective on nuclear weapons as given to NATO ministers in 
1963: "the forces that were the cutting edge of the action [in the Cuban crisis] were the 
non-nuclear ones.  Nuclear force was not irrelevant but it was in the background.  
Nonnuclear forces were our sword, our nuclear forces were our shield."16 
 Struggling with nearly overwhelming requirements, the Air Force decided that 
providing combat support to Vietnam was more important than manning missiles with 
experienced personnel, a significant change in perspective, and transitioned many non-
rated missile officers who had worked in other fields back to their previous duties.  The 
majority of Atlas and Titan I missile officers had previously served as rated pilots, 
navigators, and support officers, so the Air Force viewed the retirement of these 
missiles as a windfall for its combat requirements in Southeast Asia rather than 
retraining them to work in the growing Minuteman arsenal.17 
 Due to the increasing demands of the Vietnam War, the Air Force increased its 
personnel requirements in Southeast Asia and extended combat tours from six months 
to one year.  By 1965, the Air Force returned about 75 percent of pilots working in non-
rated positions like missiles back to their cockpits.  Two years later, the number of 
pilots working in non-rated positions dropped even further, from about 15,000 in 1965 




     To fill the gaping holes in the missile field created by the wholesale transfer of 
personnel to Southeast Asia during the height of the buildup of the new Minuteman 
missiles, the Air Force began assigning newly commissioned officers, many from Air 
Force ROTC detachments, to missiles.  Consequently, in just a few years, the missile 
community changed from a notable group of mostly rated, mid-level officers to a very 
junior group composed almost entirely of non-rated officers with less than four years in 
the Air Force.  While the service also recruited many new pilots for service in Vietnam, 
Colonel Vance Mitchell acknowledged that "even in 1967, after most of the World War 
II pilots had retired, only 20 percent of the pilots were under thirty, while nearly 40 
percent were over forty."19  Donovan Bowe, in a 1969 research report, documented 
that the rate of second lieutenants, the most junior rank in the officer corps, rose from 
5 percent of the Minuteman crew force in 1963, to 47 percent in 1968.   He further 
asserted that by 1969, 75 percent of Minuteman missileers were lieutenants and 
almost all of the other 25 percent were junior captains, almost all of whom were under 
26 and had been in the Air Force less than 5 years.20   
   The new Air Force attitude toward this new cadre was a drastic change from Lt. 
Col. William Anderson's 1957 directive that, "the missile crew must be brought to 
realize that it is the foremost element in the defense structure."  Many missileers who 
had not realized it before now understood that the Air Force did not consider them as 




 The missileers were further demeaned by the increased automation of the 
Minuteman missile system because the new system left little opportunity for ingenuity 
or innovative thought.  Chaplain Arthur Engell asserted in a 1964 thesis that "as we 
approach perfection in the push-button stage of our weapons system, with less and less 
effort required for maintenance and operation, the more difficult it becomes to provide 
useful and meaningful activity that will motivate and keep a man on the job."  Captain 
Pierce Smith agreed: "As improved missile systems were phased into our strategic 
forces, advanced technology made crew duty much less demanding.  This is especially 
true in the Minuteman system, where sophisticated equipment has greatly simplified 
crew duties."22  
 In other words, the missileers' daily work routine became more tedious, but the 
tedium did not mean the job was easy.  Major Thomas Gilkeson, citing Strategic Air 
Command Manuals 55-66, Vol. 1, and 23-9, revealed that 
  "the primary responsibility [of a missile crew member] . . . is to be fully 
 proficient in the use of the E[mergency] W[ar] O[rder] Documents, checklists, 
 and procedures necessary to implement the SAC EWO.  In addition missile 
 crews must be on alert, monitoring the safety, security, and reaction capability 
 of their weapon system until receipt of an execution order, upon such receipt 
 they must properly interpret, authenticate, and react to effect a proper 
 launch."23   
 
 Smith then described actual duty for the command's Minuteman crew 
members:  "The average work week for a missile crew is far in excess of the normal 40-
hour week.  They average at least  300 hours per month . . . .  The duty and tasks 




ten missiles in their flight by observing an array of color-coded lights on electronic 
panels."  He added, "This routine of monitoring and reporting is continued throughout 
the tour, interrupted occasionally by practice launch messages or other routine calls 
over the communications network.  These . . . functions are closely regulated by various 
publications and directives."24   
 Major Donald Sherman, in a research report for the Air Command and Staff 
College, explained how the directives made the daily tasks difficult:  "There [was] no 
room for initiative or applying an individual's own systems knowledge in solving 
malfunctions or even in accomplishing the most routine tasks . . . .  The most serious 
discrepancy a crew member can make is deviating from prescribed procedures." He 
then revealed that some crew members chose to obey incorrect guidance because they 
"may blow up the missile by following technical data as prescribed, but at least [they] 
won't be court-martialed for not following it."  Not everyone followed this mindset, but 
the pressure to conform was constant and intense.25  
 Continuous evaluations increased the stress that missile duty imposed on the 
missileers.  The Air Force determined that evaluating each crew by launching a missile 
was too expensive, so Strategic Air Command tested its missile crews through written 
exams and simulations.  The command demanded perfection, scores of 100 percent on 
several specified tests and scores of at least 90 percent on all others.  Evaluations 
occurred several times each month, adding additional pressure to an already stressful 




Commander of the 341st Strategic Missile Wing, to report, "The combat crew lives in an 
artificial environment -- strict, tight, closely controlled.  They face rigorous 
examinations regularly on which they have to make perfect scores, and yet the tests 
are not really challenging, just demanding.  Some of the men can't do it.  A few have 
simply resigned their commissions and left the Air Force."  Any discrepancies were 
resolved through immediate corrective action and individual who failed to display the 
required excellence or showed a chronic weakness was removed from the missile 
assignment and, often, the Air Force.  The pressure was even more intense during 
performance assessments since evaluators conducted these tests at operational missile 
sites, forcing the crews to determine whether to prioritize real world status or the 
simulated status. In at least one case, this decision caused an entire wing to fail an 
inspection, an extremely rare and catastrophic event that ended the careers of all of 
the wing's leadership.26  The continuous pressure actually led to stress related diseases 
for some of the missileers.27 
 Yet another factor can be seen to have related to stress and morale factors for 
missile personnel.  The Air Force intentionally situated missile wings away from 
populated areas and placed the missile sites miles away from their supporting Air Force 
bases.  The isolation further increased the missileers' frustration and boredom as they 
spent much of their days driving through rural terrain or sitting alone in the missile 
launch facility.28  Because missile squadrons were often undermanned, the missileers 




 Colonel Donovan Bowe summarized the situation in a 1969 research report:  
"Arduous duty, isolated work environment, lack of glamour, inability to see the fruits of 
productivity, and lack of opportunity for the challenging work that produces job 
satisfaction are all factors that combine to make missile combat crew duty less than a 
rewarding experience."  E. S. Ewart had identified many of these problems as far back 
as 1958, before the first missile was declared operational, in his study, "A Survey of 
Potential Morale, Motivation, and Retention Problems at Ballistic Missile Sites," but 
eleven years later, they remained critical concerns.30 
 In the same year, author Robert Rodwell acknowledged that "nobody has yet 
come forward with a palliative for what we feel will be a basic root of discontent with 
future service life, that is the sense of complete frustration that life in a missile force 
will engender among its personnel."  He then defined the primary problem, "Basically , 
inactivity will be the cause of this frustration -- not inactivity in the sense that there will 
be little to occupy the serviceman's working day, but the inactivity of the force as a 
whole.  It will be a sterile, static force, prevented by its very nature from ever being 
fully exercised."31  
 Finally, Rodwell predicted what was readily apparent by the early 1960s: "There 
will be no indication to officers or airmen [in missile units] that their combined efforts 
are achieving anything.  They will be denied the satisfaction derived from a job well 




to ignore these concerns about morale as they arose, presuming that somehow good 
leadership might resolve the situation.32 
 The extremely negative impact of the problems remained hidden for several 
years.  From October of 1959 through the end of 1961, the Air Force had only placed 
twenty-seven ballistic missiles in operational units.  Thus, 1962 was the first year that 
numerous airmen began working with missiles, primarily in Atlas and Titan I units.  The 
first missileers were almost all volunteers and saw themselves as the vanguard of a new 
concept in military operations.  The enlisted missileers maintained the missiles and 
support equipment, but were designated as operational personnel, a rare honor in the 
Air Force.  Since the early missiles were rife with problems, this provided them with 
constant work and they were able to see the fruits of their labor.  Almost all of the 
officers were rated personnel who were temporarily reassigned to missiles from flying 
units.  These early missileers had retained their aeronautical status and, in addition to 
their operational responsibilities, they guided and supervised the enlisted personnel, 
similar to their actions in the flying community.33 
 Even when the Air Force began recruiting some non-rated personnel into the 
career field, in 1962, missileers still had reason to believe that ICBMs were the future of 
the Air Force.  The Air Force,  under political pressure, terminated all new long range 
bomber production in October of that year -- the beginning of fiscal year 1963.  This 
was the first year that the Air Force did not have a bomber in production since 1946 




"mixed force."  Despite the decision of the Kennedy administration to scale back its 
reliance on nuclear weapons, in 1963, strategic missile forces continued to increase in 
number and in relative percentage as compared to nuclear-capable bombers, if not in 
explosive power, because the Air Force completed work on the missiles begun over the 
previous several years while it retired older bombers such as the B-17, the B-29 and the 
B-47.  Therefore, although manned bombers still formed the bulk of Air Force strategic 
power until April 21, 1964 -- the first time there were as many missiles on alert as 
bombers, the new missileers were willing to deal with the hardships of missile life, 
believing conditions would improve as missiles replaced bombers as the primary 
weapon system of the Air Force.34 
 However, the missileers did not foresee the impact of the administration's new 
focus on limited war.  While McNamara refused to procure new bombers, he requested 
and received approval to increase the Air Force's tactical fighter wings from 16 to 21, 
and to increase reconnaissance wings from 14 to 20.  The Air Force bomber pilots 
would have fought this change except that the Army had established the Howze Board 
to investigate whether it should create its own tactical air force.  In light of the Army 
threat and not perceiving fighter aircraft as a risk to Air Force's strategic mission, the 
bomber generals, led by LeMay, helped to build their service's tactical air force.35 
 Only in 1965, as Air Force leaders pulled pilots, navigators, and more senior 
support officers for assignments to Southeast Asia and replaced them with newly 




ballistic missiles become obvious.  By then, most of the early missileers had left the 
career field and the few who remained required retraining to enter the new 
Minuteman or Titan II systems.  Thus, it cost the Air Force very little to replace them 
with new officers if the experienced officers separated from the service.36 
 Missileers struggled with another stigma.  Even though sizable numbers of pilots 
and navigators had been pulled from operational missile jobs, the rated officers 
continued to be assigned to command and senior leadership positions in missiles, 
positions that many missileers did not believe these officers were qualified to fill.  For 
example, Major Robert Luckett, a former missileer studying at Air Command and Staff 
College, contended, "High level command and key staff positions in the missile wings 
were occupied by rated personnel.  No one questioned the need for these personnel 
initially.  However, they were not attuned to the problems and irritants of their 
assigned personnel."  Luckett continued, "Some of these same people had not visited a 
launch control center since it became operationally ready.  Not a single commander or 
staff member had ever spent a full alert tour at a control center to witness and 
experience firsthand what crew members were trying to convey when airing complaints 
[about the stresses of the assignment]."37   
 The situation was even more frustrating to the missileers since it violated a 
long-standing belief in the Air Force flying community -- that "operators," those who 
conducted the operational mission of the Air Force, would only be led by someone who 




Review article, acknowledged that the Air Force "established a . . . policy requiring that 
all Air Force activities having flying as their primary mission be commanded by a rated 
pilot.  That the rated pilot who is serving or may serve in command and operational 
positions must continue active flying to maintain the 'cockpit viewpoint' has been 
argued exhaustively . . . ."  Brauer contended, "Regardless of current assignment an 
officer expected to command or control flying activities must stay abreast of aviation 
advances, know the capabilities and limitations of the flyers and their machines, and 
most important of all, gain and maintain the respect and confidence of the men he is to 
lead."  Melvin Deaile, a former SAC pilot, put it more succinctly, "leaders flew and fliers 
led."  Yet, Air Force leaders chose not to apply a similar policy in the case of missiles.38 
 By 1967, because the Department of Defense had focused on building fighters 
while retiring the World War II bombers and replacing the large Atlas and Titan I 
missiles with larger numbers of the smaller Minuteman missiles -- decisions made in 
the late 1950s and early 1960s, there were more than two times as many missiles as 
there were bombers in the U. S. Air Force.39  Nonetheless, the Air Force still granted the 
key leadership positions to the flyers either by regulation or fiat.  Thus, the non-rated 
missileers became convinced that they were needed to operate missiles, but would 
never be offered upward mobility as the promotable positions were almost all 
designated for rated personnel.  Furthermore, because the new missile officers were 
entering missile duty as young lieutenants, they finished their assignment in missile 




as the very best were even able to get potentially promotable staff positions, while the 
rest were placed in local jobs with little promotion potential or transferred out of the 
career field.  Since the Department of Defense uses an "up or out" promotion policy for 
retention, most of those assigned to jobs with minimal potential would eventually be 
forced to leave the service because they were not promoted.40  Even in 1971, when 625 
missileers from five bases responded to a survey on morale, "40 percent of those 
surveyed considered missile duty a 'dead-end' for career progression, while only 14 
percent viewed it as a positive career opportunity."41 
 The lack of career potential was demoralizing, but another action taken by the 
Air Force infuriated the missileers just as much.  Colonels William Brooksher and Jimmy 
Scott conducted a survey of current and former missileers, who responded that the Air 
Force practice of labeling missile personnel as support personnel in "statistical reports, 
such as promotion analyses, and other publications detract[ed] from both the prestige 
and image of the career field.  To them," exclaimed the colonels, "it is inconceivable 
that personnel charged with one-third of the Triad [the title for the three legs of U.S. 
nuclear defense: ICBMs, bombers, and submarine-launched missiles] could be 
considered or listed as 'support' personnel for any reason.  As one officer put it, 'Who 
do we support? . . . Missile operations officers are not support officers!"42 
 A mid-level officer in the study contended, "M[issileers] should receive as much 
recognition as other AF combat specialties.  That would be vastly more than they 




members] as support troops."  Another officer, a senior leader of a missile wing argued, 
". . . the missile combat crew member is generally looked upon by his non-missile 
combat crew contemporaries as the dumbest 'weinie' in the force and, as such, he is 
considered to be an inferior breed . . . ."  He explained further,   "His flight officer 
contemporary receives his flight [pay and benefits] in addition to his normal military 
pay for doing a similar job, while his non-rated, non-missile contemporary is working 
his good old eight to five job, five days a week and is not betting his career about four 
times a month."43 
 The study revealed that missileers believed they were "treated as second class 
citizens compared to rated personnel.  This applies to prestige, pay, [and] 
considerations around the base."  In one example of blatant discrimination, Lieutenant 
Hojegian remembered trying to enter the Plattsburgh AFB Officers Club in his missile 
uniform, as he had seen numerous pilots do in their flight suits.  Nevertheless, he was 
turned away, told that missileers could not enter the club in their duty uniform.44  
 The Air Force policy toward the missileer's badge and request for special pay 
also reflected this discrimination.  Even before the Air Force had become a separate 
service in 1947, Army Air Force pilots were awarded badges that represented their 
aeronautical status.45  This tradition became a symbol of pride and was transferred to 
the Air Force.  As the Air Force formed new missile units, missileers began to request 
their own badge.  On April 28, 1958, , General White ordered the service to devise a 




specifically designed to show the exact type of aeronautical rating that a flyer held 
(pilots, navigators, flight engineers, bombardiers, flight surgeons, and other aircrew 
members), the Air Force designed a single badge for everyone associated with the new 
field.  (See Figure 4.)  That same day, the Air Staff directed that "the design [was] not to 
include wings of any type . . . .  It should be no larger than the pilot wings and some 
smaller designs are requested."46 
                           





 On May 23, 1958, Air Force Regulation 35-5 was published, authorizing a missile 
badge for wear by any person "with a direct and distinctive role in the command, 
maintenance, operation, or guidance of the missile and/or its related ground 
equipment . . . [or] to a position with primary duty directly associated with guided 
missiles."  Thus, all of the personnel that oversaw, guided, developed policy for, or 
worked closely with missiles were authorized to wear the badge, including the rated 
commanders, whether they had operational experience with missiles or not.  Further, 
an airman only needed to perform duty associated with the new weapons for 3 months 
before earning the badge.  The explicit differentiation between the standards of the 
two badges frustrated the missileers, who believed they deserved a specific badge for 
their operational experience, like that of their rated peers.  This may seem a trivial 
concern, but it underscored and reflected the accumulating perception of 
discrimination against missile operations.47 
 A similar frustration developed over the Air Force's refusal to provide missileers 
with additional pay to compensate for the difficult duties.  Once more, the missileers 
compared their situation to their flying brethren and questioned why the pilots not 
only earned aviation incentive pay but also received other bonuses related to flying as 
well as promotion and other benefits.  The missileers reminded the Air Force that 
Congress had authorized responsibility pay as part of the Military Pay Act of 1958, 
designated for officers occupying positions of unusual responsibility.  Since they 




destroy significant portions of any enemy's territory, people, and infrastructure, the 
missileers believed they had earned the pay for unusual responsibility.  Colonel 
Henney, a fighter pilot who served as the Vice Wing Commander at Malmstrom, 
agreed, remarking, "In the history of warfare, in the history of the world, no junior 
officers have ever before been called on to take such responsibility." Still, the Air Force, 
while arguing strenuously to continue aviation incentive pay, never authorized any 
additional pay for missileers until 2014.48 
 In 1973, Brooksher and Scott quoted another mid-level missileer as saying, 
"most of the crew members, I believe, are crying out for recognition.  Nothing sticks in 
my throat more than 'The mission of the Air Force is to fly and fight and don't you 
forget it.'  With the missile fleet carrying the portion of the SIOP [Single Integrated 
Operations Plan -- the nuclear war plan] load that it does it would seem they are vastly 
underrated and [under]recognized."49   
 Howard Tarlton, an active navigator for seven years before he joined the missile 
career field, acknowledged that the perception was real:  "I sensed the operational 
[flying] part of the Air Force thought the ICBM mission really belonged to the Army.  
They believed that ICBMs were necessary but the strategic mission was best carried out 
by aircraft bombardment and airborne missiles."  Therefore, even though the Air Force 
had struggled bitterly with the Army to control ballistic missiles from the service's 
beginning in 1947 to the transition of the Jupiter missile to Air Force control in 1956, 




no longer threatened the service's strategic bombing mission, it chose to treat the 
exceptionally powerful weapons and those who controlled them as a secondary 
mission at best, as Secretary McNamara earlier described nuclear weapons as a whole, 
as a shield rather than the sword.50 
 Study after study tied the abject frustration of the missileers with their 
perceived neglect to poor retention rates, concerning the Air Force leadership greatly, 
but the service's leaders refused to respond in any meaningful way to the missileer's 
concerns.  The situation only grew worse as fighter pilots, who had won recognition for 
conventional warfighting in Southeast Asia, began to earn positions of leadership and 
influence.  These flyers, frustrated over years of their own neglect from Strategic Air 
Command bomber pilots, denigrated all nuclear operations, especially missileers, who 
could not show what novelist Thomas Wolfe called the "code of the right stuff: . . . 
courage, skill, coolness, and eagerness for combat."51 
 The Air Force did made incremental improvements to the Minuteman missile, as 
long as the costs did not reduce funding for flying operations. However, technologies 
designed and deployed in the late 1950s and early 1960s remained the backbone of 
missile operations for the next two decades.  In fiscal year 1963, the Air Force began 
researching an advanced ICBM.  Some concepts considered for use in the new missile 
included a "cold launch," whereby compressed gases would expel the missile from its 
silo before the missile's rockets ignited, and an improved guidance system.  Congress 




by then focused heavily on conventional fighting in Vietnam and averse to anything 
that would increase the risk of nuclear conflict, reduced actual allocations to $8 million 
and $3 million respectively.  The new technologies appeared promising, but none were 
actually used for two decades.  In 1965, the Air Force determined that the Minuteman 
missiles would need to be replaced by 1973.  Advanced development of the next 
missile did not begin until late 1973 and the missiles, known as the Peacekeeper, did 
not become operational until 1986, considerably after the time frame of this study.  
Even then, only fifty Peacekeeper missiles were ever deployed and these remained 
operational only until 2005, when the last one was deactivated under the terms of the 
Strategic Arms Reduction Talks.  Thus, the U.S. Air Force ballistic missile force in 2015 
consists of 450 Minuteman III missiles, designed and built in the early 1960s.52 
 In 1957, Brigadier General Charles McCorkle, the Air Force's Assistant Chief of 
Staff for Guided Missiles, had warned that the Air Force that "even without a great deal 
of study it becomes apparent that we cannot treat the command and control of 
missiles as though we were simply integrating additional bombers into our forces."53  
The Air Force complied with McCorkle's advice, although not in the manner he 
intended.  As long as the service feared that political leaders would take the Air Force's 
long-range strategic mission from the bombers and give it to missiles, its senior leaders 
worked vigorously to show that they were quickly and efficiently incorporating the 
mission into the service.  However, it was evident that Air Force leaders never fully 




Therefore, once McNamara and other political leaders stopped pressing the service to 
quickly incorporate and integrate missiles into operations, service leaders placed the 
bulk of their money, personnel, and emphasis back in the areas they preferred -- flying 
and mission support for flying operations.  As political and service attention became 
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7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 During the 1950s, when scientists and engineers designed and created ballistic 
nuclear missiles, they were marketed as the ultimate weapon, the future of warfare.  A 
unique confluence of several critical events, including the incorporation of the 
thermonuclear bomb into the ballistic missile, the beginning of the Cold War, and the 
creation of the U.S. Air Force and the Department of Defense, combined to provide the 
nuclear ballistic missile with seemingly unlimited potential.   
 U.S. Air Force leaders and their supporters, concerned that the ballistic missile 
would replace the strategic bomber and eliminate the need for their newly 
independent service, struggled to control the new weapon system, even though many 
of the force's pilots wanted nothing to do with it.  The differing perspectives about 
missiles led to a struggle within the Air Force between those who saw the potential of 
the new missiles and those who saw them only as a threat to manned strategic air 
operations.  Once the Air Force garnered responsibility for the new missiles, the 
service's missile proponents quickly built a substantial force, concurrently designing, 
building, deploying and manning the new weapons.  The rush to build the "bomber's 
replacement" further incited those who worried about the future of manned aircraft.  
The haste of construction also created problems with the first missiles' reliability and 
standardization, as well as generating concerns over personnel selection and training 




the Air Force built the second iteration, but some problems inherent to missile duty 
remained unresolved. 
 Although the generals recognized many innate problems with missile crew duty, 
they chose to downplay these in the hurry to put missiles into operation.  Then, 
following the Cuban Missile Crisis, when the political leaders who had sponsored the 
build-up of nuclear missiles determined that the United States should move away from 
a nuclear buildup and became enmeshed in the Vietnam conflict, the service replaced 
their operationally savvy missileers with inexperienced second lieutenants.  Focused on 
the requirements to support the conflict in Vietnam, Air Force leaders and the rated 
officers in command of the new missile wings continued to ignore the festering 
concerns of the new missileers.  These decisions resulted in substandard missiles being 
quickly fielded and replaced at a cost of billions.  They also contributed to long-lasting 
consequences of perpetuating a single-mission focused Air Force that subsumed 
politically supported missions to protect the dominance of manned flight.  Moreover, 
the decisions produced a dysfunctional missile community that struggled with low 
morale, little sense of mission, and operationally inexperienced leadership. 
 When Congress established the Air Force in 1947, the new service prioritized a 
single primary mission -- strategic bombing -- rather than several cohesive and 
cooperative roles for air power, such as supporting ground troops, transporting critical 
supplies, or even ensuring control of the airspace.  By 1942, even before the Air Force 




primary school for military aviation, "began to graft the concept of the primacy of the 
bomber onto the concept of air warfare and strategic air operations."  The struggle to 
become a separate service from the Army made Air Force pilots even more convinced 
that they must control strategic bombing.  They proclaimed that the Army could not 
understand nor control the strategic air mission, wanting to disperse Air Force aircraft 
to support the ground battle rather than allowing a united force to strategically destroy 
the enemy's industrial base and demoralize its population.  In fact, during World War II, 
General Carl "Tooey" Spaatz, who would become the first Chief of Staff of the Air Force, 
refused to provide heavy bombers to support British Army General Bernard 
Montgomery in the battle for Caen, France because "if he helped the Army, the U.S. Air 
Force would never become independent of them."1 
 The invention of nuclear bombs only heightened the primacy of the bombing 
mission, especially since the Air Force's heavy bombers were the only effective delivery 
system for atomic weapons during the first decade after the atomic bomb was created.  
Although, as historian Andrew Erdmann contends, President Dwight D. Eisenhower did 
not want to use the "horrible" weapon, "he grimly accepted nuclear weapons as an 
inescapable and significant element in post-war defense planning."  Apprehensive that 
establishing a large defense structure would damage the U.S. free market economy and 
turn the nation into a garrison state, Eisenhower decided to build his defense structure 
around the nuclear bomb and the Air Force's strategic bombers.  Therefore, by the end 




security policy.  It received almost half of the nation's defense budget and held the key 
to national defense policy -- the nuclear bomb.2   
 The creation of the nuclear-capable ballistic missile threatened this domination.  
The ballistic missile was believed to be an almost unstoppable weapon that could carry 
a nuclear bomb anywhere in the world in minutes.  The aggressive competition that 
festered between the United States and the Soviet Union in the 1950s caused U.S. 
national leaders to believe that America had to build and deploy this new weapon 
before the Soviet Union could do so.  Otherwise, some politicians alleged, the Soviets 
would use the weapon to destroy the United States.3 
 The Soviet launch of the satellite Sputnik in 1957 created social repercussions in 
the United States like those following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, greatly 
increasing this impetus to build missiles.  Politicians from both major political parties 
scrambled to show their concern for national defense, with Senator Lyndon B. Johnson 
(D-TX) exclaiming, "the country is in grave danger -- a danger that will last for many 
years to come."4   The Soviets had been advancing their atomic capabilities faster than 
the United States, testing their atomic bomb four years after the Americans but 
exploding a hydrogen bomb less than a year following that of the United States.  
Therefore, many U.S. leaders overestimated the impact of the Sputnik launch.  Backed 
by their constituents, key Congressmen demanded that the military services respond to 
this crisis and quickly build a nuclear capable ballistic missile.  Both Democrats and 




competed to gain control of this new weapon, along with its funding and status.  
Although Eisenhower tried to quell the fear, John F. Kennedy was elected as president, 
in part, on fears that Eisenhower's administration had not done enough to protect the 
nation from a purported "missile gap."5 
 Of the U.S. military services, the Air Force worried most about garnering control 
of this new military capability.  Due to its speed and ability to deliver an atomic weapon 
into the enemy heartland, the missile directly threatened the Air Force's primary 
mission, less than ten years after the service's establishment.6  Bob Glaves, a reporter 
for the Dallas Morning News, declared in 1957, "The Sputnik is linked directly to space 
flight, and when you speak of space flight you speak of the missile.  And when you 
control space, you control the land beneath it." He then proclaimed, "Everything else, 
in a military sense, is rudimentary and embryonic.  By the very existence of Sputnik, the 
jet plane, a valuable deterrent to aggression since World War II, suddenly is obsolete.  
The interceptor, the fighter, the bomber . . . are doomed.  As dictated by this satellite, 
the United States is going for missiles.  It is build such a force or be destroyed."7   
 Reporters were not the only ones predicting the demise of the Air Force's 
strategic bombers.  Eisenhower, arguably one of the most prestigious military figures of 
his time and, certainly, as President, the most powerful, believed that missiles should 
replace bombers in the foreseeable future.8  Many key leaders and other influential 
analysts held the same view, believing that missiles should be the principal military 




president's key advisors espoused the same viewpoint.  For example, Secretary of 
Defense Robert McNamara proclaimed on December 11, 1961, "The introduction of 
ballistic missiles is already exerting a major impact on the size, composition, and 
deployment of the manned bomber force, and this impact will become greater in the 
years ahead.  As the number of . . . ballistic missiles increases, requirements for 
strategic aircraft will be gradually reduced."10 
 The Air Force first responded to these predictions by downplaying the capability 
of the ballistic missile.  Later, as it became apparent that the missile was going to play a 
significant role in U.S. military capabilities, the Air Force attempted to tie the missile to 
strategic airpower and bombing.  The Air Force, under pressure from Assistant 
Secretary of the Air Force Trevor Gardner and other political leaders and motivated by 
interservice and corporate rivalries, quickly built three major missile systems, two 
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and an intermediate range ballistic missile 
(IRBM).  At the same time, the Army created an IRBM of their own.  General Thomas 
Power, the Commander in Chief of Strategic Air Command, declared the Atlas missile 
operational after a single successful long range launch, but this haste to deploy created 
severe problems, both for the missiles and those who would control and use them.11 
 The hurried construction and duplicative efforts in building the missiles cost the 
nation billions of dollars.  The three variants of the Atlas missile cost over $31.59 billion 
dollars, with the "backup" Titan I system adding another $20.32 billion to the bill.  The 




billion more. Yet, the missiles were part of the U.S. defense structure for less than eight 
years, from the date the first Atlas was declared on alert to the time the last liquid 
fueled missile was retired.  Since the first solid-fuel Minuteman and Polaris missiles 
were operational by 1962, the same year that many of the liquid-fueled missiles were 
completed, the older missiles became an extremely expensive short-term solution.12 
 Part of the problem was the political difficulty of selecting just one missile.  
Foreign policy expert Michael Armacost quotes an unnamed Assistant Secretary for 
Defense grousing in 1958 that, "if the Defense Department suggested canceling the Air 
Force's Thor program, a Congressional delegation from California would be down our 
necks.  And elimination of the Army's Jupiter program would have half the Alabama 
delegation plus a couple of representatives from the Detroit area fighting us."  A 
second major reason for the extreme cost of missiles was the decision to complete 
missiles as soon as possible.13 
 The hurried and concurrent development created cost overruns.  It also 
prevented the contractors and their overseers from adequately testing the new 
missiles, creating concerns with reliability, and leading to several variants of the same 
missile.  The missile variants, in turn, generated a requirement for multiple training 
programs and prevented the Air Force from establishing uniform standards.  Since the 
IRBMs were built without coordinating with the U.S. allies who would be required to 
host the new missiles, the urgency to complete the missiles and deploy them also led to 




the missiles was extremely volatile, Department of Defense leaders determined as early 
as December 1960 that the Atlas and Titan I were too dangerous and costly to operate 
and maintain, replacing them with the Minuteman, Titan II, and Polaris.14 
 As long as national political and social pressure continued to promote missiles, 
Air Force leaders strove to publicly assimilate the new weapon into the Air Force, no 
matter what their personal attitudes towards the weapons were.  Service leaders 
created missile squadrons and placed them into operation.  They also assigned pilots 
temporarily into the missile squadrons to conduct the modified strategic air operation  
-- and to ensure that the new missileers adopted the strategic air mindset and cultural 
traditions.  Soon the Air Force had a strong and viable missile force that grew to be as 
potent as the manned bomber force.15     
 Nonetheless, service leaders and their Congressional allies argued that the 
nation should not move too quickly to sole reliance on missiles and contended that 
bombers offered greater flexibility than missiles:  "they [bombers] could seek out 
targets, . . . bring back reconnaissance reports, . . . be recalled, and so forth."  Even 
General Thomas White, the Air Force Chief of Staff, after remarking that the ICBM had 
"the potential of becoming one of the most formidable weapons of all time," said he 
believed the new weapons must be balanced by manned aircraft because missiles could 
not meet every combat and support requirement effectively.16 
 In addition, single-minded bomber supporters like General Curtis LeMay 




missiles or to place them on par with strategic bombing.  Bomber pilots had influence 
far beyond their numbers, holding 59 percent of the four star general positions in the 
Air Force in the early 1960s.17 
 While they professed publicly to wanting to incorporate missiles into a blended 
aerospace mission, these bomber men quietly continued to treat missiles as a capability 
that should only be accorded secondary importance.  Key members of LeMay's 
leadership team admitted that they backed up missile targets with bombers because 
they did not trust the missiles to accurately destroy the target.  Further diminishing the 
status of missile forces, the bomber commanders declined to award missileers with an 
aeronautical rating and required any rated flyers who served as missileers to maintain 
their flight status by flying a prescribed number of hours while serving in missiles, as if 
they were serving in a support position.  Moreover, when the Air Force created 
statistical records, missileers were placed with the support personnel rather than with 
the "operational" pilots.18  Finally, neither Air Force leaders nor SAC leaders prioritized 
resolving the pervasive problems unique to missile crew duty:  isolation; sterile, 
monotonous, and tedious work; an inability to see the results of one's labor; and the 
stressful, exacting standards that held no benefit to the crewmember or the mission.19 
 The bomber pilots who controlled the Air Force claimed that missiles would be 
fully accepted once they were proven, but contended that the only acceptable proving 
ground was combat.  Scientists and engineers had tested and validated both key parts 




actual launches, but skeptics claimed that "our only knowledge of the actual workability 
of an ICBM fired in anger is in textbooks and laboratories."20  As late as 1971, long after 
missiles had become a part of the nuclear triad, LeMay asserted, "The airplane has 
been tested in battle; the missile is an unknown quantity.  We don't know exactly how 
reliable they are or what they can do."  General Bernard Schriever, while at the 
Western Development Division, had considered expanding ballistic missiles into a non-
nuclear mission.  This would have provided the ballistic missile an opportunity to prove 
itself in combat and increased its value to the service and to the nation, but the Air 
Force does not appear to have ever seriously considered the concept.  Frankly, LeMay's 
problem with missiles was not their lack of reliability.  In a 1965 interview with Colonel 
Bill Peck, another SAC pilot, LeMay acknowledged that "I certainly don't foresee the 
time where we can build a sense of loyalty or judgment into missiles and mechanical 
gadgets that you have in man."21 
  Billy Mitchell had declared, "It is probable that future wars will be conducted by 
a special class, the air force, as it was by the armored knights in the Middle Ages . . . . 
[In this future,] the whole population will not have to be called out in the event of a 
national emergency, but only enough of it to man the machines that are the most 
potent in national defense."  Although missileers now controlled the most potent 
machines for national defense, Colonel Melvin Deaile, a former SAC bomber pilot, 




Pilots could not understand the chivalry of missiles passing each other in flight," so the 
pilots did not accept them as a part of their special class of warriors.22 
 Following the Cuban Missile Crisis, as the Kennedy administration dropped its 
vocal advocacy for missiles, the disconnect between the Air Force leaders and the 
missileers grew more disconcerting.  The Department of Defense replaced the 
dangerous and unreliable Atlas and Titan I missiles with Minuteman missiles.  While this 
improved the strategic capability of missiles, it added to the difficulties of missile duty 
because it reduced the crew's ability to interact with the system while expanding their 
responsibilities.  The Air Force, led by LeMay after June 8, 1961, replaced the veterans 
in the missile units with young second lieutenants who did not have their predecessor's 
broader understanding of the Air Force.23  At the same time, the service leaders failed 
to ensure that squadron and wing leadership were experienced missileers, who would 
have understood the trials and tribulations of missile crew duty and could have offered 
the opportunity of upward mobility to the crewmembers.24   
   The Air Force's leadership learned an important, though possibly detrimental 
lesson, from their experience with nuclear missiles.  During its formative years, the 
early years of the Cold War, the Air Force focused almost solely on the strategic nuclear 
air assignment.  Pilots who flew fighters and other aircraft struggled unsuccessfully to 
expand this single-minded focus.25  Then, discerning and farsighted leaders like Henry 
"Hap" Arnold, Thomas White, and Bernard Schriever -- generals who all spent the 




service's focus by expanding into missiles, a mission they perceived as critical to the 
future of the service as well as U.S. defense capabilities.  With the political support and 
oversight of men like Assistant Secretary Trevor Gardner, Senator Henry Jackson (D-
WA), and Senator Clinton Anderson (D-NM), the Air Force moved quickly and forcefully 
into the new enterprise.  The Air Force desperately fended off efforts by the other 
services to share or take the assignment, but it never lost its resolute focus on strategic 
air.  Therefore, when the Air Force leaders saw the opportunity to reduce their 
attention on missiles and return the service's primary focus to strategic air operations, 
they believed that they had defeated the Department of Defense's attempt to expand 
the service's mission in any meaningful way.26 
 The next contest was not long in coming.  As the national focus changed from 
nuclear preparation to the conflict in Vietnam, Air Force leaders attempted to use the 
same methodology to defeat what they perceived as the new threat to strategic air.  
Within three months of his promotion to Chief of Staff, LeMay had replaced all of the 
fighter generals in senior leadership positions in the U. S. Air Forces in Europe and in 
Tactical Air Command with bomber pilots.  By October 1, the majority of the air staff 
leadership and all major operational commanders were LeMay's bomber protégés.  To 
meet the increasing need for pilots to support the ongoing conflict, SAC pilots were 





 This time the results differed from the missile experiment.  As pilots flying 
missions over Vietnam gained combat experience, the pilots most capable at flying 
fighters earned respect, medals, and promotions based on their combat exploits, just as 
the bomber pilots of World War II had, while those who perceived themselves as 
bomber pilots returned to nuclear alert.  Thus, the fighter pilots began to move into key 
leadership positions after LeMay retired, positioning themselves to take over the Air 
Force in the decades to come.  Although the victors were different, the lesson learned 
was the same.  The fighter pilots retained the singular focus on a particular undertaking 
-- this time, fighter operations, and the Air Force established a trend of focusing on a 
single primary mission rather than several cohesive and cooperative assignments.    
Charles Gabriel, a fighter pilot became Chief of Staff of the Air Force in 1982.  A decade 
later, all nuclear forces were transferred to the newly created Air Combat Command, 
run by fighter pilots, and SAC was disestablished.  By 2001, even though fighter pilots 
constituted only 5.3 percent of the Air Force, they occupied two-thirds of the Air 
Force's four-star general positions and commanded 63 percent of the service's major 
commands.28 
 The impact to the long term health of the Air Force was the same as when the 
bomber pilots had controlled the service.  The senior leaders of America's newest 
military service continued to focus on a single mission to the detriment of all other 
capabilities.  Early theories in aviation created a reflexive drive to have a man in a 




airspace.  When a new and politically supported defense commitment appeared to 
threaten the Air Force flying mission, the Air Force took immediate action to 
incorporate the capability into the service.  Once the Air Force leaders effectively 
gained control of the new capability, they tied it closely to manned flight and then, as 
political oversight wanes, assimilated it as a subsidiary of the flying mission.  Other Air 
Force aviators have seen the trend as well and have speculated on when and if a new 
breed of flyers will take the helm of the Air Force.29 
 A second example of this mindset is the remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) or 
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) program.  According to Rebecca Grant, the Director of 
the General Billy Mitchell Institute for Airpower Studies, Secretary of Defense Robert 
Gates complained that "in 1992," while he was the director of the CIA, "the Air Force 
would not co-fund with CIA a vehicle without a pilot."30 
 Nevertheless, as had occurred with missiles, interservice rivalry created Air 
Force interest.  The Office of the Secretary of Defense created the Predator UAV, then 
offered both the Air Force and Navy the opportunity to operate the new capability in 
Bosnia in 1995.  Both services refused, so an Army military intelligence battalion flew 
operations over the Balkans.  "Suddenly, the Air Force made an all-out bid to be the 
'lead service' for Predator,"  Ehrhard declared, " [because] combat operations over 
Bosnia had caused a stir and had crystallized Congressional support.  Air Force Chief of 
Staff [Ronald] Fogelman could see that due to its success in Bosnia, Predator was going 




successfully garnered control of the newly revealed weapon system, with the Army 
Chief of Staff ceding the mission after Air Force assurances that they would respond 
effectively to Army requirements.  On April 9, 1996, the Secretary of Defense approved 
the Air Force as the lead service for UAV operations and, less than six months later, on 
September 2, 1996, the Air Force took control of Predator operations over Bosnia with 
experienced pilots who were transferred to the 11th Reconnaissance Squadron.32 
 By June 2011, Congressional and defense leaders had to remind the Air Force to 
take care of their new mission as it was still critical to ongoing defense operations.  
Promotion rates to major for the pilots who flew the service's remotely piloted aircraft 
had fallen from 96 percent to 78 percent, well below that of other airmen.  Secretary 
Gates "directed the Air Force to 'increase opportunities for highly skilled members of 
the UAS [unmanned aircraft systems] military community to reach senior leadership 
positions,' emphasizing that 'General Officers originating from this community are 
critical to our institutional goals."33 
 By 2015, the Air Force had not effectively addressed Gates' requests.  Struggling 
to retain its qualified RPA pilots, the Air Force loses about 240 or 25 percent each year.  
The Air Force acknowledged that the low retention numbers add incredible stress to 
the lives of the RPA pilots, who are required to serve on average 14 hour days, 6 days a 
week, but the pilots expressed another concern as well -- the humiliation of being 
scorned by other Air Force pilots who view them as second-class citizens.  Brandon 




else thinks that the whole program or the people behind it are a joke, that we are 
video-game warriors, that we’re Nintendo warriors. And that’s—that’s really not the 
case. And these—the people that do the job are just as legit and just as combat-
oriented as anyone else."34 
 The RPA pilots are not alone in their frustration.  The missileers did not escape 
their experience of entering the Air Force unscathed either.  While the pilots who ran 
the Air Force demanded that an experienced pilot lead other pilots and looked upon 
extensive flying experience as a badge of honor, they chose not to apply a similar 
standard to missile units.  At first, there were no Air Force leaders with missile 
experience to place into these leadership positions, but even after the first mid-level 
officers finished their missile crew experience, the Air Force chose to continue placing 
rated pilots in the key leadership positions.  Therefore, missileers took a very different 
lesson from their experience in Strategic Air Command.  Rather than valuing 
operational experience controlling the missiles, the commanders of missile units began 
to behave as if those who served in the missile field were less capable than those who 
did not.  Although the practice changed in 2014, for years the leaders of missile units 
selected their instructors and evaluators from very inexperienced crew members.  
These personnel spent very little time monitoring the missiles, but were then promoted 
into leadership positions while those who had remained in operational positions were 




 The devaluation of experience actually operating the missiles meant that 
missileers had to be differentiated in some other way.  The differentiator became 
monthly test scores.  Lieutenant General James Holmes revealed in a "Report of 
Commander-Directed Investigation" that "all MCCMs [missile combat crew members] 
receive periodic training to maintain the operational readiness required to perform 
their alert missions.  This training consists of classroom and simulator instruction and is 
given on a monthly basis.  Every month, a missileer must attend recurring classroom 
training in weapon system . . ., codes handling . . .,  and E[mergency] W[ar] O[rder 
operations].   Additionally, every month a missileer must take and pass a 20-30 
question knowledge test in each of those three subject--with a minimum passing score 
of 90 percent on each test."36  
 However, these tests had become the single differentiator between success and 
failure, Holmes' investigation revealed that "leaders placed too much emphasis on 
monthly test scores.  Although the required passing score is 90 percent, crewmembers 
felt pressured to score 100 percent on each and every test.  Leaders lost sight of the 
fact that execution in the field is more important than what happens in the 
classroom."37   
 In 2014, Secretary of the Air Force Deborah Lee James expressed alarm over this 
poor leadership, stating, "The drive to always score a hundred percent on exams when 
90 percent was the standard, and the use of these scores in some cases as the sole 




so she changed the standard.38  Nevertheless, this standard had applied to missileers all 
the way back to at least 1964, when Colonel Max Henney, Vice Commander of the 
341st Strategic Missile Wing, reported to an Esquire writer, "The combat crew lives in 
an artificial environment -- strict, tight, closely controlled.  They face rigorous 
examinations regularly on which they have to make perfect scores."39 
 Other frustrations expressed by missileers in 2014 reflected similar ones 
revealed by missileers from the 1950s and 1960s.  Author Jeffrey Smith, in a 2014 
article, wrote that the missileers' "day-to-day enemy, for decades, has not so much 
been another superpower, but the unremitting boredom of an isolated posting that 
demands extreme vigilance, while also requiring virtually no activity. . . . paired with the 
military's sky-high expectations for their workplace performance."40   This complaint 
resembled those addressed by numerous missileers, including Pierce Smith, who 
described missile crew duty in 1965 as "long, monotonous hours in an isolated 
environment, a high degree of tension and stress, and (in the Minuteman system) 
greatly simplified tasks to perform."41 
 Finally, missileers, like the RPA pilots, reached the conclusion that the Air Force 
designated them as second class citizens.42  Complaints heard after 2010 sounded 
strongly like those expressed by crew members from earlier decades.  After news 
reports surfaced revealing problems in the missile career field, Charlie Simpson 




were missileers felt we were the 'second class' part of the Air Force," especially when 
all of the leaders wore wings.43  After fighter pilots disestablished Strategic Air 
Command in 1992 and then replaced it with the less influential Global Strike Command 
in August 2009, missileers expressed uneasiness that the top Air Force reduced the top 
nuclear commander from a four star general to a three star, a significant reduction.  In 
2014, Secretary James upgraded the position to four-stars, like the other major 
operational commanders.  The person that she sent to fill the position was not a 
missileer though--he was a fighter pilot.  James dismissed the concern, emphasizing, "I 
think he is just the ticket. . . .  It would have been great if he also had the nuclear 
experience, but in this case we didn't have somebody immediately in the wings who 
was ready to take that on at that level, who had the experience."44  Thus, nearly sixty 
years after General Thomas Power declared the first Atlas missile operational, pilots 
remained in command of missiles, confirming William Brooksher and Jimmy Scott's 
findings from 1973 that "as long as the operations command structure combines both 
missiles and rated organizations the demand for missile general officers will continue to 
be negligible."45 
 In 1957, as the first ballistic nuclear missile sat on alert, many Americans 
thought its potential, and that of the men who would control it, were limitless.  Less 
than ten years later, the nation had returned to non-nuclear, limited war and the 
missileers were relegated to secondary status in their own service.  In part, this drastic 




early Cold War, when many Americans believed that a nuclear war was not only likely, 
but preferable to domination by the communist Soviet Union.  That the missiles' 
development also occurred as the newly established Air Force was at the height of its 
power ensured that the Air Force would struggle strenuously to take on the new 
capability, if for nothing else than to ensure that the missile did not replace the 
strategic bomber.  Finally, the Kennedy administration's decision to return emphasis to 
conventional conflicts and to shift away from the ballistic missile allowed the Air Force 
leadership to push the missiles and their missileers into relative obscurity.  Problems 
with missile duty that were recognized in the late 1950s were left to fester into the 
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